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Abstract
Among various means of energy harvesting (EH) for green communications,
radio-frequency (RF)-enabled wireless energy harvesting (WEH), inter alia,
has recently drawn significant interest for its long operational distance and
effective energy multicasting; it thus motivates the paradigm of wireless powered
communication network (WPCN). Nevertheless, besides benefitting from the
broadcast nature of wireless channels, WPCN is also vulnerable in terms of
confidentiality and privacy of the data transmission, since legitimate information may
be eavesdropped by unauthorized parties. To resolve this issue, physical-layer security
(PLS) has been proposed as a promising solution to achieve information-theoretic
security. This thesis is devoted to addressing some major challenges encountered
in enhancing PLS for WPCN while exploiting opportunities gained from WPCN
by pragmatic and prominent transmitting and/or cooperative strategies along with
corresponding optimal (suboptimal) resource allocations.
This thesis begins with considering a three node single-input-single-output
(SISO) fading wiretap channel, where the confidential messages sent to the
information receivers (IRs) may be eavesdropped by the energy receivers (ERs) that
are usually deployed nearer to the transmitter because of their high power receiving
sensitivity. In this case, an artificial noise (AN)-aided transmission scheme, where
the transmit power is split into two parts, to send the confidential message to the
IR and an AN to interfere with the ER respectively, is proposed to facilitate the
secrecy information transmission and yet meet the EH requirement. The fundamental
challenges in balancing the goals between achieving PLS and satisfying ER’s EH
requirement are modeled by various secrecy performances versus harvested energy
iv
Abstract
trade-offs, the regions of which are enlarged by both dual decomposition-based
optimal solutions and alternating optimization-based suboptimal solutions.
On the other hand, under circumstances where some ERs are trustful, their
self-sustaining features can also be favourable to providing PLS by means of
cooperative jamming (CJ). In the second part of the thesis, a novel harvest-and-jam
(HJ) relaying protocol is proposed for multiple multi-antenna ERs to assist in
the secrecy information transmission via one multi-antenna amplify-and-forward
(AF) relay. Joint optimization of the CJ covariance and AF-relay beamforming is
studied using semidefinite relaxation (SDR) under perfect and imperfect channel
state information (CSI) respectively. In particular, for the imperfect CSI case, a
novel approach that jointly models channel imperfections induced by an arbitrary
number of CJ helpers is proposed to equivalently reformulate the worst-case robust
optimization problem into the convex optimization framework.
Following the trend of WEH-enabled cooperative secrecy transmission, a more
general wiretap channel with multiple WEH-enabled AF relays in the presence of
multiple eavesdroppers all equipped with single antenna is studied in the last part of
the thesis. To the end of combing the benefit of CJ and cooperative beamforming
(CB), a new hybrid power splitting (PS) relaying strategy is proposed. In the first
transmission phase each AF relay employs a PS receiver that splits a fraction of
the received power for EH and consumes the rest for information receiving. In the
second transmission phase the relay further divides its harvested power to forward the
confidential information and to generate the jamming signals. The formulated secrecy
rate maximization problems turn out to be very challenging due to the multiplicative
variables in the relay weights. Under the centralized scheme, the global optimum
joint CB and CJ solution is obtained for the static power splitting (SPS) case, while
for the generalized dynamic power splitting (DPS) case, the global optimum CB-only
solution is provided by utilizing SDR, which is then developed into a suboptimal joint
CB and CJ design based on alternating optimization.
v
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With the increasing demand for numerous amount of data traffic in wireless
communication networks vis-a-vis the fact that mobile devices are usually constrained
by their limited battery life and it is often costly to replace or recharge their
batteries, energy harvesting (EH) has become attractive for realizing perpetual
communications. Recently, radio-frequency (RF)-based wireless energy harvesting
(WEH), which circumvents costly infrastructure and intermittence of the conventional
means of EH, has therefore drawn an upsurge of interests owing to the development
of RF-enabled circuits (see [3, 4] and the reference therein). With the transmit power,
waveforms, and dimensions of resources etc., all being fully controllable, WEH-based
technologies not only allow the wireless devices in low-power applications to scavenge
energy from RF-signals that ubiquitously exist in wireless networks, but also enable
“Shannon meets Tesla” [5], i.e., simultaneous wireless information and power transfer
(SWIPT) over the same band of frequency, and therefore paves a new paradigm for
truly self-sustaining next generation communications.
The advent of wireless networks, on the other hand, by permitting pervasive
access to the on-line resources in its tremendous applications such as e-commerce,
e-transaction, and cloud computing etc., has played a pivotal role in defining
“the age of information”. In comparison with WEH that essentially benefits
from the broadcast nature of RF signals, wireless communications is nevertheless
very susceptible to this intrinsic nature of wireless channels, since sensitive and
confidential information, e.g., financial data, medical records, and customer files
etc., is now easily exposed to unauthorised interception. Therefore, providing
1
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privacy and integrity of data transmission has become indispensable in designing
large-scale and heterogeneous wireless networks. In light of this, physical-layer
security (PLS) has recently been proposed as a prominent solution to achieve wireless
information-theoretic security [6], i.e., perfect secrecy, which is known to be a much
stronger notion than computational security that is implemented by cryptography
in upper layers. The key idea of PLS is to leverage the physical channel-induced
randomness and impairments, such as channel fading and noise, to achieve both
secure and reliable transmission for legitimate parties.
To accommodate the emerging wireless powered communication network
(WPCN), PLS needs to be carefully reexamined to take these two underlying “double
sides of a coin” into account. This thesis is thus devoted to investigating some of
the fundamental challenges in achieving PLS goals for WEH-enabled networks while
fully exploiting opportunities brought by WPCN to enhance PLS. This chapter begins
with the discussion on motivation of the thesis in typical application scenarios and
then highlights the major contributions followed by the outline of the thesis.
1.1 Motivation
In WPCN, energy receivers (ERs) that are interested in harvesting energy from
ambient RF signals are usually deployed in more proximity to the access point (AP)
than information receivers (IRs) that intend to decode information, to meet their
different receiving power sensitivity (−10dBm for ERs versus −60dBm for IRs).
As such, albeit being able to facilitate SWIPT, WPCN gives rise to a potential
threat to information-theoretic security: what if the ERs attempt to eavesdrop the
information destined to IRs rather than harvest energy as presumed to? On the other
hand, PLS issues in the emerging cooperative communications, such as heterogeneous
networks, device-to-device systems, and relaying networks etc., have been widely
studied over the recent years by exploiting cooperative secure transmission schemes,
particularly, cooperative jamming (CJ) [7, 8], which exploits friendly jamming to
degrade eavesdropper’s decoding ability. However, the benefits of CJ would be
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quite compromised if the potential helpers are unwilling to cooperate due to their
own limited battery capacity. In this regard, WPCN that makes self-sustainable
communication possible also provides opportunities to circumvent this ultimate








Figure 1.1: A SWIPT system with separate IRs and ERs deployed “far” and “near”
to the AP, respectively.
A typical SWIPT system with separate IRs and ERs is shown in Fig. 1.1, where
a hybrid AP with constant power supply broadcasts RF signals to a set of distributed
user terminals scheduled in a “near-far” fashion aforementioned. In view of secrecy
information transmission to the IRs, it is easy to identify two conflicting goals in the
transmission design: the power of the information signal at the energy receiver (ER)
is desired to be made large for efficient EH, but also needs to be kept sufficiently
small to prevent information leakage. To resolve this conflict, transmit power has
to be split in part for artificial noise (AN) to interfere with the ER. It is worthy of
noting that, although soliciting for AN in secret communications has been extensively
studied in the literature, the AN design in SWIPT is fundamentally different since it
also contributes to the total power harvested at the ER, which is otherwise beneficial











Figure 1.2: A cooperative SWIPT system with CJ-aided multi-AF relaying.
Unlike the above situation where the ERs in the SWIPT systems attempt to
intercept the confidential information for the IR, it is possible that some of the
WEH-enabled ERs are actually cooperative. For example, following the recent
advances in WPCN, in addition to conventional cooperative schemes, such as
amplify-and-forward (AF) and decode-and-forward (DF), helpful ERs relieved of
energy-constrained concerns in a cooperative SWIPT network can now work as
self-sustaining friendly jammers who protect the forwarded confidential information
against eavesdropping in the second transmission phase using its harvested energy
from the first transmission phase as depicted in Fig. 1.2.
First, considering the case where the friendly ERs and the
information-forwarding relay are separately located, an immediate challenge
vis-a-vis the scenario shown in Fig. 1.1 is that the eavesdroppers now incline to
conceal from the transmitter (Tx), since they do not need to assist the Tx in
estimating their channels for efficient WEH. Consequently, robust transmission
design is motivated so as to combat the imperfect channel state information (CSI)
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regarding the eavesdroppers. Furthermore, it is worth noting that most of the well
studied CJ-aided cooperative schemes in the literature cannot be directly applied
to this case of interest, since the power allocations in WPCN is more challenging
than that with constant power supply in the sense that presently the design of AN
is also subject to their respective EH channels. Second, considering a more general
case where the friendly ERs and the information-forwarding relays are co-located,
i.e., the available power at each relay is split into two parts: one for forwarding the
confidential message and the other for CJ, the secrecy performance with the aid of
WEH-enabled relays is expected to considerably outperform the CJ and cooperative
beamforming (CB) separately designed ones, thanks to the vast degree-of-freedom
(d.o.f) brought about by relays. However, due to the practical circuit limit that the
RF signals cannot be decoded during its energy being harvested, dynamic power
splitting (DPS) that is known to be the best possible receiver architecture for SWIPT
so far [9], has to be employed at the relays, which poses intractable non-convexity
to the joint optimization of CB and CJ due to the multiplicative relay weights. As a
result, current state-of-art secrecy rate maximization (SRM) algorithms that jointly
optimize the power splitting (PS) ratios and relay beamforming in the literature
only converge to local optimum solutions.
1.2 Contributions of the Thesis
The major contributions of this thesis are summarized as follows.
Considering a simplified three-node single-input single-output (SISO) fading
wiretap channel, an AN aided transmission scheme is proposed in Chapter 3
to facilitate the secrecy information transmission to IRs and yet meet the EH
requirement for ERs. Problems are formulated to minimize the outage probability
for the IR for delay-limited secrecy transmission, or to maximize the ergodic secrecy
capacity (ESC) for the IR for no-delay-limited secrecy transmission, subject to
combined average and peak power constraints at the Tx as well as an average EH
constraint at the ER. The formulated problems, however, are shown to be both
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non-convex. For each of the two problems, a dual decomposition based method is
first proposed to solve it optimally and then an efficient suboptimal algorithm is
designed by iteratively optimizing the transmit power allocations and power splitting
ratios over different fading states. Finally, the proposed schemes are evaluated by
various trade-offs for wireless (secrecy) information transfer versus wireless power
transfer (WPT).
In a multi-antenna AF relay wiretap channel in the presence of Alice, Bob and
Eve all equipped with single-antenna, an innovative multi-antenna harvest-and-jam
(HJ) relaying protocol is proposed in Chapter 4. The contributions of this chapter
are threefold. First, with perfect CSI, in addition to the joint optimal solutions,
two near-optimal schemes with much reduced complexity are proposed. One of the
schemes exploits the optimal structure of the relay weight matrix, which is a novel
extension of a similar relay beamforming matrix optimal to the two-way relay channel
[10], while for the other null-space jamming, a semi-closed form solution for the relay
weight matrix is provided. Second, besides the imperfect eavesdroppers channel,
legitimate channels such as those from the HJ helpers to the legitimate receiver (Rx)
and from the AF relay to the Rx are jointly modeled with imperfect CSI, and multiple
semi-indefinite non-convex constraints induced have been, for the first time to the best
knowledge of the author, equivalently replaced by linear matrix inequalities (LMIs)
in order to fit in with the convex optimization. Third, a rank-one reconstruction
algorithm to enable transmit beamforming has been proposed to provide promising
performance by exploiting the structure of the semi-definite relaxation (SDR)-based
solutions.
A CJ-aided wiretap channel with multiple WEH-enabled AF-operated relays in
the presence of multiple single-antenna eavesdroppers is studied in Chapter 5. The
achievable secrecy rates are maximized subject to individual EH power constraints of
relays by jointly optimizing the CB and CJ covariance matrices using the technique
of SDR. In the centralized case with global CSI, optimal AF relay beamforming is
provided in closed-forms, respectively, for static power splitting (SPS)-enabled AF
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relays performing joint optimization of CB and CJ, and DPS-enabled AF relays
performing only CB. The optimal solutions are derived based on rigourous proof for
the tightness of SDR. In particular, the global optimum AF relay beam along with
its DPS ratios without (w/o) the use of CJ has been derived for the first time as far
as the authors know, which thus gives a tight upper-bound for wireless-powered CB
design in a wide range of SWIPT-enabled applications. For joint optimization of CB
and CJ with DPS-enabled AF relays, a viable suboptimal algorithm that iteratively
obtains the optimal AN beams, relay beams as well the power splitting ratios is
proposed based on alternating optimization.
1.3 Outline of the Thesis
The thesis is organized as follows. Some basic concepts of information-theoretic
security are introduced in Chapter 2, followed by an overview of the state-of-art
signal processing techniques achieving wireless PLS in a variety of wiretap channels,
and the recent advances in enhancing PLS for WPCN are summarized. The main
contributions are presented in Chapters 3-5. Specifically, in Chapter 3, the potential
security issues induced by SWIPT in a three-node SISO fading wiretap channel are
discussed and the compromise of information-theoretic security on the system EH
requirements is characterized by various trade-offs, such as (secrecy) outage-energy
(O-E) trade-off and (secrecy) rate-energy (R-E) trade-off. Chapters 4 and 5, on
another front, focus on opportunities gained by WPCN for PLS designs. In Chapter 4,
(worst-case robust) SRM problems are considered for a cooperative SWIPT network
in the presence of one eavesdropper by exploiting wireless powered CJ, and the
AN covariances and AF beamforming are jointly optimized under the perfect and
imperfect CSI, respectively, while in Chapter 5, the above model is generalized
to a more sophisticated case with multi-AF relays in the presence of multiple
eavesdroppers by investigating both wireless powered CJ and CB, and dedicated
hybrid PS receiver at each relay is employed. Finally the thesis is concluded and




In this chapter, a unified literature review on the related work is presented.
In Section 2.1, fundamentals of information-theoretic secrecy are briefly introduced,
which provide the fundamental limits of various PLS enhancements schemes. It
is followed by Section 2.2, where an overview of the state-of-art signal processing
techniques applied in a variety of wiretap channels is given. Finally, the latest progress
in secrecy communications with the upsurge of SWIPT technologies is summarized
in Section 2.3.
2.1 Fundamentals of Information-theoretic
Secrecy
Information-theoretic secrecy not only allows for precise and quantitative
analysis of various secrecy schemes across different layers communication system, but
also provides fundamental limits of the transmission rate over which the transmitter
is able to achieve reliable and secure communication with the legitimate Rx. The
objective of this section is to introduce several information-theoretic secrecy metrics
along with their operational meaning and to present the classical model first proposed
by Wyner [11], which is, albeit basic, amendable to more complex wiretap channels
investigated in the literature (see Section 2.2 for more detail). Furthermore, the
coding mechanism that achieves information-theoretic secrecy based on this model is
intuitively interpreted.
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(b) Wyner’s wiretap channel.
Figure 2.1: Classical information-theoretic secrecy model.
2.1.1 Information-Theoretic Secrecy Metrics
To illustrate the significant notion of information-theoretic secrecy, perfect
secrecy [12], Claude Shannon’s classical model of a cipher system as seen in Fig. 2.1(a)
needs to be recalled. The objective of this cipher system is to reliably transmit a
confidential message M from the transmitter (Alice) to a legitimate receiver (Bob) in
the presence of an eavesdropper (Eve), who intercepts all transmitted signals. In this
model, the cryptographic encoder-decoder that maps the plain text M to the cipher
text C and vice versa is realized by sharing a random key K that is exclusively
between Alice and Bob. perfect secrecy is achieved if the confidential message M
is statistically independent of C, i.e., p(m) = p(m|c), where m and c are instances
of M and C, respectively. According to basic inequalities from information theory,
it is equivalent to state that the mutual information between M and C, I(M ;C), is
identical to zero. In other words, assumingM is uniformly distributed over a message
set {1, . . . , 2N}, the only way left behind for Eve is to guess M with the successful
probability of 2−N .
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Remark 2.1.1. It is worthy noting that perfect secrecy is a much stronger notion than
those used in computational security, since it is a quantitative measure independent of
any assumption regarding Eve’s computational capacity and therefore ensures that C
intercepted by Eve reveals no information about M . It was shown that it is achievable
using a simple one-time pad encryption [13], which induces a secret key of the same
length as the message itself.
Perfect secrecy defined by Shannon that requires exact independence between M
and C is too stringent to be implemented in practice, since the advantage of perfect
secrecy is considerably offset by generation of long-bit keys as above mentioned.
Consequently, as is often done in information-theoretic secrecy, perfect secrecy
in Shannon’s cipher system is relaxed by only asking for statistical independence
between M and K in an asymptotic sense, which necessitates a metric to measure
the statistical dependence between M and K. Among many ways to define such
metrics, the most commonly used one is strong secrecy [14] given by
lim
n→∞
I(M ;Cn) = 0. (2.1)
In comparison, weak secrecy measures the rate at which the information about M is





I(M ;Cn) = 0, (2.2)
where Cn denotes a length-n codeword encoding M .
2.1.2 Wyner’s Wiretap Channel
It is important to note that Shannon’s cipher system cannot be applied directly
to the PLS system of the interest, especially to the wireless PLS system, since
the intrinsic property of (wireless) communication system that is not captured in
Shannon’s model is the presence of impairments in the communication channel,
and therefore his model is restricted to the assumption of perfect interception of
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the transmit symbols. However, the significant motivation for PLS is to explicitly
consider the imperfection induced by communication channels. The basic model for
PLS, called the wiretap channel, was pioneered by Wyner [11], which captured the
joint problem of reliable and secret communication over noisy channels. As illustrated
in Fig. 2.1(b), the objective is that Alice is able to reliably and secretly communicate
with Bob at rate R, by encoding messages M ∈ {1; 2nR} into codewords Xn of length
n and transmitting Xn over a noisy memoryless broadcast channel, characterized by
a transition probability WY Z|X . Y n and Zn denote the receiver observation at Bob
and Eve, respectively, and M ′ ∈ {1; 2nR′} is a local random number generator (each
of its realization is known only by Alice) to assist in encoding of message M . In this
model, R is achievable in the sense that there exists a codebook, called wiretap code
with increasing block length n such that
lim
n→∞
Pr(Mˆ 6=M) = 0, lim
n→∞
I(M ;Zn) = 0, (2.3)
which guarantees reliability and secrecy, respectively.
Remark 2.1.2. It is worthy of noting that the wiretap channel model introduced
by Wyner is different from Shannon’s cipher system, besides introducing noise, also
in the respect that it does not include any shared secret key between Alice and Bob,
and therefore allows for independent design from cryptography. Furthermore, one
fundamental difference between the wiretap code and the conventional communication
code lies in the stochastic encoder M ′, the role played by which will be clarified shortly.
Intuitively, one can think of the function ofM ′ analogous to the key used in a one-time
pad, because both of them aims for randomizing the source message M . In addition,
the wiretap channel model herein assumes that Alice and Bob know the Eve’s channel
perfectly, which might be too strong to account for a passive eavesdropper. However,
recent advances in signal processing have resolved this issue in part that will be detailed
in Section 2.2.
The supremum of all achievable R defines one of the information-theoretic
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metrics for PLS, i.e., secrecy capacity, which is shown to be [11, 15]
Cs = max
V→X→Y Z
(I(V ; Y )− I(V ;Z)), (2.4)
where V is an auxiliary random variable (RV).
The structure and design of wiretap code that achieves Cs is quite nontrivial. To
give an intuitive illustration of the coding mechanism behind (2.4), a simple model
with noiseless main channel but noisy eavesdropper’s channel is considered. Since
reliable communication is automatically achieved under this assumption, it is safe
to consider V = X without loss of generality (w.l.o.g.). Now assuming that given
the joint distribution of this broadcast channel, WY Z|X, the achievable rate of the
respective channel between Alice to Bob and Eve, are R+R′ and R′, it follows from
(2.4) that a positive secrecy rate R > 0 is achievable since Bob’s channel is less
noisy. Furthermore, for a noiseless channel with binary input, it is easy to verify that
1
n


















Figure 2.2: Nested structure of a wiretap code [1, Figure 1.3].
In the following, a nested-structure wiretap code using stochastic encoding is
constructed as depicted in Fig. 2.2. Specifically, given a message set represented
by {1; 2nR} with R defined earlier, each of the 2nR distinct messages is randomly
mapped into a codeword indexed by M ′ from a (2nR
′
, n(1 − R)) codebook, which
is designed to be capacity-achieving for the eavesdropper’s channel. The codebook
corresponding to one particular message forms a bin, which is a subcode of the wiretap
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code, and consequently there are totally 2nR subcodes indexed byM . Now it is ready
to evaluate the information leaked about the messageM . First, I(M ;Zn) is rewritten
by manipulating with basic information-theoretic identities as follows.
I(M ;Zn) = I(Xn;Zn)−H(M ′) +H(M ′|MZn), (2.5)
where I(Xn;Zn) represents the information leaked about the codewords, H(M ′)
represents the entropy of the local random generator, and H(M ′|MZn) measures
Eve’s uncertainty within the subcode. It is intuitively to observe from (2.5) that if
H(M ′) is large enough to compensates the information leaked about the codeword
Xn and the uncertainty induced by H(M ′|MZn), the information leakage about the
message tends to vanish. Fortunately, since the subcode (2nR
′
, n(1−R)) is designed to
be capacity-achieving, which is possible since R′+R ≤ 1, it can be shown by [16] that
1
n
H(M ′) ≈ 1
n
I(X ;Zn) and 1
n
H(M ′|MZn) ≈ 0 are guaranteed so that 1
n
I(M ;Zn) ≈ 0.
Combining with Pr(Mˆ 6= M) = 0 under the noiseless main channel, this approach of
code construction is shown to achieve secrecy rate R with (2.3) satisfied in a weak
sense.
Note that more detailed discussion on capacity-achieving wiretap code design is
out of the scope of this thesis. However, the random coding mechanism introduced
above also sheds light upon the design of wiretap code in other wiretap channels, the
principle of which will be favourable in appreciating the fundamental results reviewed
in the sequel. On the other hand, there is another information-theoretic secrecy
branch for PLS dealing with secret-key generation that focuses on the distillation of
secrecy from common randomness by public discussion over noiseless side channel
of unlimited capacity. The related discussion is out of the scope of this paper and
it is mentioned herein nevertheless to emphasize that PLS can complement, rather
than replace, existing cryptographic techniques used in upper layers, for instance, by
providing a secure means of randomness sharing for generating secret keys.
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2.2 An Overview of Signal Processing
Approaches for Improving PLS
Compared with the immediate benefit brought by multiple antennas and/or
multiple users to reliable communications w/o secrecy concerns, the advantage of
extra d.o.f could have been severely compromised by the simultaneously increased
decoding capacity of potential eavesdroppers w/o careful design. In this section, an
overview of some typical approaches for achieving gains in secrecy diversity and/or
multiplexing by judiciously designing the extra dimensions of resources is given.
The section commences with a presentation of transceiver design algorithms
for the classical three-user multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) wiretap channel.
The work generalized to multi-Eve wiretap channel is expected to be more arduous,
because increasing the number of eavesdroppers indicates the increasing interception
ability of unauthorized parties even if they do not collude. A critical countermeasure
that paves a new way for effective transceiver design is to generate artificial noise
(AN), i.e., synthetic noise embedded in conjunction with the confidential messages,
which also refers to cooperative jamming (CJ) when it is generated by separate
helpers in cooperative communications. Subsequently, the fading wiretap channel
is examined, the intrinsic randomness of which that used to be regarded as a
downside for wireless communications, however, plays a major role in achieving secret
communications. Lastly, another interesting wiretap channel worth investigating is
the relay wiretap channel, where a joint optimization of precoders in both relays and
the Tx is an effective enabler in enhancing secrecy.
In each subsection, key techniques of secrecy transceiver designs in the literature
are summarized under both perfect and imperfect (or even no) channel state
information at the transmitter (CSIT), the latter of which necessitates robust
transmission strategies.
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2.2.1 MIMO Wiretap Channels
A classical type of wiretap channel, three-user MIMO wiretap channel as shown
in Fig. 2.3 consists of a transmitter (Alice), a legitimate receiver (Bob), and an
eavesdropper (Eve), each of which is equipped with NT , NR and NE number of
antennas, respectively. The received signal by the legitimate receiver is given by
yb =Hbxa + nb, (2.6)
whilst that also received at the eavesdropper is
ye =Hexa + ne, (2.7)
where xa ∈ CNT×1 is the transmit signal with covariance matrix E[xaxHa ] denoted by
Qx; Hb and He represent the complex MIMO channels from Alice to Bob and Eve,
respectively; nb and ne are additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) at the receivers










Figure 2.3: A three-user MIMO wiretap channel.
Note that the wiretap channel model described above is also referred
to as multiple-input, multiple-output, multiple-eavesdropper (MIMOME) channel
[17], a special class of which, multiple-input, single-output, multiple-eavesdropper
(MISOME) channel [18], corresponds to the case where Bob is equipped with
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only one single antenna. As MIMOME suggests, the “multi-eavesdropper” herein
comprises the scenario when there are multiple antennas equipped on a single
eavesdropper or when there is a group of geographically dispersed but colluding
single-antenna eavesdroppers. Note that the case in which there are several
non-colluding eavesdroppers is referred as compound wiretap channel [19, 20].
Assuming AWGN at the receivers, the secrecy capacity under an average power




[I(Xa;Y b)− I(Xa;Y e)]. (2.8)
For Gaussian input signaling, which is the optimal choice for achieving the secrecy





b )− log det(I +HeQxHHe )], (2.9)
where it is assumed that nb (ne) is an AWGN denoted by nb ∼ CN (0, INR) (ne ∼
CN (0, INE)) for simplifying analysis.
1) Perfect CSI
Not very surprisingly, even for the case when instantaneous CSI for both Bob and Eve
are perfectly known at the transmitter, a precise characterization of the three-user
MIMO wiretap channel under an average power constraint of Tr(Qx) ≤ P , in general,
remains an open problem. However, in some special cases, closed-form solutions
can be found. For example, in the MISOME case where NR = 1, NT , NE > 1,
the optimal transmit beamforming is given by Qx = Pψmψ
H
m, where ψm is the
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Another special circumstance is that when Qx is known to be full rank [24, Theorem
2]. For the general unsolvable MIMOME case, nevertheless, the asymptotically
optimal solution in the high signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) regime can be found by
decomposing the system into parallel channels based upon the generalized singular
value decomposition (GSVD) of the matrix pair (Hb,He) [17]. The optimal power
allocation for GSVD transmission precoding was derived in [25] and shown to
empirically achieve the MIMO secrecy capacity given in (2.9).
An alternative type of power constraint, namely, a matrix power covariance
constraint, Qx  S, was considered in [26], where the MIMO wiretap channel was
reexamined by exploiting the derivative relationship between mutual information and
mean-squared error to provide a closed-form expression for the secrecy capacity, which















2 + I) (2.12)
that are greater than one.
The secrecy capacity given in (2.11), for which the imposed matrix power
constraint places considerable limits on the per-antenna power power and the transmit
correlation structure, is expected to achieve inferior performance to that under an
average power constraint given in (2.9). The relationship between (2.11) and (2.9) is
characterized by [27, Lemma 1]
Csec(P ) = max
S0,Tr(S)≤P
Csec(S), (2.13)
where for any given S, Csec(S) is computed as in (2.11).
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The fundamental work on information-theoretic security pioneered by Wyner
[11], Csisza´r and Ko¨ner [15], have already shown that a positive secrecy capacity
can be achieved only if the eavesdropper’s channel is a degraded version of the
main channel. Recently, a variety of physical-layer techniques from signal processing
perspective were devoted to breaking through this assumption, among which,
exploiting synthetic interference (from the co-located transmitter, known as AN;
from an external helping interferer, referred as CJ) to deteriorate Eve’s interception
capability has been shown effective. Although multi-antenna precoding embedded
with AN is regarded promising, for a three user MISOME wiretap channel, it has
been shown in [18, 22] that if Eve’s channel is known at the transmitter, the secrecy
capacity is achievable w/o transmission of AN.
2) Imperfect CSI
On the other hand, considering an extreme case where no eavesdroppers CSI is
available at all, well-known isotropic AN [21] is designed to effectively degrade the
Eves channel, nevertheless nulled out at the intended receiver. Therefore, it is
significant to investigate the role of AN with exposure to different level of Eves
CSI. The assumption with regards to eavesdroppers’ imperfect CSI can be mainly
categorized into three classes: the statistical distribution of He, a known bound
for the error where the uncertainty in knowledge of He lies within, and no Eve’s
CSI at all. For the first case, the AN injection strategy proposed by Goel and
Negi [21] remains the best known secure transmission strategy that optimizes the
number of spatial dimensions and power allocated to the AN. For the second case
with norm-bounded error, [28] studied the optimal transmit strategy by exploiting
the relationship between the multi-input single-output (MISO) wiretap channel in
the presence of one single-antenna eavesdropper and the cognitive radio MISO
channel. Huang et al. in [29] considered the robust transmit designs against Eve’s
bounded channel mismatches with the aid of AN generated by an external helper,
also termed as cooperative jamming (CJ) for similar MISO wiretap channel. Robust
transmit covariance matrices were obtained therein with and w/o CJ, respectively, by
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transforming the nonconvex max-min problem into a quasiconvex one based on the
worst-case secrecy rate formulation. It was further concluded in [29] that the robust
transmit designs with CJ is particularly helpful when the Eve’s channel is imperfect,
although the benefit of CJ is not seen under perfect Eve’s CSI. For the third case,
since CSI of Eve(s) are totally unknown, nothing might be more intelligent than
transmitting as much as possible spatially isotropic AN to the nullspace of the desired
signal [30, 31]. Specifically, [30] focused on maximizing the amount of power allocated
to the AN that hides the confidential information from a potential eavesdropper
while guaranteeing a prescribed signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) at the
legitimate Rx assuming that Eve employs the optimum beamformer at its receiver.
In addition, robust coding schemes from the perspective of information-theoretic
security can also be designed to circumvent eavesdropping irrespective of the Eve’s
CSI, which is beyond the discussion of this thesis.
Besides, instead of fixing AN in the nullspace of the legitimated channel[29,
32], [33] considered the optimal AN-aided transmit strategy that simultaneously
optimizes the transmit and AN covariances to maximize the secrecy rate. These
joint optimization approaches under both perfect and imperfect CSI case obfuscate
eavesdroppers’s interception more effectively in the sense that the AN can now take
on any spatial pattern rather than a specific kind, for example, spatially isotropic
AN [34], beamforming AN [35, 36], which are all suboptimal in terms of secrecy rate
maximization.
2.2.2 Fading Wiretap Channels
Multi-path fading phenomenon in wireless communications, albeit negative in
most wireless communications, is nevertheless beneficial to achieving nonzero ergodic
secrecy rate or outage secrecy rate [6, 37]. Before examining fundamental results
for fading wiretap channel in literature, a three-node fading wiretap channel that is
corrupted by multiplicative fading in addition to AWGN is introduced to illustrate
the definition of ESC and secrecy outage probability. As shown in Fig. 2.4, the source
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S communicates with the destination D in the presence of an eavesdropper, E, over
the main channel, denoted by gM , and the eavesdropper channel, denoted by gE,
respectively. The power gains experiencing fading of the two complex channels are
correspondingly denoted by hM = |gM |2 and hE = |gE|2. The i.i.d. AWGN at the
receivers are denoted by WM ∼ CN (0, 1), WE ∼ CN (0, 1) for D and E, respectively.
Using index i to differentiate one coherence interval from another, the signal received
by D and E during one coherence interval are respectively given by
y(i) =gM(i)x(i) + wM(i),
z(i) =gE(i)x(i) + wE(i), (2.14)
where x(i) ∼ CN (0, 1) denotes the transmit signal representing a codeword xn that is
mapped from the source message w ∈ W = 1, 2, . . . ,M by an (M,n) encoder-decoder.
Both the main channel and the eavesdropper channel are assumed to follow the block
fading, where gM(i) and gE(i) remain constant within each block and vary from
block to block. The fading process is also assumed to be stationary and ergodic with
bounded continuous probability distribution function (pdf) denoted by f(hM), f(hE),
for hM(i) and hE(i), respectively. In addition, hM(i) is assumed to be independent












Figure 2.4: A three-user fading wiretap channel.
20
Chapter 2. Literature Review
variable for simplicity), the ESC for the above three-user fading wiretap channel,
subject to a long-term power constraint, i.e., E[p(h)] ≤ P , is given by [38, 39]
Cs = E
E[p(h)]≤P
[log2(1 + hMp(h))− log2(1 + hEp(h))], (2.15)
where the expectation is taken with respect to (w.r.t.) the RV h ∈ H, with H =
{h|hM > hE}. On the other hand, the secrecy outage probability is defined as follows.
Pout = Pr(Rs(h, p(h)) < R1). (2.16)
In (2.16), Rs(h, p(h)) denotes the secrecy capacity for a given fading realization
h with the source transmit xn using power p(h), which is given by
[S.K.Leung-Yan-Cheong1978]
Rs(h, p(h)) = [log2(1 + hMp(h))− log2(1 + hEp(h))]+. (2.17)
In the following, some important results on the optimal power allocations to
maximize the ESC or minimize the secrecy outage probability are reviewed under the
assumption of full and/or partial CSIT, respectively.
1) ESC
• Full CSIT
In this case, the Tx knows the CSI of both the legitimate Rx and the eavesdropper
perfectly at the beginning of each coherence interval and therefore is able to adapt
the transmit power to the realization of hM and hE . Hence, the ESC maximization
problem is formulated as
(P1-full) :max
{p(h)}
E[log2(1 + hMp(h))− log2(1 + hEp(h))]
s.t. E[p(h)] ≤ P,
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the expectation of which is still taken w.r.t. h ∈ H. The optimal power allocation


























where the parameter λ is a Lagrangian multiplier that satisfies the long-term power
constraint with equality.
It is worthy of noting that (2.18) is sometimes known as the “secrecy water
filling” solutions equivalent to those for the SISO fading channel under the long-term
power constraint w/o secrecy consideration.
• Partial CSIT
When only the CSIT regarding the legitimate Rx, i.e., hM is known, the ESC defined
in (2.15) is modified as
Cs = E[[log2(1 + hMp(hM))− log2(1 + hEp(hM))]+]. (2.19)
Consequently, the corresponding ESC maximization problem is given by
(P1-partial) : max
{p(hM )}
E[[log2(1 + hMp(hM))− log2(1 + hEp(hM))]+]
s.t. E[p(hM)] ≤ P,














f(hE)dhE − λ = 0, (2.20)
where λ is a constant that satisfies the long-term power constraint. It is seen that
the optimal power allocation policy is also determined by f(hE), which is known as
the channel distribution information (CDI). Hence, the main channel’s CSI and at
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least the eavesdropper’s CDI are assumed to be known at the Tx for this scheme.
Note that compared with (2.15), Cs in the partial CSIT case, the instantaneous
secrecy capacity admits [·]+. This subtlety is a consequence of variable-rate
transmission scheme, in which the Tx transmits at a rate log2(1 + hMp(hM)) adapt
to the main channel’s fading state. This scheme ensures that when hM < hE, the
achievable rate at the eavesdropper is bounded by log2(1 + hMp(hM)) and when
hM > hE , it is log2(1 + hEp(hM)), which ensures non-negative instantaneous secrecy
capacity for the partial CSIT.
2) Secrecy outage probability
• Full CSIT




s.t. E[p(h)] ≤ P,
where R1 > 0 denotes a target secrecy rate. The power allocations policy p
∗(h) that
solve (P2-full) for a given target rate R1 is given by [39, Proposition 1]
p∗(h) =
 pmin(h), if pmin(h) ≤ s∗0, otherwise, (2.21)










(2.21) is also known as the “secrecy channel inversion” solutions, which are
counterparts of those to the outage probability minimization of delay-limited SISO
fading channels.
23
Chapter 2. Literature Review
• Partial CSIT
Except for the stochastic properties induced by the fading process, when only partial
CSIT is available, the calculation of Pout also relies on how the channel uncertainties
are modeled [40]. If Alice has full CSI regarding the main channel only the CDI
regarding the eavesdropper’s as the partial CSIT case discussed above for the ESC,
following the similar analysis developed in [38], the optimal power allocations are as
follows.
p∗(hM) =
 pmin(hM), if L(λ, pmin(hM)) < 10, otherwise, (2.23)
where L(λ, p(hM)) =
∫∞




L(λ, p(hM)), and λ is the associated optimal dual variable.
For another example, when Alice’s knowledge of the eavesdropper’s fading
coefficient is a noisy version modeled by
gˆE = gE + w
′
E, (2.24)
where gˆE denotes an imperfect estimate of Eve’s channel by Alice and w
′
E ∼ CN (0, σ2e)
is the stochastic error, the frequently used metric in this situation is also the secrecy
outage probability [6]. It admits the same form as (2.16) but has a different
operational interpretation, that is, the probability that the wiretap channel fails
to support a target secrecy rate R1. Note that, R1 = log2(1 + hMp(hM)) −
log2(1 + hˆEp(hM)), where hˆE = |gˆE|2 is set by Alice. As a result, perfect secrecy
is ensured if Eve’s channel is worse than Alice’s estimate. However, if Eve’s channel
is underestimated, i.e., hˆE < hE , R1 cannot be achieved and thus secrecy outage
occurs. Combing with the fading process, Pout under the long-term power constraint




Pr(Rs(hM , p(hM)) < R1|hM)f(hM)dhM . (2.25)
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Although, to the best knowledge of the author, there are no results directly
providing optimal power allocations for minimizing Pout defined in (2.25), optimal
power allocations over all fading realizations are expected to be obtained by similar
methods as applied to (P2-full), if pmin(hM), i.e. the minimum power needed to
support the target rate R1 under the Eve’s channel uncertainty, is well approximated.
Fortunately, this power minimization problem under the chance constraint w.r.t.
channel uncertainties has been well addressed by either equivalently solving a
simplified problem in the single-eavesdropper case [32], or conservatively transforming
Pr(Rs(hM , p(hM)) < R1|hM) into deterministic and convex constraints using
Bernstein-Type Inequality [40, Lemma 1, Lemma 2] [41] in the multi-eavesdropper
case.
Furthermore, [39] extended the results in [38] to fading broadcast channel with
confidential messages (BCC), where the secrecy capacity region for the fading BCC
was established, based on which the optimal power allocations were derived to
achieve the boundary of the secrecy capacity region, or to minimize the secrecy
outage probability with and w/o the common messages, respectively. In addition,
[42] employed a slightly different definition of the outage event and combined
cryptography and PLS to tackle the secrecy outage in fading channels.
2.2.3 Relay Wiretap Channels
Soliciting for cooperative relaying to improve PLS has drawn much attention
since it was first considered in [43], where several cooperation strategies were
devised and the corresponding achievable secrecy regions were characterized. Of
particular interest was the proposed noise forwarding (NF) scheme, where the relay
sends codewords independent of source messages while being totally ignorant of the
confidential information, which has been shown to increase the secrecy region in the
reversely degraded scenario. On the contrary, the conventional relay for cooperative
communications fails to provide performance gains in such setup. Benefitting not
only from the conventional advantage of cooperative communications, but also from
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the effect of CJ on interfering with the eavesdroppers, various relay-assisted secure
transmission schemes have thus been investigated, which, depending on the role of
the relays, mainly fall into three categories as follows.
1) CB alone
Cooperative beamforming (CB) inherits its concept in the conventional cooperative
communications, where relays are exploited to facilitate the source-destination
transmission utilising CB via either decode-and-forward (DF) or amplify-and-forward
(AF) mode. However, compared with CB in classical relay systems, CB for secrecy
takes not only reliable but also secure information transmission into account and
therefore yields different optimal beamformer from that w/o secrecy consideration
in general. For example, for a single-antenna relay network, the celebrated
matched-filter (MF) relay weights, i.e., joint maximum ratio combining (MRC) and
maximum ratio transmission (MRT) at the relays, is known to be optimal beamformer
for maximizing the communications rate, which is nevertheless not necessarily optimal
in terms of maximizing the secrecy rate, since the former solutions may induce large
interception at the eavesdroppers as well. As a result, the optimal relay beamformer
for maximizing the secrecy rate of the single-antenna DF relay network has been
developed in [35] and [44] subject to the total and per-relay power constraints,
respectively. For the AF alone case, although the optimal relay beamformer for
secrecy rate maximization under a total power constraint was derived in [45], to
obtain the optimal relay beamformer under individual relay power constraints poses
much challenges and therefore only suboptimal designs are available. [46] extended
the work to a multi-eavesdropper scenario under both total and individual relay power
constraints, where suboptimal but tractable SDR approaches were exploited. [47] and
[48] considered the similar secrecy rate maximization problems for a multi-antenna
AF relay network, the former of which developed alternating optimization algorithms
to iteratively derive the Tx and relay precoders, while the latter of which studied
robust designs for suboptimal beamformers against fading and deterministic channel
uncertainty models, respectively.
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2) CJ alone
CJ alone refers to the strategy where there is an external relay serving as helper
to facilitate the secrecy information transmission, which in particular has two
kinds of implementation, i.e., coordinated CJ and uncoordinated CJ (also known
as independent jamming (IJ)). In coordinated CJ, common jamming signals are
cooperatively generated across all single-antenna relays [8, 21, 35, 36, 49], while in
uncoordinated CJ, each relay helper emits its own artificial noise (AN) that is
independent of the confidential information to confound the eavesdroppers [50, 51].
For the purpose of illustration, a general CJ model that mathematically subsumes
all the cases discussed above is assumed in a single-antenna N -relay network, where
the CJ signal is given by x = [x1, . . . , xN ]
T with its covariance matrix denoted
by S = V˜ Σ˜V˜
H
, where xi’s are the individual signal transmitted by relays, Σ˜ =
diag([σ1, . . . , σd]) is a diagonal matrix comprising all the positive eigenvalues of S,
and V˜ is the associated precoding matrix satisfying V˜
H
V˜ = I. Accordingly, the







where v˜j ’s are drawn from the columns of V˜ and s
′
j ∼ CN (0, 1), ∀j. For a special




1, each relay transmits one common jamming signal s
′
1
with their respective weight drawn from v˜1. This kind of coordinated CJ is desirable
in practice since it reduces the overhead of exchanging d CJ beams. Another special
case when S is a full-rank diagonal matrix with all σi’s positive is referred as IJ,
which corresponds to the jamming scheme where each relay transmits i.i.d. CJ beam
s′i, i = 1, . . . , N . It is worthy of noting that IJ is of practical interest, since the
jamming beams s′i’s can be completely generated in a distributed fashion without
coordination among relays.
3) Joint CB and CJ
Under the circumstances that the direct link between the Tx and the legitimate Rx
is broken, i.e., some of the relays have to take on their conventional role of forwarding
the information apart from jamming. Depending on whether information forwarding
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and CJ are performed on the same relay, the joint CB and CJ schemes vary in their
designs. For separately located conventional relays and friendly jammers, a selection
of their function was studied in [52–54], while for co-located relay helpers, a recent
paradigm makes better use of d.o.f of relays by allowing simultaneously forwarding
the confidential information and emitting AN [55, 56].
The CB and AN design for secrecy rate maximization from a single-antenna Tx
to a single-antenna Tx via multiple multi-antenna relays in the presence of multiple
multi-antenna eavesdroppers, in spite of being more general, is quite challenging to
solve due to the amplified noise at relays, and nonconvex and nonsmooth property of
the secrecy rate function etc. [51] computed the joint optimal CB and AN solution
to the above problem under imperfect CSIT w.r.t. the eavesdroppers’ channels using
SDR, which was proved be tight. For a more practical scenario when no Eve’s CSI
is available, similar to [30], in [31], distributed beamforming with AN was performed
by associated intermediate nodes so as to maximize the power permitted for AN
under individual power constraint of each AF relay. It has been noticed that even
for the case of perfect CSIT, the joint transmission beams, relay beams and CJ
optimization for secrecy MIMO relay networks turns out to be very intractable and
only some simplified designs are available in the literature. For example, interference
alignment-based CJ was employed in [56] for a single multi-antenna relay MIMO
wiretap channel.
2.3 Recent Progress in Enhancing PLS for
SWIPT Systems
Some major challenges and opportunities identified in the literature for wireless
PLS in WPCN are surveyed in this section mainly from a signal processing point
of view, which fundamentally differ these SWIPT-enabled PLS enhancements from
those reviewed in Section 2.2. The main thrust of this thesis is also developed based
on and/or in parallel with some of the results reviewed in this section. Complying
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with the motivation introduced in Chapter 1, the challenges of enhancing PLS in
WPCN are introduced first followed by opportunities in related work.
[57] and [58] were among the earliest work that identified the critical threat to
PLS in SWIPT, that is the confidential messages destined to IRs may be eavesdropped
by ERs who need to operate with significantly higher received power as compared
to the conventional IRs and are therefore usually deployed in more proximity to
the Tx than the IRs. Both of the work advocated the usage of AN and/or energy
signal to protect the secrecy information against eavesdropping in a MISO downlink
system with one IR and multiple ERs when different levels of eavesdroppers’ CSIT
is available. Specifically, joint design of transmit and AN beamforming vectors
along with their power allocations was investigated in [57] with different objectives:
the first problem maximized the secrecy rate for the IR subject to individual
EH constraints of ERs; the second problem maximized the weighted sum-energy
transferred to ERs subject to the required secrecy rate for the IR. Both of these
problems were non-convex and optimally solved by a two-stage procedure utilizing
the technique of SDR. Furthermore, two suboptimal solutions of lower complexity
that separately design the information and AN beamforming vectors were proposed
for each of the studied problems, and then compared against the optimal solution
in terms of achievable (secrecy) rate-energy trade-off. While [57] considered the
secure beamforming schemes with perfect eavesdroppers’ CSI known at the Tx, [58]
investigated a more complex scenario where the CSI of the desired IR is perfectly
available whereas that of the idle receivers (potential eavesdroppers) and passive
eavesdroppers are only imperfectly and not known at the Tx, respectively. Compared
with [57], the non-convexity was also incurred by the minimum outage probability
requirement at the passive eavesdroppers, which was then replaced by a convex
deterministic constraint. The advantage of the joint design of AN and/or energy
signals as well as the information beamforming further corroborated the dual usage
of AN that facilitates secrecy SWIPT, which is fundamentally different from the mere
role of interfering with eavesdroppers in conventional wiretap channels.
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[59] further considered the secure beamforming designs in a more threatening
scenario where the ERs are able to collude each other to perform joint decoding of
the confidential messages, and therein obtained the robust beamforming against the
eavesdropper’s channel uncertainties including both covariance-based and worst-cased
based imperfect CSI, respectively. A similar worst-case robust secrecy rate
maximization problem was also considered in [60] to cripple multiple multi-antenna
ERs’s eavesdropping.
[61] considered a more general system model that enables secure multi-casting
for SWIPT (with multiple IRs) in the presence of multiple ERs acting as potential
eavesdroppers. Unlike designing the optimal transmit beamforming based on SDR,
the authors proposed a novel secure multi-casting design to minimize the total
transmit power under the SINR constraints for IRs/ERs and the harvested energy
constraints for ERs by using rank-two beamformed Alamouti space-time (AST)
coding and SDR, apart from jointly employing energy signals as AN. The sufficient
conditions under which the proposed scheme is optimal were also derived with
a corresponding rank-two Gaussian randomization procedure, which provides a
suboptimal solution when the SDR is not tight. [62] extended the system model
to a three-node MIMO downlink system with one IR and one eavesdropping ER.
The authors aimed to maximize the achievable secrecy rate subject to a transmit
power constraint and an EH constraint for the ER. The SRM problem with multiple
streams was then solved by an inexact block coordinate descent (IBCD) algorithm,
which proved to monotonically converge to a Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) solution.
Besides, [63] explored secure beamforming design in a multi-user MISO secondary
communication system with secondary idle receivers as potential eavesdroppers
using multi-objective optimization, while [64] studied the secrecy precoding for a
MIMOME SWIPT-enabled secondary communication system. In addition, a massive
MIMOME wiretap channel for a SWIPT system was studied in [65], which derived the
asymptotic-optimal transmit covariance that achieves the trade-off between the ESC
and the harvested energy given only statistical CSIT using large-dimension random
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matrix theory and Tayler series expansion.
Following the trend of secure beamforming design in SWIPT, in contrast
with the aforementioned work that considered co-located ERs and eavesdroppers,
[66] and [67] studied the secure information transmission with separate ERs and
eavesdroppers (passive) under perfect and imperfect eavesdroppers’ CSI, respectively.
The secrecy optimization framework with and w/o AN for MISO wiretap channel
was also investigated in [68] by taking error-bounded channel uncertainties into
account. Moreover, [68] proposed successive convex approximation-based solutions
to the associated problems as effective alternative for those rank-relaxation based
approaches in the literature [69]. Later, when an external help was solicited for
assisting the source in secrecy SWIPT with EH constraints for both IR and ERs,
a CJ-aided worst-case secrecy rate maximization problem was considered in [70] by
employing alternating optimization.
On another front, with the upsurge of SWIPT, when some of the idle
WEH-enabled network subscribers are friendly and not subject to stringent EH
requirements, recent advances in WPCN [71] provide essential incentives for them
to assist in the secrecy communications. [72] considered to boost the confidential
information transmission throughput (long-term metric) via a wireless-powered
friendly jammer by proposing a judiciously designed protocol including the “harvest”
and “jam” phases, based on which four types of power transfer (PT)-information
transmission (IT) cycles were characterized and the behavior of this stochastic process
was analyzed to derive a closed-form throughput. In addition, the jamming power
threshold and rate parameters were further optimized to maximize the throughput
subject to a secrecy outage probability constraint. Furthermore, motivated by the
PS technologies which circumvent the circuit limit that the received signal used for
harvesting energy cannot be reused for decoding information, wireless-powered relays
adopting the PS-enabled hybrid receiver have recently been exploited to enhance
PLS by means of self-sustaining cooperative strategies [73, 74]. Specifically, [73]
investigated the joint optimization of PS ratios and relay weights to maximize the
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secrecy rate in a multiple non-regenerative wireless-powered relay networks resorting
to destination-based AN. The authors proposed efficient numerical algorithm that
converges to a local optimal solution. A similar approach was further applied to
an untrustful multi-antenna wireless-powered relay network by [74]. Alike [73], the
WPCN was in the favor of PLS design in the sense that the destination-generated AN
also served as a new source of RF EH. Very recently, motivated by the 5G-enabling
large-scale MIMO technology, secret transmission assisted by a wireless-powered
large-scale MIMO relay was considered in [75], where an explicit expression of the
secrecy outage capacity was derived under the assumption of imperfect legitimate
Rx’s CSI and no eavesdropper’s CSI.
32
Chapter 3
Secrecy Wireless Information and
Power Transfer in Fading Wiretap
Channel
3.1 Introduction
SWIPT has recently drawn significant interests for its dual use of radio signals to
provide wireless data and energy access at the same time. In a SWIPT system with
secrecy information transmission to the IRs, there are two-fold conflicting goals in the
transmission design: the distance of ERs away from the hybrid AP is scheduled short
enough to circumvent the low energy efficiency of WPT due to the substantial power
attenuation of RF signals, but is also expected to be longer than that of IRs in order
for achieving perfect secrecy if they do not harvest energy as presumed; the power
of the received signal at the ERs is desired to be made large for efficient WEH, but
also needs to be kept sufficiently small to prevent leakage of the borne confidential
information. To resolve this conflict, in this chapter the transmit signal is split into
two parts, with one part carrying the secrecy information for the IR and the other
part carrying an AN to interfere with the ER to prevent it from eavesdropping, while
the total signal power received at the ER can still be kept high to satisfy its energy
harvesting requirement, under the assumption that the AN can be cancelled at IRs
but not at ERs. Under a simplified three-node wiretap channel setup, the transmit
power allocations and power splitting ratios over fading channels are jointly optimized
to minimize the outage probability for delay-limited secrecy information transmission,
or to maximize the average rate for no-delay-limited secrecy information transmission,
subject to a combination of average and peak power constraints at the transmitter
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as well as an average energy harvesting constraint at the ER. For each of these
non-convex problems the optimal solution based on the dual decomposition as well
as suboptimal solution based on the alternating optimization are proposed. Finally,
the performances of proposed schemes are evaluated by simulations against two
benchmark schemes in terms of various trade-offs for wireless (secrecy) information
versus power transmissions.
3.1.1 Assumption
Note that unlike the existing literature on PLS, where the eavesdroppers are
passive devices and thus their channels are practically assumed to be unknown at the
Tx, in this chapter, the Tx is assumed to know the ER’s eavesdropping channel since
the ER needs to assist the Tx in obtaining its CSI to design the power allocations to
satisfy its energy harvesting requirement. Moreover, for the AN-aided transmission,
both the Tx and IR are assumed to have the knowledge of the AN to be used prior to
transmission via a known PHY-layer “key” distribution method [76, 77] (see Section
3.3 for the details). Thus, the AN can be cancelled at the IR and however, is kept
strictly confidential to the ER so that it cannot be cancelled at the ER. Such a
scheme provides a theoretical upper-bound for the achievable secrecy rate of the
SWIPT system under our consideration.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. The SWIPT system model
over a SISO fading wiretap channel is introduced in Section 3.3. The formulations
of the proposed secrecy outage probability minimization problem and the ESC
maximization problem are presented in Section 3.4. Both optimal and suboptimal
solutions to the two formulated problems are proposed in Section 3.5 and Section
3.6, respectively. Two benchmark schemes and their optimal designs are presented in
Section 3.7. Numerical results on the performance of various schemes proposed are
provided in Section 3.8. Finally, the chapter is concluded in Section 3.9.
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3.2 Related Work
3.2.1 AN in Secrecy SWIPT
In the conventional secrecy communication setup without the EH consideration,
AN has been widely applied to improve the secrecy transmission rates [21, 33, 34, 78],
where a fraction of the transmit power was allocated to send randomly generated
noise signals to reduce the amount of information intercepted by the eavesdroppers.
In [57], AN was first applied in a MISO SWIPT system, where the joint information
and energy beamforming design at the transmitter was investigated to maximize the
secrecy rate of the IR subject to individual harvested energy constraints of ERs, or to
maximize the weighted sum-power harvested by ERs subject to a given secrecy rate
constraint at the IR. However, [57] considered the AWGN channels, while the optimal
AN-aided secrecy transmission design for SWIPT systems over fading channels has
not yet been addressed in the literature, which motivates the work in this chapter.
3.2.2 The Role of Fading in PLS
Although channel fading is traditionally regarded as a detrimental factor to the
wireless channel capacity, it can be exploited to reduce the secrecy communication
outage probability [6, 37, 39, 42, 79] or improve the wireless channel secrecy capacity
[6, 38, 39, 80]. For the secrecy outage probability minimization for wireless fading
channels with stringent transmission delay constraint, [39] has derived the optimal
power allocations in the fading broadcast channel with confidential messages
assuming the CSIT is known. While for maximizing the ESC of fading channels
with no-delay-limited transmission, the corresponding optimal power and rate
allocation strategies have been studied in [38]. However, existing results for fading
wiretap channels cannot be directly applied in our new SWIPT setup due to the
additional energy harvesting requirement for the ER (which may also play a role of
eavesdropper).
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Figure 3.1: The fading wiretap channel in a three-node SWIPT system.
3.3 System Model
In this chapter, consider a three-node SISO fading wiretap channel in a SWIPT
system consisting of one transmitter (Tx), one IR and one ER, each equipped with
one antenna, as shown in Fig. 3.1. The complex channel coefficients from the Tx to
IR and ER for one particular fading state are denoted by u(ν) and v(ν), respectively,
where ν denotes the joint fading state. The power gains of the channels at fading
state ν are defined as h(ν) = |u(ν)|2 and g(ν) = |v(ν)|2; and it is assumed that at
each fading state ν, both h(ν) and g(ν) are perfectly known at the Tx. 1 A block
fading model is further assumed such that h(ν) and g(ν) remain constant during each
block for each fading state ν, but can vary from block to block as ν changes. It is
assumed that h(ν) and g(ν) are two RVs with a continuous joint pdf.
Since secrecy information transmission to the IR is of the interest, similar to
[21], the transmit signal is assumed to comprise an information-bearing signal s0 and
an AN-bearing signal s1. It is assumed that s0 is a circularly symmetric complex
Gaussian (CSCG) RV with zero mean and unit variance, denoted by s0 ∼ CN (0, 1).
Furthermore, since s1 plays the role of AN to reduce the information eavesdropped
by the ER and the worst case AN is known to be Gaussian distributed [21], s1 is also
1In practice, considering time division duplex (TDD) is used, at the beginning of each
transmission block, the IR and ER can send their respective pilot signal to the Tx for it to estimate
the reverse-link channel assuming short-term channel reciprocity between the Tx and IR/ER. TDD
is also assumed for the subsequent description of secret “key” generation and transmission.
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assumed to be a CSCG RV denoted by s1 ∼ CN (0, 1), and independent of s0. The






where p(ν) is the transmit power at fading state ν and 0 ≤ α(ν) ≤ 1 denotes the
portion of the transmit power allocated to the AN signal at fading state ν. Moreover,
similar to [81], in this chapter two types of power constraints on p(ν) are considered,
namely, average power constraint (APC) and peak power constraint (PPC). The APC
limits the average transmit power at the Tx over all fading states, i.e., Eν [p(ν)] ≤ Pavg,
where Eν [·] denotes the expectation over ν. In contrast, the PPC constrains the
instantaneous transmit power of the Tx at each fading state, i.e., p(ν) ≤ Ppeak, ∀ν.
W.l.o.g., Pavg ≤ Ppeak is assumed. The signals received at the IR and the ER are
then respectively given by
















where nIR ∼ CN (0, σ21) and nER ∼ CN (0, σ22) denote the AWGN at the IR and the
ER, respectively.
3.3.1 A PHY-layer “key” Distribution Scheme
As previously mentioned in the chapter, a PHY-layer “key” distribution scheme
with practical complexity is assumed for generating and cancelling the AN signal s1
at the IR, which is described in this subsection. First, a large ensemble of seeds for
a Gaussian pseudo-random generator are pre-stored at both the Tx and IR (but not
available at the ER). The index of each seed in the ensemble is denoted as a “key” in
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the sequel. Next, by randomly picking up one seed and transmitting its index to the
IR before sending the confidential message at the beginning of each fading state, the
Tx is able to generate a “random” AN sequence using the selected seed that is only
known to the IR. Note that the seed used at each fading state is random and unknown
to the ER since “key” (index of the seed in use) is also non-accessible by the ER. To
achieve such secure “key” sharing, a two-step phase-shift modulation based method
[76, 77] by leveraging the short-term reciprocity of the wireless channels between the
Tx and IR is further adopted.
Specifically, in the first step, IR transmits a sinusoid pilot at frequency fc to the






where E is the symbol energy and φ is a reference phase. The received signal by the





cos(2πfct+Θ(k)) + n(t), (3.5)
where Λ2(k)’s denote the power gain due to the large-scale fading and remain the
same as h(ν) for each fading state, while Θ(k)’s indicate the small-scale fading that
can be differentially estimated by the Tx w.r.t. φ as Θ(k) − φ. n(t) is the received
AWGN. Now that the Tx has already probed the channel response from the IR,
under the assumption of reciprocity of channels, it will in the sequel use this CSI to
transmit a “key” to the IR by pre-compensating the phase difference of the sinusoid





cos(2πfct− (Θ(k)− φ) + Ψ), (3.6)
where Ψ ∈ {−π, . . . ,−π+2(M−1)π/M} is determined by the “key”-bearing symbol
and the corresponding constellation for modulation and M indicates cardinality of
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cos(2πfct+ φ+Ψ) + n(t), (3.7)
which allows the IR to decode the information borne in the estimated phase difference,
i.e., Ψ, in accordance with the region that it falls in.
It is worth noting that the effect of the proposed “key” sharing closely depends on
two assumptions: the channels’ reciprocity and the de-correlation of phase differences.
The former is ensured as long as the mobile’s distance moved within the transmission
interval is negligible compared to the wavelength. The latter is almost satisfied since
the difference between the estimated phase at the ER and that at the Tx has been
shown to be almost uniformly distributed [77], which thus enforces the ER to break
the “key” only by exhaustive trials.
Remark 3.3.1. The reason for which the above scheme is not employed to transmit
information is as follows. Since the sequence of symbols are transmitted within a block
duration so that the symbol interval T is less than the channel coherence time. Thus,
the received phase difference between the symbols being transmitted in two successive
intervals seen by ER would fall in the information set {−π, . . . ,−π+2(M−1)π/M},
which is prohibitive in terms of “strong secrecy”. However, it is relatively secure for
the “key” transmission, since even if the ER attempts to decode the seed index, it does
not have access to the seed ensemble, the complexity for breaking which is practically
infeasible.
Remark 3.3.2. If the Tx and the IR are assumed to share certain common
information a priori, our considered scheme may not be optimal as inspired by
[42, 79]. Nevertheless, this scheme is considered for its ease of implementation in
view of two folds. For one thing, in practical SWIPT systems the AN also plays
the role of delivering wireless power to the ER. For the other thing, although the
above “key” distribution method requires additional transmission time, it is negligible
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compared to the whole length of block duration especially when the channel coherence
time is sufficiently large.
With the scheme proposed in the last subsection, the associated interference at
the IR in (3.2), i.e., u(ν)
√
α(ν)p(ν)s1, can be canceled at each fading state prior to
decoding the desired information signal, s0. Then from (3.2), the SNR at the IR at





Note that in practice the AN cancelation at the IR cannot be perfect, while the residue
interference due to imperfect AN cancellation could be included in the receiver noise
power, i.e., σ21. On the other hand, since the AN signal s1 is assumed to be unknown
to the ER and thus cannot be canceled, from (3.3), the SNR at the ER at fading
state ν is expressed as (assume that the ER eavesdrops the information intended for





















where [x]+ , max(0, x).
Next, for wireless power transfer, the amount of power harvested at fading state
ν at the ER is given by [82]
Q(p(ν)) = ζ [(1− α(ν))g(ν)p(ν) + α(ν)g(ν)p(ν)]
= ζg(ν)p(ν), (3.11)
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where 0 < ζ ≤ 1 denotes the energy harvesting efficiency. Note that the background
noise power σ22 is ignored in (3.11), since it is typically very small as compared with
the received signal power for energy harvesting. The average harvested power at the
ER is thus given by
Qavg = Eν [Q(p(ν))] . (3.12)
3.4 Problem Formulation
In this section, both delay-limited and no-delay-limited secrecy information
transmission to the IR are considered, for which the design problems are formulated
in the following two subsections, respectively.
3.4.1 Delay-Limited Secrecy Information Transmission
First, consider the delay-limited secrecy information transmission to the IR, for
which the outage probability is a relevant metric. Given a target rate r0, the secrecy
outage probability at the IR can be expressed as [39]
δ = Pr(R(α(ν), p(ν)) < r0), (3.13)
where R(α(ν), p(ν)) is the achievable secrecy rate at fading state ν given in (3.10),
and Pr(·) denotes the probability. With CSIT known, the transmitter-aware secrecy
outage probability is generally minimized by the “secrecy channel inversion” based
power allocation strategies [39]. For convenience, the following indicator function is
introduced for the event of outage w.r.t. the target secrecy rate r0 at each fading
state ν:
X(ν) =
 1 if R(α(ν), p(ν)) < r0,0 otherwise. (3.14)
41
Chapter 3. Secrecy SWIPT in Fading Wiretap Channel
It thus follows that the outage probability can be re-expressed as δ =
Pr(R(α(ν), p(ν)) < r0) = Eν [X(ν)].
For delay-limited secrecy information transmission, we aim at minimizing the
secrecy outage probability for the IR by jointly optimizing the transmit power
allocations, i.e., {p(ν)}, as well as the transmit power splitting ratios, i.e., {α(ν)}
over different fading states, subject to a given pair of combined APC and PPC at the
Tx, i.e., Pavg and Ppeak, as well as an average harvested power constraint at the ER,




Subject to Eν [p(ν)] ≤ Pavg,
p(ν) ≤ Ppeak, ∀ν,
Eν [Q(p(ν))] ≥ Q¯,
0 ≤ α(ν) ≤ 1, ∀ν.
3.4.2 No-Delay-Limited Secrecy Information Transmission
Next, consider the no-delay-limited secrecy information transmission to the IR.
In this case, ESC is a relevant metric that is expressed as
Cs = Eν [R(α(ν), p(ν))]. (3.15)
With CSIT known, (3.15) is generally maximized by the “secrecy water-filling” based
power allocation policies [38, 39].
For no-delay-limited secrecy information transmission, we aim at maximizing the
ESC for the IR subject to the same set of constraints (APC, PPC at the Tx, and an
average harvested power constraint at the ER) as for the delay-limited case in (P1).
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Subject to Eν [p(ν)] ≤ Pavg,
p(ν) ≤ Ppeak, ∀ν,
Eν [Q(p(ν))] ≥ Q¯,
0 ≤ α(ν) ≤ 1, ∀ν.
Since the objective functions in (P1) and (P2) are in general non-convex and
non-concave, respectively, (P1) and (P2) are non-convex problems. In the following
two sections, we propose both optimal and suboptimal solutions to these two
problems, respectively.
3.5 Proposed Solutions for Delay-Limited Case
In this section, we propose both optimal and suboptimal solutions to (P1). First,
we derive the optimal power allocations, i.e., {p(ν)}, and power splitting ratios,
i.e., {α(ν)}, to solve problem (P1). Although (P1) is shown to be non-convex, it
can still be solved effectively with global optimum solutions thanks to a so-called
“time-sharing” condition proposed in [2], which is introduced shortly. “time-sharing”
condition guarantees that zero duality gap approximately holds for (P1) so that the
Lagrangian duality method can be applied subsequently.
3.5.1 Time-Sharing Condition
The objective of this section is to interpret that the time-sharing condition
implies zero duality gap and the problems of our interest such as (P1) and (P2)
satisfy this condition under the assumption of continuous joint distribution of h(ν)
and g(ν). To generalize the context in which this property is usually embedded,
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hn(xn) ≤ P ,
where xn ∈ RK is a vector of optimization variables, i.e., xn = (xn1 , . . . , xnK)T , ∀n,
fn(·)’s are RK → R functions, and hn(·) are functions that map from RK to RL.
The L power constraints are denoted by an L-vector P ∈ RL and “≤” stands for
component-wise no bigger than.
Definition 3.5.1. ([2, Definition 1 ]) Let x∗n and y
∗
n be optimal solutions to the
optimization problem (P0) with P = P x and P = P y, respectively. (P0) is said to
satisfy the time-sharing condition if ∀P x, ∀P y, and ∀θ ∈ [0, 1], ∃zn’s that are feasible
solutions to (P0), such that
∑N












Lemma 3.5.1. If problem (P0) satisfies the “time-sharing” condition defined in
definition 3.5.1, then the optimum value of problem (P0), is a concave function of P .
Proof. Let P z be a vector with P z = θP x+(1−θ)P y and z∗n be the optimal solutions
to problem (P0) with the constraint P z. For the convenience of exposition, we denote
the optimum value of problem (P0) with a constraint P by f ∗(P ). Since for any 0 ≤
θ ≤ 1, there always exists a zn such that
∑N
n=1 hn(zn) ≤ θP x+(1− θ)P y = P z, the






n=1 fn(zn), which is, on the other









∗(P x)+(1−θ)f ∗(P y).
Combining the above two facts, it follows that f ∗(P z) = f ∗(θP x + (1 − θ)P y) ≥
θf ∗(P x) + (1− θ)f ∗(P y), which completes the proof.
Next, we show that the concavity of f ∗(P ) w.r.t. P implies zero duality
gap. Theoretical proof can be referred to [83] while a graphical illustration of
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(a) An optimization problem that satisfies the
“time-sharing” condition.
(b) An optimization problem w/o
“time-sharing” condition.
Figure 3.2: “Time-sharing” condition implies zero duality gap [2].
the proof when L = 1 is given in the sequel. As it is easily verified that (P0)









n) as shown by the solid line








n) denote the coordinates
corresponding to the x-axis and y-axis, respectively. Given a fixed P , the intersection












n) = P yields exactly the
primal optimum value f ∗ to problem (P0), as denoted by R in Fig. 3.2(a). Consider










Given any λ, let xˆ∗n be the optimal solutions to (3.16). Then g(λ) can be graphically








n)) (c.f. H in








n)). Consequently, λ is equivalent













n) = P . Now
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The minimization of g(λ) can therefore be visualized as the minimum coordinate




n) = P , which is achieved by the line
tangent to (P, f ∗), i.e., g∗ = f ∗, as seen in Fig. 3.2(a). Hence we have proved that the
concavity of f ∗(P ) w.r.t. P suffices for a zero duality gap between the primal problem
(P0) and its dual. To the end of comparison, Fig. 3.2(b) depicts a situation when









n). In this case, a nonzero duality gap between g
∗ and f ∗ is
obviously seen.
The significance of “time-sharing” condition results from the fact that it is always
satisfied in multi-carrier/fading-based optimization problems in the limit sense when
the number of carriers (fading states)N goes to infinity. Following the similar analysis
given in [81], we now show that (P1) satisfies the “time-sharing” condition. Let the
optimum value of (P1) given the APC Pavg and the average harvested power constraint
Q¯ be f1(Pavg, Q¯) and meanwhile let {px(ν), αx(ν)} and {py(ν), αy(ν)} denote the
optimal solutions corresponding to f1(Pavg,x, Q¯x) = Eν [Xx(ν)] and f1(Pavg,y, Q¯y) =
Eν [Xy(ν)], respectively. Considering to interleave the solutions (px(ν), αx(ν)) and
(py(ν), αy(ν)) with a proportionality θ, denoted by pz(ν) = θpx(ν)+(1−θ)py(ν), and
αz(ν) = θαx(ν) + (1 − θ)αy(ν), within each fading state ν, we have the achievable
objective function of (P1) given by
Eν [Xz(ν)] =Eν [θXx(ν) + (1− θ)Xy(ν)]
=θEν [Xx(ν)] + (1− θ)Eν [Xy(ν)]
=θf1(Pavg,x, Q¯x) + (1− θ)f1(Pavg,y, Q¯y). (3.17)
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On the other hand, it is easily to verify that
Eν [pz(ν)] = Eν [θpx(ν) + (1− θ)py(ν)] ≤ θPavg,x + (1− θ)Pavg,y, (3.18)
and similarly
Eν [Q(pz(ν))] = Eν [θQ(px(ν)) + (1− θ)Q(py(ν))] ≥ θQ¯x + (1− θ)Q¯y. (3.19)
Note that the approximation is introduced in (3.17) where X(ν) is assumed to remain
constant within the considered fading block, which is however, automatically satisfied
under the block fading assumption given in Section 3.3. Combining (3.17), (3.18),
and (3.19), (P1) is thus proved to satisfy the “time-sharing” condition and therefore
admits zero duality gap.
3.5.2 Optimal Solution to Secrecy Outage Probability
Minimization
The Lagrangian of (P1) is expressed as
L({p(ν)}, {α(ν)}, λ, µ)
= Eν [X(ν)] + λ(Eν [p(ν)]− Pavg)− µ(Eν [Q(p(ν))]− Q¯)
= Eν [X(ν) + λp(ν)− ζµg(ν)p(ν)]− λPavg + µQ¯, (3.20)
where λ and µ are the dual variables associated with the APC, Pavg, and the
average harvested power constraint, Q¯, respectively. Then the (partial) Lagrange
dual function of (P1) is expressed as
g(λ, µ) = min
{p(ν)≤Ppeak},{α(ν)∈[0,1]}
L({p(ν)}, {α(ν)}, λ, µ). (3.21)
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The dual problem of (P1) is thus given by
(P1 − dual) : Maximize
λ,µ
g(λ, µ)
Subject to λ ≥ 0, µ ≥ 0.
The minimization problem in (3.21) can be decoupled into parallel subproblems each
for one fading state all having the same structure. Specifically, for one particular
fading state ν, define L1(p, α) = X + λp − ζµgp. Then the associated subproblem
given a pair of λ and µ is expressed as
(P1− sub) : Minimize
p,α
L1(p, α)
Subject to p ≤ Ppeak,
0 ≤ α ≤ 1.
Note that we have dropped the index ν in p(ν), α(ν) and X(ν) for brevity.
Given any 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, let p1(α) denote the minimum required power to maintain






2α¯(1−α¯)hg if 0 < α < 1,
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Moreover, define α˜ as the optimal solution to the following problem:
(P1− search) : Minimize
α
p1(α)
Subject to 0 ≤ α ≤ 1,
which can be obtained by a simple one-dimension search. Then we have the following
proposition.
Proposition 3.5.1. The optimal power allocations and power splitting ratios to
problem (P1-sub) are given as

p∗ = Ppeak, α∗ =
 α˜ if p1(α˜) ≤ Ppeak,0 if p1(α˜) > Ppeak, if g > λζµ






p∗ = 0 α∗ = 0, otherwise.
(3.24)
Proof. Please refer to Appendix A.
Remark 3.5.1. We can draw some useful insight from Proposition 3.5.1 for the
optimal power control policy for a given pair of (λ, µ). When g > λ
ζµ
, which means
a relatively better channel condition for the ER, the Tx needs to transmit with peak
power in order to maximize the harvested energy at the ER. Under this circumstance,
if furthermore, p1(α˜) > Ppeak, i.e., the outage event is inevitable, there is no need
to optimize α and thus it is set to be zero for simplicity; however, if p1(α˜) ≤ Ppeak,
the outage can be avoided by setting α to be any value satisfying p1(α) ≤ Ppeak, and
thus we set α = α˜. On the other hand, when g ≤ λ
ζµ
, we need to decide for the Tx
whether to transmit with power p1(α˜) with power splitting ratio α˜, or to shut down
its transmission to save power, based on whether p1(α˜) is smaller or larger than a
certain threshold, i.e., min( 1
λ−ζµg , Ppeak).
According to Proposition 3.5.1, with a given pair of (λ, µ), (P1-sub) can be
efficiently solved state by state based on (3.24). Problem (P1) is then iteratively
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solved by updating (λ, µ) via the ellipsoid method [84], for which the details are




∗(ν)]− Pavg, Q¯−Eν [Q(p∗(ν))]
)
, where p∗(ν) is the optimal solution
to problem (P1-sub) with given λ and µ.
3.5.3 Suboptimal Solution to Secrecy Outage Probability
Minimization
Note that the optimal solution given in Proposition 3.5.1 requires an exhaustive
search over α in (P1-search) for α˜ in each of the fading states. In this subsection,
we propose a suboptimal algorithm to solve (P1) with lower complexity based on the
principle of alternating optimization. Specifically, by fixing α(ν) = α¯(ν), ∀ν, we first




Subject to Eν [p(ν)] ≤ Pavg,
p(ν) ≤ Ppeak, ∀ν,
Eν [Q(p(ν))] ≥ Q¯.
Let the optimal solution to (P1.1) be denoted by {p¯(ν)}, with p(ν) = p¯(ν), ∀ν,




Subject to 0 ≤ α(ν) ≤ 1, ∀ν.
The above procedure is repeated until both {p(ν)} and {α(ν)} converge. In the
following, we solve (P1.1) and (P1.2), respectively.
Problem (P1.1) is a non-convex problem since the objective function is not
concave over p(ν). However, similar to (P1), it satisfies the “time-sharing” condition,
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and thus we can use Lagrange duality method to solve it approximately with zero
duality gap. Similarly as for problem (P1), problem (P1.1) can be decoupled into
parallel subproblems each for one particular fading state and expressed as (by ignoring
the fading state ν)
(P1.1− sub) : Minimize
p
L1(p)
Subject to p ≤ Ppeak,
where L1(p) = X + λp− ζµgp.
Through the similar analysis as for Proposition 3.5.1, given any 0 ≤ α¯ ≤ 1, the
optimal solution to problem (P1.1-sub) is given as
p∗ =

Ppeak if g >
λ
ζµ ,








With a given pair of (λ, µ), (P1.1-sub) can be efficiently solved state by state
based on (3.25). Problem (P1.1) can thus be iteratively solved by updating (λ, µ) via
the ellipsoid method.
Next, we derive the optimal power splitting ratios {α(ν)} for problem (P1.2) with
given {p¯(ν)}. Note that the objective function of (P1.2) is separable over different





Subject to 0 ≤ α ≤ 1.
(3.26)
Note that we have dropped the index ν for brevity.
Define Φ = {α|R(α, p¯) ≥ r0} as the set of α that can guarantee the non-outage
secrecy information transmission given p¯. If Φ = ∅, the outage cannot be avoided and
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thus any 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 can be the optimal solution to problem (3.26). Otherwise, any
α ∈ Φ is optimal to problem (3.26). To select the best solution among the feasible
α’s, we solve the following problem.
(P1.2− sub) : Maximize
α
R(α, p¯)






. Then we have the following proposition.









−1 ≤ x < 1,
1 x ≥ 1.
(3.27)
Proof. Please refer to Appendix B.
By combining both the cases of Φ 6= ∅ and Φ = ∅, the optimal solution to
problem (P1.2-sub) is given by α∗ = αˆ∗. Hence, problem (P1.2) for all ν’s can be
solved according to (3.27).
With both problems (P1.1) and (P1.2) solved, we can then iteratively solve the
two problems to obtain a suboptimal solution for (P1). It is worth noting that the
suboptimal algorithm proposed guarantees that the outage probability obtained is
non-increasing after each iteration; thus the algorithm is ensured to at least converge
to a locally optimal solution to (P1).
3.6 Proposed Solutions for No-Delay-Limited
Case
In this section, we propose both optimal and suboptimal solutions to solve (P2).
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3.6.1 Optimal Solution to ESC Maximization
First, we propose an optimal algorithm to solve (P2). Similar to Section 3.5.2,
based on the Lagrange duality method, problem (P2) can be decoupled into parallel
subproblems all having the same structure and each for one fading state. Specifically,
for one particular fading state ν, we define L2(p, α) = R(α, p) − λp + ζµgp, where
R(α, p) is given in (3.10). Then the associated subproblem to solve for fading state
ν is expressed as
(P2− sub) : Maximize
p,α
L2(p, α)
Subject to p ≤ Ppeak,
0 ≤ α < 1.
Note that we have dropped the index ν in p(ν) and α(ν) for brevity.
Since R(α, p) is not concave over p and α, problem (P2-sub) is non-convex and
thus difficult to be solved by applying convex optimization techniques. Hence, we
propose a two-stage procedure to solve (P2-sub) optimally. First, we fix α = α¯
and then solve (P2-sub) to find the corresponding optimal power allocation p¯. Let
fν(α¯) denote the optimal value of (P2-sub) given α = α¯. Next, the optimal α
∗ to
(P2-sub) is obtained by max
0≤α¯≤1
fν(α¯), which can be solved by a one-dimension search
over α¯ ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore, in the following we focus on how to solve problem (P2-sub)















where A , α¯hg2(λ−µζg)(α¯−1) ln 2, B , h(α¯−1)F−α¯hg2(α¯−1)−α¯g2σ21(λ−µζg) ln2,
C , hσ42(λ− µζg)(α¯− 1) ln 2− σ21F − hgσ22(α¯ − 1)2 − (hgσ22 + α¯hgσ22)(α¯− 1), D ,
gσ22σ
2
1(α¯−1)−hσ42(α¯−1)−σ42σ21(λ−µζg) ln 2, E , (σ21 +(1− α¯)ph)(σ22+ α¯pg)(σ22+
pg) ln 2, and F , gσ22(λ − µζg)(1 + α¯) ln 2. It can be observed from (3.28) that the
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monotonicity of L2(p, α¯) closely relates to the following cubic equation:
Ap3 +Bp2 + Cp+D = 0. (3.29)
According to fundamental theorem of algebra, there are at most three roots (counted
with multiplicity) to (3.29), denoted by x1, x2, and, x3. Define a set as X =
{x1, x2, x3}. Since p ∈ R, only real roots in X need to be taken into account. Thus,
we define another set Ψ as follows:
Ψ = {x|x ∈ R, 0 ≤ x ≤ Ppeak, x ∈ X} ∪ {0, Ppeak}, (3.30)
where 2 ≤ |Ψ| ≤ 5, with | · | denoting the cardinality of a set. Note that |Ψ| = 2 when
no real roots fall in the interval [0, Ppeak], while |Ψ| = 5 when there are three distinct
real roots in (0, Ppeak). Next, it is easy to show that the optimal p that maximizes
L2(p, α¯) over p ∈ [0, Ppeak] is obtained via a simple search over Ψ, i.e.,
p¯(λ, µ) = argmax
p∈Ψ
L2(p, α¯). (3.31)
As a result, problem (P2-sub) is solved given any pair of (λ, µ). Problem (P2)
is then solved by iteratively updating (λ, µ) by the ellipsoid method.
3.6.2 Suboptimal Solution to ESC Maximization
Note that the optimal solution to (P2) requires a one-dimension search to find
α∗ for each fading state. Thus, in this subsection, we propose a suboptimal algorithm
to solve (P2) with lower complexity based on alternating optimization. Specifically,
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Subject to Eν [p(ν)] ≤ Pavg,
p(ν) ≤ Ppeak, ∀ν,
Eν [Q(p(ν))] ≥ Q¯.
Let the optimal solution of (P2.1) be denoted by {p¯(ν)}. With p(ν) = p¯(ν), ∀ν,




Subject to 0 ≤ α(ν) ≤ 1, ∀ν.
The above two-stage procedure is repeated until both {p¯(ν)} and {α¯(ν)}
converge. In the following, we solve (P2.1) and (P2.2), respectively.
Similar to (P1.1), problem (P2.1) can be decoupled into parallel subproblems
each for one fading state and expressed as (by ignoring the fading state ν)
(P2.1− sub) : Maximize
p
L2(p)
Subject to p ≤ Ppeak,
where L2(p) = R(α¯, p)− λp+ ζµgp.
Note that problem (P2.1-sub) is equivalent to problem (P2-sub) with given α =
α¯, the solution of which has been given in (3.31). As a result, problem (P2.1-sub)
can be efficiently solved. Then, problem (P2.1) can be solved by iteratively updating
(λ, µ) via the ellipsoid method.
Next, we derive the optimal power splitting ratios {α(ν)} for problem (P2.2) with
given {p¯(ν)} obtained by solving problem (P2.1). Note that the objective function
of (P2.2) is separable over different fading states. Thus, for each fading state ν, we
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need to solve the following problem (by dropping the index ν for brevity):
(P2.2− sub) : Maximize
α
R(α, p¯)
Subject to 0 ≤ α ≤ 1.
Note that problem (P2.2-sub) is the same as problem (P2.1-sub) in Section 3.5.3,
the solution of which has already been derived in Proposition 3.5.2. Hence, problem
(P2.2) for all ν’s can be solved according to (3.27).
With both problems (P2.1) and (P2.2) solved, we can obtain a suboptimal
solution for (P2) by iteratively solving these two problems. Similar to that for
(P1), this suboptimal algorithm guarantees that the ESC is non-decreasing after
each iteration, and thus convergence to at least a local optimal solution of (P2) is
ensured.
3.7 Benchmark Schemes
In this section, we introduce two benchmark schemes, where no AN is used at the
transmitter, and the AN is used but is unknown to both the IR and ER, respectively.
First, consider the case when no AN is employed, i.e., α(ν) = 0, ∀ν for both
the delay-limited secrecy transmission and the non-delay-limited counterpart. In this

























It follows from (3.34) that the outage probability becomes δ′ = Pr(R′(p(ν)) < r0),
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or equivalently, δ′ = Eν [X ′(ν)], where X ′(ν) is modified from (3.14) as
X ′(ν) =
 1 if R′(p(ν)) < r0,0 otherwise. (3.35)
Thus, (P1) reduces to the following problem.




Subject to Eν [p(ν)] ≤ Pavg,
p(ν) ≤ Ppeak, ∀ν,
Eν [Q(p(ν))] ≥ Q¯.
Accordingly, (P2) reduces to the following problem.




Subject to Eν [p(ν)] ≤ Pavg,
p(ν) ≤ Ppeak, ∀ν,
Eν [Q(p(ν))] ≥ Q¯.
Note that (P1-NoAN) and (P2-NoAN) can be solved by simply setting α(ν) = 0
in (P1.1) and (P2.1), respectively.
Next, consider the case when the AN is used but is unknown to both the IR and
ER, i.e., it cannot be canceled by the IR any more unlike that assumed in Sections 3.5
and 3.6. In this case, the SNR expression at the ER at fading state ν is unchanged
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It follows from (3.37) that the outage probability reduces to δ′′ = Pr(R′′(α(ν), p(ν)) <
r0), or equivalently, δ
′′ = Eν [X ′′(ν)], where X ′′(ν) is also modified from (3.14) as
X ′′(ν) =
 1 if R′′(α(ν), p(ν)) < r0,0 otherwise. (3.38)
Thus, (P1) is reformulated as




Subject to Eν [p(ν)] ≤ Pavg,
p(ν) ≤ Ppeak, ∀ν,
Eν [Q(p(ν))] ≥ Q¯,
0 ≤ α(ν) ≤ 1, ∀ν.
Accordingly, (P2) is reformulated as




Subject to Eν [p(ν)] ≤ Pavg,
p(ν) ≤ Ppeak, ∀ν,
Eν [Q(p(ν))] ≥ Q¯,
0 ≤ α(ν) ≤ 1, ∀ν.
(P1-NoCancel) and (P2-NoCancel) are both non-convex problems because X ′′(ν)
and R′′(α(ν), p(ν)) are non-convex and non-concave over p(ν) and α(ν), respectively.
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However, we have the following proposition on their optimal solutions.
Proposition 3.7.1. The optimal solution to problem (P1-NoCancel) and
(P2-NoCancel) must satisfy α∗(ν) = 0, ∀ν.
Proof. For problems (P1-NoCancel) and (P2-NoCancel), suppose that the average
harvested power constraint is not present, the optimal power splitting ratios for both
problems can be shown to be α∗(ν) = 0, ∀ν, by solving max
0≤α(ν)≤1
R′′(α(ν), p¯(ν)) at









≤ 0, R′′(α, p¯) is monotonically non-increasing w.r.t. α
over the interval [0, 1], and thus attains its maximum at α = 0. Now, with the average
harvested power constraint added, since the harvested power given in (3.11) in each
fading state ν is independent of α(ν), it is also true that setting α∗(ν) = 0, ∀ν, has no
loss of optimality. Combining the above two results, we conclude that α∗(ν) = 0, ∀ν,
should be optimal for both problems. Proposition 3.7.1 is thus proved.
Proposition 3.7.1 indicates that no AN should be used in (P1-NoCancel) or
(P2-NoCancel), if it cannot be canceled by the IR. As a result, (P1-NoCancel)
and (P2-NoCancel) are equivalent to the previous two problems, (P1-NoAN) and
(P2-NoAN), respectively, which can be efficiently solved.
3.8 Numerical Results
In this section, we provide numerical examples to evaluate the performance of
our proposed optimal and suboptimal algorithms in Sections 3.5 and 3.6, against the
two benchmark schemes introduced in Section 3.7. For comparison, we also consider
the following heuristic approach to solve (P1) and (P2). First, we fix α(ν) = α¯, ∀ν,
in (P1) or (P2), i.e., a uniform power splitting ratio for all fading states is assumed;
then, we solve (P1.1) or (P2.1) to obtain the optimal {p(ν)} . For convenience,
in the sequel we refer to the above scheme as Fixed-α¯. Compared with the two
suboptimal algorithms proposed in Sections 3.5 and 3.6, which require iteratively
updating between {α(ν)} and {p(ν)} until their convergence, the algorithm of Fixed-α¯
59
Chapter 3. Secrecy SWIPT in Fading Wiretap Channel
with fixed α(ν) = α¯, ∀ν, only needs one-shot for solving {p(ν)}, and thus has a much
lower complexity.
We set Pavg = 100mW or 20dBm, Ppeak = 1W or 30dBm, ζ = 50%, and σ
2
1 =






, d ≥ d0, (3.39)
where A0 is set to be 10
−3, d denotes the distance between the Tx to the IR or ER,
d0 is a reference distance set to be 1m, and α is the path loss exponent set to be
3. It is assumed that h(ν) and g(ν) are independent exponentially distributed RVs
(accounting for short-term Rayleigh fading) with their average power values specified
by (3.39).
3.8.1 Secrecy Outage-Energy Trade-off
At first, we consider (P1) for characterizing the trade-offs between the secrecy
outage probability for the IR and the average harvested power for the ER. Specifically,
we adopt the (secrecy) O-E region [81], which consists of all the pairs of achievable
(secrecy) non-outage probability ǫ and average harvested power E for a given set of







(ǫ, E) : ǫ ≤ 1− δ, E ≤ Qavg
}
, (3.40)
where Qavg is given in (3.12), and 1 − δ is the non-outage probability w.r.t. a given
secrecy rate r0, where δ is given in (3.13). Note that by solving (P1) with different
Q¯’s, the boundary of the corresponding O-E region for each considered scheme can
be obtained accordingly.
Consider a setup where the IR and the ER are of an identical distance of 2m
to the Tx. The target secret rate is set as r0 = 6.5bps/Hz. Fig. 3.3 shows the
O-E regions of the different schemes. It is observed that compared with both the
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Figure 3.3: Achievable O-E regions with a target secret rate r0 = 6.5bits/sec/Hz by
different power allocation schemes when the IR and ER are both 2m away from the
Tx.
schemes of NoAN and NoCancel, the proposed optimal algorithm with the use of AN
achieves substantially improved O-E trade-offs thanks to the AN cancellation at the
IR. For example, when an average harvested power of 7.0µW is achieved, the secrecy
outage probability can be made less than 5% versus more than 98%. Furthermore,
it is observed that when the AN can be canceled by the IR, the O-E region achieved
by the suboptimal solution with alternating optimization is very close to that of the
optimal solution. Furthermore, it is also observed that the O-E region achieved by
Fixed-α¯ with α¯ = 0.5, ∀ν, has only negligible loss as compared to that of the optimal
solution. The reason is as follows. In this setup, both the IR and the ER are very
close to the Tx, and thus their average SNRs are high. It thus follows from (3.27)






zero, and as a result, if the transmission is on, i.e., p¯ 6= 0, the optimal power splitting
ratios to (P1.2) becomes α∗(ν) ≈ 0.5, ∀ν. Last, we observe that the O-E trade-offs
achieved by Fixed-α¯ with other fixed values of α¯ instead of α¯ = 0.5 deviate more
notably from that of the optimal solution.
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Figure 3.4: Achievable O-E regions with a target secret rate r0 = 6.5bits/sec/Hz by
different power allocation schemes when the IR and ER are 2m and 1m away from
the Tx, respectively.
Next, we consider a more challenging setup for secrecy transmission when the ER
is in more proximity to the Tx than the IR. Specifically, we assume that the IR and
ER are 2m and 1m away from the Tx, respectively. Fig. 3.4 shows the O-E regions
achieved by different schemes. Compared with Fig. 3.3, it is observed that despite
of the much worse channel condition for the IR than the ER, the achieved outage
probability for secrecy transmission is almost unchanged. Also note from Fig. 3.4
that the achievable average harvested power for the ER is as about 10 times as that
in Fig. 3.3. However, it is observed that under this setup, the outage probability
achieved by the schemes of NoAN or NoCancel is almost one due to the severely
deteriorated average SNR of the IR’s channel.
3.8.2 Secrecy Rate-Energy Trade-off
Next, we consider (P2) for characterizing the trade-offs between the ESC for the
IR and the average harvested power for the ER. Specifically, we adopt the (secrecy)
R-E region [82], which consists of all the pairs of achievable (secrecy) rate R and
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(R,E) : R ≤ Cs, E ≤ Qavg
}
, (3.41)
where Qavg is given in (3.12), and Cs is expressed as Cs = Eν [R(ν)], with R(ν)
given in (3.10), (3.34) and (3.37), respectively, for different schemes. Note that by
solving (P2) with different Q¯’s, the boundary of the corresponding R-E region for
each considered scheme can be obtained.
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Figure 3.5: Achievable R-E regions by different power allocation schemes when the
IR and ER are both 2m away from the Tx.
Similar to the case of O-E region, we first consider the setup when the IR and
the ER are of an identical distance of 2m to the Tx. Fig. 3.5 shows the R-E
regions of the different schemes. It is observed that compared with the scheme of
NoAN (or NoCancel), the proposed AN-aided optimal solution achieves substantially
improved R-E trade-offs due to the cancelable AN at the IR. For example, when
an average harvested power of 6µW is achieved, the ESC is increased by about
700%. Furthermore, it is observed that when the AN can be canceled by the IR,
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Figure 3.6: Achievable R-E regions by different power allocation schemes when the
IR and ER are 2m and 1m away from the Tx, respectively.
the R-E region achieved by the suboptimal solution is very close to that by the
optimal solution. Finally, similar to the case of O-E region, the R-E region achieved
by Fixed-α¯ with α¯ = 0.5, ∀ν, is the best compared with those achieved by other fixed
values of α¯, i.e., α¯ = 0.1 and α¯ = 0.3.
Next, we consider the same setup with unequal distances from the Tx to the ER
and IR as for Fig. 3.4. Fig. 3.6 shows the R-E regions achieved by different schemes.
Compared to Fig. 3.5, it is observed that the performance gaps between the proposed
optimal/suboptimal solutions and the scheme of NoAN or NoCancel become more
substantial.
3.9 Chapter Summary
The important issue of PLS in emerging SWIPT applications was studied in this
chapter. Under a simplified three-node SISO fading wiretap channel setup, a dual use
of the AN was proposed for both interfering with and transferring energy to the ER,
under the assumption that the AN is perfectly canceled at the IR. The transmit power
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allocations and power splitting ratios over the fading channel were jointly optimized
to minimize the outage probability for delay-limited secrecy transmission, and to
maximize the average rate for no-delay-limited secrecy transmission, respectively,
subject to the combined average and peak power constraint at the Tx, as well as an
average EH constraint at the ER. Optimal solutions to these non-convex problems
were derived, and suboptimal solutions of lower complexity were also proposed based
on the alternating optimization. Through extensive simulation results, the proposed
schemes were shown to achieve considerable (secrecy) Outage-Energy (O-E) and
(secrecy) Rate-Energy (R-E) trade-off gains, as compared to the schemes without
the use of AN.
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HJ-aided AF Relaying for Secrecy
in SWIPT Networks
4.1 Introduction
It was assumed in Chapter 3 that the ERs in the SWIPT systems attempt
to intercept the information for the IR, which might be overly protective at times,
since it is possible that some ERs are, however, helpful from the perspective that
they cooperatively contribute to communications utilizing their wirelessly harvested
energy. It is well known that in the classical three-node SISO wiretap channel,
non-zero secrecy capacity is achievable if and only if the eavesdropper sees a degraded
channel of the main one seen by the legitimate Rx. This bottleneck has been
finally broken through from the signal-processing perspective by exploiting CJ, which
selectively interferes with the legitimate Rx and the eavesdropper, respectively, such
that the equivalent eavesdropper’s channel becomes a degraded version of the main
one. The effect of CJ is also deemed further enhanced by taking advantage the
multi-antenna array gain. In spite of being a promising solution to break the
“degraded channel” assumption, the technique of CJ is nevertheless prohibitive
due to the extra supply of power for external helpers, especially when they are
ultra-low-power applications with limited battery capacity. Hence, following the
recent advances in WPCN [71], a self-sustaining harvest-and-jam (HJ) relaying
protocol is proposed in this chapter, where in the first transmission phase a
single-antenna Tx transfers confidential information to a multiple-antenna AF relay
and simultaneously power to a group of multi-antenna EH-enabled ERs, while in the
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second phase, the relay amplifies and forwards the information to the IR under the
protection of the AN generated by the ERs merely using their harvested energy from
the received signals in the first transmission phase. In particular, we study the use of
multi-antenna HJ helpers in a multi-antenna amplify-and-forward (AF) relay wiretap
channel assuming that the direct link between the source and destination is broken.
The goal is to maximize the achievable secrecy rate at the destination subject to the
transmit power constraints of the AF relay and HJ helpers. In the case of perfect
CSI, the joint optimization of the artificial noise (AN) covariance for jamming and
the AF beamforming matrix as well as suboptimal solutions with lower complexity
are presented all based on SDR, which proves to be tight in this case. Under practical
circumstances where the CSI is imperfect, the formulation of the robust optimization
is provided for maximizing the worst-case secrecy rate. Using SDR techniques, a
near-optimal robust scheme is also proposed. Numerical results are given to validate
the effectiveness of the HJ protocol.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. The AF relaying SWIPT
system model is introduced and the HJ protocol is described in Section 4.3. In
Section 4.4, the secrecy rate maximization problem with perfect CSI is presented
and the joint-optimal AN covariance and AF beamforming matrices as well as a
complexity-reduced suboptimal solution is given. Effective solutions are proposed in
Section 4.5 to tackle the case of imperfect CSI via the worst-case robust formulation.
In Section 4.6, numerical results are provided to compare different schemes. Finally,
the chapter is concluded in Section 4.7.
4.2 Related Work
4.2.1 Cooperation Strategies for PLS
PLS issues in the rapidly growing cooperative networks have attracted much
attention. Cooperative approaches, such as CJ communications, have been widely
examined [7, 8, 56, 86]. The idea is to assist the transmitter in the secrecy transmission
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by generating an AN to interfere with the eavesdropper via either multiple antennas
or external trusted helpers [21, 36, 87, 88]. However, all of those utilizing ANs require
additional supply of power and therefore incur extra system costs. Meanwhile,
collaborative use of relays to form effective beams jamming the eavesdropper, i.e.,
secure collaborative relay beamforming, has been studied for relay-wiretap channels
with single eavesdropper in [45], multiple eavesdroppers with AF relays and DF relays
in [46] and [35], respectively. All, however, assumed the availability of perfect channel
state information (CSI).
4.2.2 (Worst-Case) Robust Secrecy Optimization
The assumption of perfect CSI of the eavesdroppers appears to be too ideal
because the eavesdroppers, despite likely being subscribed users, wish to hide from
the transmitter without being cooperative in the stage of channel estimation. Even
if they are bound to help the transmitter in obtaining their CSIs to facilitate their
own communication, the CSIs at the transmitter side will change due to mobility
and Doppler effect, and may be outdated. Moreover, even for the legitimate users,
the estimated CSIs may also be subject to quantization errors due to the limited
capacity of the feedback channel, although the inaccuracy is reasonably assumed
less severe than that for the eavesdroppers. To tackle this issue, state-of-art
schemes have been developed ([89] and the references therein), among which the
worst-case secrecy rate is commonly employed to formulate the robust secrecy rate
maximization problem [29, 41, 49, 58, 88]. The robust transmit covariance design
for the secrecy rate maximization in a MISO channel overheard by multi-antenna
eavesdroppers was considered in [49] while the enhanced secrecy performance was
achieved by introducing a friendly jammer in the same scenario in [29], in which a
joint optimization of the robust transmit covariance and power allocation between
the source and the helper was studied via geometric programming. More recently,
[58] studied a joint robust design of the information beams, the AN and the energy
signals for SWIPT networks with quality-of-service (QoS) constraints.
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Note that [48] proposed robust AF relay beamforming against the eavesdropper’s
channel though, the solutions were yet suboptimal. Furthermore, of particular
relevance to this chapter is [51] that jointly optimized the AF beamforming matrices
and AN covariances in a relay wiretap channel with multiple multi-antenna AF relays
and multiple multi-antenna eavesdroppers via a worst-case robust formulation. While
their network model is similar to the concerned one in the following, the difference
between this chapter and [51] is twofold. On one hand, the AN generated by the
friendly jammers in this chapter are subject to their respective channels from the
transmitter during WPT in the first transmission phase. On the other hand, the
technique in [51, Proposition 1 ] cannot be applied herein since the AN beams and the
forwarded information are now transmitted via separate channels. As a consequence,
to the best of authors’ knowledge, the proposed worst-case based robust optimization
scheme that incorporates imperfect CSIs into all the HJ helpers, has not yet been
addressed in the literature.
4.2.3 Wireless Powered CJ
It is worth noting that devising a wireless-powered friendly jammer to enhance
PHY-layer security for a direct transmission protocol was studied in [72], in which
the “harvesting” blocks and “jamming” blocks were well exploited to compose four
different types of harvesting-jamming cycles. Compared to [72], which focused
on the dedicated scheduling of “harvest” and “jam” operations and its long-term
performance, this chapter is concerned with adaptive rate/power optimization with
multiple HJ helpers to achieve higher (worst-case) secrecy rate. Moreover, instead of
assuming perfect channels to/from the HJ helpers, the robust optimization algorithms
proposed in this chapter take imperfect CSI of legitimate channels into account as
well.
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4.3 System Model
We consider a cooperative relay wiretap channel for SWIPT over a given
frequency band as shown in Fig. 4.1(a). We assume that there is a transmitter,
named Alice, sending confidential messages to the IR, Bob, in the presence of an
eavesdropper [90], Eve, with the aid of a multi-antenna AF relay and K ERs willing
to act as HJ helpers, Hhelper = {H1, . . . ,HK}. The transmitter, ERs, and the AF
relay are deployed in a same cluster that is relatively far away from the destination
and Eve, such that there is no direct link from the transmitter to the receiver or
Eve, respectively [45, 46]. Moreover, the ERs are assumed to be located closer to the
transmitter than the AF relay in order that they can harvest sufficient amount of
energy for jamming. Furthermore, as in [48, 51], the channel between the transmitter
and the AF relay is assumed to be perfectly known in a global fashion throughout
the chapter. In addition, Alice, Bob and Eve are all equipped with single antenna,
while the AF relay and each of the K helpers have the same number of Nt multiple
antennas.
Using two equal slots for the HJ relaying protocol, as shown in Fig. 4.1(b), for
the first phase, Alice sends a confidential message to the relay while simultaneously
transferring energy to the K helpers; for the second phase, the relay amplifies and
forwards the message to Bob while the K helpers perform CJ using their respective
harvested energy from the first transmission phase, to compromise Eve. In this
chapter, we assume a quasi-static fading environment and for convenience denote
h0 ∈ CNt×1 as the complex channel from the transmitter to the relay and hk ∈ CNt×1,
k = 1, . . . , K, as that from the transmitter to the kth helper; h˜0 as the transpose of
the complex channel from the relay to Bob and h˜k ∈ CNt×1, k = 1, . . . , K, as that
from Hk to Bob; g0 ∈ CNt×1 and gk ∈ CNt×1, k = 1, . . . , K, as those from the relay
and Hk to Eve, respectively.




Pss + nr, (4.1)
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(b) The HJ relaying protocol.
Figure 4.1: HJ-enabled cooperative relaying for secure SWIPT.
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where s is a circularly symmetric complex Gaussian (CSCG) RV, denoted by s ∼
CN (0, 1) and nr is the additive complex noise vector, denoted by nr ∼ CN (0, σ2rI).
Also, Ps denotes the given transmit power at Alice. Further, the received signal at






where n′k is the additive noise, denoted by n
′
k ∼ CN (0, σ2hI).




Pss‖2] = ηPs ‖hk‖2 , ∀k, (4.3)
where 0 < η ≤ 1 denotes the EH efficiency.
In the second transmission phase, the linear operation at the AF relay can be
represented by
x′ =Wyr, (4.4)
where x′ ∈ CNt×1 is the retransmit signal at the AF relay and W ∈ CNt×Nt is the

































) ≤ Pr. (4.6)
In the meantime, each Hk will help generate an AN nk ∈ CNt×1 to interfere with
Eve. Similar to [21], we assume that nk’s are independent CSCG vectors denoted by
nk ∼ CN (0,Qk), ∀k, since the worst-case noise for Eve is known to be Gaussian. In
addition, each Hk has a transmit power constraint due to its harvested energy in the
previous transmission phase, i.e., tr(Qk) ≤ ηPs‖hk‖2 (c.f. (4.3)), ∀k.
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0Wnr + nb, (4.7)
where nb ∼ CN (0, σ2bI) is the additive noise at Bob. Similarly, the received signal at










0Wnr + ne, (4.8)
where ne ∼ CN (0, σ2eI). According to (4.7) and (4.8), the SINR at Bob and Eve can










































[log2(1 + γb)− log2(1 + γe)]+ . (4.11)
4.4 Joint AN-AF Beamforming with Perfect CSI
4.4.1 Problem Formulation for Perfect CSI
We aim to maximize the secrecy rate at Bob subject to the transmit power
constraints at the AF relay and each individual helper Hk, k = 1, . . . , K. Thus, our
73
Chapter 4. HJ-aided AF Relaying for Secrecy in SWIPT Networks





tr (Qk) ≤ ηPs ‖hk‖2 , ∀k, (4.12b)
Qk  0, ∀k. (4.12c)
Next, we define a new function F¯ ({Qk},W ) as




It can be easily shown that the optimal solution {Q∗k}, W ∗ to (P1), is also optimal
for (P1′) given by
(P1′) : max
{Qk},W
F¯ ({Qk},W ) s.t. (4.12a)− (4.12c). (4.14)
Hence, we focus on solving problem (P1′) in the rest of the chapter. However,
since (P1′) is in general a non-convex problem that is hard to solve, we will reformulate
it into a two-stage optimization problem. First, we constrain the SINR at Eve to be
γ¯e, it thus follows from (4.13) that F¯ ({Qk},W ) is maximized when γb is maximized,







































LetH(γ¯e) denote the optimal value of (P1
′.1) given γ¯e. Then (P1′) can be equivalently
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Lemma 4.4.1. Problem (P1′) has the same optimal value as (P1′.2), and the same
optimal solution as (P1′.1) when γ¯e takes the optimal solution for (P1′.2).
Proof. The proof follows from [57, Lemmas 4.1-4.2 ].
Therefore, (P1′) can be solved in the following two steps. First, given any γ¯e > 0,
we solve (P1′.1) to attain H(γ¯e); then we solve (P1′.2) to obtain the optimal γ¯∗e .
4.4.2 Optimal Solution for Perfect CSI
Here, we consider solving problem (P1′.1) by jointly optimizing the covariance
matrix for the AN at each of the HJ helper, Qk’s, and the beamforming matrix,W .
To facilitate the analysis in the sequel, we rewrite the following equations in line with
our definition of vec(·) [91, Chapter 13]:












0 = ‖(gT0 ⊗ I)vec(W )‖2. (4.21)





































‖Φw‖2 ≤ Pr, (4.22b)
(4.12b), (4.12c),
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in which w = vec(W ), f1 = vec(h˜0h
T
0 ), f 2 = vec(g0h
T
0 ), Y 1 = h˜
T
0 ⊗ I and Y 2 =
gT0 ⊗ I.









2 , Y 1 , Y
H
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HΦ. Then by ignoring the



























tr(ΦX) ≤ Pr, (4.23b)
tr (Qk) ≤ ηPs ‖hk‖2 , ∀k, (4.23c)
X  0, Qk  0, ∀k. (4.23d)














b = 1, (4.24a)












tr(ΦX) ≤ τPr, (4.24c)
tr (Qk) ≤ τηPs ‖hk‖2 , ∀k, (4.24d)
X  0, Qk  0, ∀k, τ ≥ 0. (4.24e)
Lemma 4.4.2. The constraints in (4.24a) and (4.24b) can be replaced by
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e), respectively, where both inequalities will be activated when
problem (P1′) obtains its optimum value.
Proof. See [93, Appendix A].
Since problem (P1′.1-RW-SDR) is a standard convex optimization problem and
satisfies the Slater’s condition, its gap with its dual problem is zero [84]. Now,
let λ denote the dual variable associated with the equality constraint in (4.24a),
α associated with the other equality constraint in (4.24b), β0 associated with the
transmit power constraint for the AF relay in (4.24c), {βk} associated with the
transmit power constraints for each Hk in (4.24d), and ζ associated with τ . Then the
Lagrangian of problem (P1′.1-RW-SDR) is given by
L(Ω) = tr(AX) +
K∑
k=1
tr(BkQk) + ζτ + λ, (4.25)
where Ω denotes the set of all primal and dual variables,







k − βkI, ∀k, (4.27)




Proposition 4.4.1. The optimal solution, (X∗, {Q∗k}, τ ∗), to (P1′.1-RW-SDR)
satisfies the following conditions:
1. rank(Qk)
 ≥ Nt − 2, if β∗k = 0,= 1, if β∗k > 0, ∀k;
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where an ≥ 0 ∀n, b > 0, rc = rank(C∗) (c.f. (C.2)) and ξ ∈ CN2t ×1 is a vector
orthogonal to Ξ = {ηn}N
2
t −rc
n=1 , which consists of orthonormal basis for null(C
∗);
3. According to (4.29), if rank(X∗) > 1, then we have the following sufficient
condition to yield an optimal solution of X with rank-one:
Xˆ
∗






τˆ ∗ = τ ∗ +∆τ, (4.32)






















Proof. See Appendix C.
Note from Proposition 4.4.1 that if rank(X∗) = 1, then the optimal w∗ to





= X∗/τ ∗. Namely, the upper-bound optimum value obtained by solving
(P1′.1-RW-SDR) is tight in this case; otherwise, (X∗, {Q∗k}, τ ∗) only serves as an
upper-bound solution.
Now, we show that this upper-bound is always achievable by a rank-one X∗.
When rank(X∗) > 1, firstly, we check whether the sufficient condition proposed in
(4.33) is satisfied. If it is met, then a direct reconstruction of (Xˆ
∗
, {Qˆ∗k}, τˆ ∗) with
rank(Xˆ
∗
) = 1 follows according to (4.30)–(4.32); otherwise, assume that any optimal
solution to problem (P1′.1-RW-SDR) has no zero component, i.e., (X∗ 6= 0, {Q∗k 6=
0}, τ ∗ 6= 0). In addition, the number of optimization variables and the number of
shaping constraints are denoted by L and M , respectively. Since L = K + 2 and
M = K + 3 for (P1′.1-RW-SDR), we have M ≤ L + 2 satisfied. Thus, according
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to [94, Proposition 3.5 ], (P1′.1-RW-SDR) has an optimal solution of Xˆ
∗
that is
rank-one. Also, the detailed rank reduction procedure based on an arbitrary-rank
solution has been given in [94, Algorithm 1]. Algorithm 4.1 for solving (P1′) is shown
in Table 5.1.
Table 4.1: Algorithm I for (P1′)
• Initialize γ¯e search = 0 : α : γ¯emax and i = 0
• Repeat
1) Set i = i+ 1;
2) Given γ¯e = γ¯e search(i),
solve (P1′.1-RW-SDR) and obtain H(γ¯(i)e ).
• Until i = L, where L = ⌊ γ¯emax
α
⌋ + 1 is the length of γ¯e search













• Given γ¯∗e , solve (P1′.1-RW-SDR) to obtain (X∗, {Q∗k}, τ ∗)
if rank(X∗) = 1, apply EVD on X∗ such that X∗ = w∗w∗H ;
else if the sufficient condition in (4.33) is satisfied,





using the procedure in [94, Algorithm 1].
end
end
• RecoverW ∗ = vec−1(w∗)
4.4.3 Suboptimal Solutions for Perfect CSI
Optimal Solution Structure based Scheme
We propose a relay beamforming design for (P1′.1) based on the optimal
structure of W [10, Theorem 3.1]. First, define H1 , [h˜0 g0] and H2 , [h0 g0].
Then express the truncated singular-value decomposition (SVD) of H1 and H2,
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respectively, as
H1 = U 1Σ1V
H
1 , (4.34)
H2 = U 2Σ2V
H
2 . (4.35)
Lemma 4.4.3. The optimal relay beamforming matrix W for problem (P1′.1) is of
the form:








where B ∈ C2×2 and C ∈ C2×(Nt−2) are two unknown matrices, and U⊥1 , U⊥2 ∈
CNt×(Nt−2) satisfy U⊥1 (U
⊥
1 )
H = I −U 1UH1 , U⊥2 (U⊥2 )H = I −U 2UH2 , respectively.
Proof. First, we construct W as




















where B ∈ C2×2, C ∈ C2×(Nt−2), D ∈ C(Nt−2)×2 and E ∈ C(Nt−2)×(Nt−2)












0 = ‖BHUT1 h˜
†
0‖2 + ‖CHUT1 h˜
†
0‖2.
Similarly, we also have |gT0Wh0|2 = |gT0U †1BUH2 h0|2 and gT0WWHg†0 =
‖gT0U †1B‖2 + ‖gT0U †1C‖2. Thus, γb (c.f. (4.9)) and γe (c.f. (4.10)) do not depend
on D and E.
Next, by substituting (4.37) for W in (4.5), we have Pr ≥ Ps(‖BUH2 h0‖2 +
‖DUH2 h0‖2) + σ2r tr(BHB + CHC +DHD + EHE). Since (P1′) is a secrecy rate
maximization problem subject to the given Pr, it turns out that given the optimum
secrecy rate, Pr is the minimized required power by taking D = 0 and E = 0, while














h0, h¯0, g¯0, respectively. We thus simplify
|h˜T0Wh0|2 and |gT0Wh0|2 as |¯˜hT0Bh¯0|2 and |g¯T0Bh¯0|2, respectively. Since C has
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2(Nt − 2) complex variables, we devise a suboptimal design for C to reduce the size
of variables by (Nt − 2). Specifically, let C = u′⊥vT , where u′ = ¯˜h†0/‖¯˜h0‖ such







0 and (4.5) can be
reduced to ‖BH ¯˜h†0‖2, ‖BH g¯†0‖2+ |v†u′⊥H g¯†0|2 and Ps‖Bh¯0‖2+σ2r tr(BHB)+σ2r‖v‖2,










hT0 ⊗ I, Y ′2 = g¯T0 ⊗ I, and Φ′ = (I ⊗Θ′T )1/2 with Θ′ = Psh¯0h¯H0 + σ2rI; Z = bbH ,























The suboptimal design for problem (P1′.1) by ignoring the rank constraints on Z















b = 1, (4.38a)




















Z) + σ2rtr(Z) + σ
2
rtr(V ) ≤ τPr, (4.38c)
tr (Qk) ≤ τηPs ‖hk‖2 , ∀k, (4.38d)
τ ≥ 0, Qk  0, ∀k, Z  0, V  0. (4.38e)
Remark 4.4.1. The variables in (P1′.1-sub1-SDR), i.e., Z ∈ C4×4, V ∈
C(Nt−2)×(Nt−2), are of much reduced size. Further, the reconstruction of v∗ from V
can be briefly explained as follows. Given the Lagrangian of (P1′.1-sub1-SDR), the
KKT conditions w.r.t. V ∗ are given by
(α∗γ¯e|g¯T0u′⊥|2 − β∗0σ2r )I +U ∗ = 0, (4.39)
U ∗V ∗ = 0. (4.40)
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where v0 ∈ C(Nt−2)×1 is an arbitrary vector with unit norm. With V solved,
(P1′.1-sub1-SDR) reduces to a problem with similar structure as (P1′.1-RW-SDR),
and the proof for existence of a rank-one Z can be referred to Proposition 4.4.1.
Zero-forcing
We propose a low-complexity zero-forcing (ZF) scheme for (P1′.1), in which the
jamming signal places a null at Bob, and then a semi-closed form solution for W
is derived. In line with the principle of ZF jamming [36], the jamming signal nk










k , and n˜k ∈ C(Nt−1)×1
is an arbitrary random vector, n˜k ∼ CN (0, Q˜k), k = 1, . . . , K. Thus, given


































turns out to be
∑K
k=1 ηPs‖hk‖2‖g˜k‖2, which is denoted by q.




s.t. σ2r tr(Y 1X) + τσ
2
b = 1, (4.41a)
Pstr(F 2X) ≤ γ¯e
(





tr(ΦX) ≤ τPr, (4.41c)
X  0, τ ≥ 0. (4.41d)
Proposition 4.4.2. (P1′.1-sub2-SDR) must yield a rank-one solution, i.e., X∗ =
ww∗, such that w∗ = µνmax(Z∗), and
Z∗ =PsF 1 − λ∗σ2rY 1 − α∗PsF 2 + α∗γ¯eσ2rY 2 − β∗0Φ, (4.42)
where νmax(Z
∗) represents the eigenvector corresponding to the largest eigenvalue of
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. Also, λ∗, α∗ and β∗0 are the optimal dual
variables associated with (4.41a)–(4.41c), respectively.
Proof. See Appendix D.
The only problem involved in Proposition 4.4.2 is the dual problem of
(P1′.1-sub2-SDR), which admits a much simpler structure to solve than the primal
one.
4.5 Joint AN-AF Beamforming with Imperfect
CSI
4.5.1 Problem Formulation for Imperfect CSI
We use a deterministic spherical model [29, 49] to characterize the resulting CSIs’
uncertainties such that
G0 ={g0|g0 = gˆ0 +∆g0,∆gH0 W 0∆g0 ≤ 1}, (4.43a)
Gk ={gk|gk = gˆk +∆gk,∆gHk W k∆gk ≤ 1}, ∀k, (4.43b)
H˜0 ={h˜0|h˜0 = ˆ˜h0 +∆h˜0,∆h˜H0 W ′0∆h˜0 ≤ 1}, (4.43c)
H˜k ={h˜k|h˜k = ˆ˜hk +∆h˜k,∆h˜Hk W ′′k∆h˜k ≤ 1}, ∀k, (4.43d)





hk’s and hˆk’s are the estimates of the corresponding channels;







k’s determine the shape of each error region. W.l.o.g.,



















k represent the respective size of the bounded
error regions, k = 1, . . . , K.
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) ≤ Pr, (4.44a)
tr (Qk) ≤ ηPs min
hk∈Hk,∀k
‖hk‖2 , ∀k, (4.44b)
Qk  0, ∀k. (4.44c)




1 + Fˆ (γ¯e)
, (4.45)

































tr(ΦX) ≤ Pr, (4.46b)
tr (Qk) ≤ ηPs min
hk∈Hk,∀k
‖hk‖2 , ∀k, (4.46c)
rank(X) = 1, (4.46d)
X  0, Qk  0, ∀k. (4.46e)
As stated in Lemma 4.4.1, similarly, (P2′) can be proved to have the same optimal
value as (P2′.2) and the same optimal solution as (P2′.1) when γ¯e takes its optimal
value to (P2′.2). As a result, (P2′) can be solved in a two-stage fashion as well.
Specifically, given any γ¯e, we first solve (P2
′.1) to obtain Hˆ(γ¯e) and then search for
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the optimal γ¯e to (P2
′.2).
4.5.2 Solutions for Imperfect CSI

















s.t.(4.46a)− (4.46c), (4.46e). (4.47a)
It is worth noting that due to the rank-one relaxation of (P2′.1-RW-SDR-Eqv),
the solution provided by (P2′.1-RW-SDR-Eqv) in general yields an upper-bound
for Hˆ(γ¯e), which may not be achievable. However, in the sequel we insist on
solving (P2′.1-RW-SDR-Eqv) that is regarded as an upper-bound benchmark for our
proposed problem detailed later in this subsection.
Solutions to (P2′.1-RW-SDR-Eqv)
To make the “max-min” objective function of (4.47) tractable, we first rewrite



















(4.46a)− (4.46c), (4.46e). (4.48b)
As there are potentially infinite number of constraints in (4.48a), (4.46a), and (4.46c),
they are semi-indefinite and thus intractable. In the following, we equivalently
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transform these constraints to tractable ones using S-Procedure and a generalized
S-Procedure given in Lemmas 4.5.1 and 4.5.2, respectively.
Lemma 4.5.1. (S-Procedure [84]) Let fm(x), m = 1, 2 be defined as
fm(x) = x
HAmx+ 2ℜ{bHmx}+ cm, (4.49)
where Am = A
H
m ∈ CN×N , bm ∈ CN×1 and cm ∈ R, and ℜ gives the real part of the
input entity. Then the implication f1(x) ≥ 0 ⇒ f2(x) ≥ 0 holds if and only if there





  0, (4.50)
provided there exists a point xˆ such that fm(xˆ) > 0, m = 1, 2.
Lemma 4.5.2. ([95, Theorem 3.5]) The robust block quadratic matrix inequality
(QMI),
 H F +GX
(F +GX)H C +XHB +BHX +XHAX
  0,
for all I −XHDX  0, (4.51)
is equivalent to










  0. (4.52)












k − δσ2b ≥ 0. (4.53)
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Recalling the following matrix equalities in line with our definition of vec(·) operation:
tr(ABT ) = vecT (A)vec(B), (4.54)
vec(AXB) = (A⊗BT )vec(X), (4.55)
(A⊗B)T = AT ⊗BT , (4.56)
it follows that
tr(F 1X) = h˜
T
(h0 ⊗ I)X(hH0 ⊗ I)h˜
†
, (4.57)
tr(Y 1X) = h˜
T
(I ⊗X)h˜†, (4.58)
where h˜ ∈ CN3t ×1 = vec(h˜T0 ⊗I). The equivalent channel model for h˜ is given by h˜ =
ˆ˜
h+∆h˜, where ‖∆h˜‖2 ≤ Ntǫ′0 (c.f. (4.43)). By introducing X ′′ = (h0⊗I)X(hH0 ⊗I)







′′ − δσ2rX ′)∆h˜
†








k − δσ2b ≥ 0. (4.59)
Hence, according to Lemma 4.5.1, the implication ‖∆h˜‖2 ≤ Ntǫ′0 ⇒ (4.59) holds




  0, (4.60)
where H1 = PsX
′′ − δσ2rX ′ + w(0)I, F 1 = (PsX ′′ − δσ2rX ′)ˆ˜h† and c1 =
ˆ˜
hT (PsX






k − δσ2b − w(0)Ntǫ′0. Now, (4.48a) has been
equivalently reformulated as (4.60). To further cope with channel uncertainties with
regards to h˜k’s such that (4.60) holds for h˜k ∈ H˜k, k = 1, . . . , K, we need the
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following proposition.
Proposition 4.5.1. The semi-indefinite constraint of (4.59) can be equivalently















































 , k > 1;
PsX










 , k > 1;
(PsX























(l), k = 1, . . . , K. In addition, G
(k)
1 ∈ C(N3t +(k−1)Nt)×Nt = 0, B(k)1 = −δQk ˆ˜h†k,
A
(k)
1 = −δQk, k = 1, . . . , K, and {w(k) ≥ 0} denote pertinent auxiliary variables.
Proof. See Appendix E.














k − γ¯eσ2e ≤ 0, (4.64)
where g ∈ CN2t ×1 = vec(gT0 ⊗ I) and the equivalent imperfect channel model is given
by g = gˆ +∆g such that ‖∆g‖2 ≤ Ntǫ0.
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Proposition 4.5.2. The semi-indefinite constraint of (4.64) is satisfied if and only















































 , k > 1;










 , k > 1;
































2 = γ¯eQk, k = 1, . . . , K.
Proof. See Appendix F.
Last, we rewrite (4.46c) to facilitate the robust optimization against the errors
introduced by ∆hk’s. By applying Lemma 4.5.1, (4.46c) holds if and only if there
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exists µk ≥ 0, k = 1, . . . , K, such that the following LMI constraint is met:ηPsI + µkI ηPshˆk
ηPshˆ
H
k ηPs‖hˆk‖22 − tr(Qk)− µkǫ′k
  0, ∀k. (4.69)




s.t. (4.61), (4.65), (4.69), (4.46b), (4.46e).
Because of the non-convex term such as δX ′ in (4.61), problem
(P2′.1-RW-SDR-Eqv) remains very hard to solve. We thus use the bisection method
[84] w.r.t. δ to solve it. However, using bisection in addition to solving (P2′.2) by
one-dimension search over γ¯e may lead to very high complexity. As a result, we
propose an alternative problem to approximate Hˆ(γ¯e).
Solutions to (P2′.1-RW-SDR)


































tr(ΦX) ≤ τPr, (4.70d)
tr (Qk) ≤ τηPs min
hk∈Hk,∀k
‖hk‖2 , ∀k, (4.70e)
X  0, Qk  0, ∀k, τ ≥ 0. (4.70f)
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Remark 4.5.1. It is worth noting that as the numerator and the denominator of the
objective function in (P2′.1) are coupled by common uncertainty h˜0, Charnes-Cooper
transformation, in general, cannot be applied to realize equivalent decoupling. As
a result, (P2′.1-RW-SDR) yields a more conservative approximation for Hˆ(γ¯e) than
(P2′.1-RW-SDR-Eqv). However, considering that (P2′.1-RW-SDR) needs to be solved
only once for given γ¯e in contrast with (P2
′.1-RW-SDR-Eqv) requring isection over
δ, we exploit it in the sequel. The effectiveness of this approximation will be evaluated
in Section 4.6.2.






Pstr(F 1X) ≥ δ, (4.71a)
(4.70b)–(4.70f). (4.71b)
First, by rewriting F = f †1f
T
1 , where f 1 = fˆ 1 +∆f 1, in line with Lemma 4.5.1,
the implication ‖∆f 1‖2 ≤ ‖h0‖2ǫ′0 ⇒ (4.71a) holds if and only if there exists s′(0) ≥ 0







1 − s′(0)ǫ′0‖h0‖22 − δ
  0. (4.72)
Next, as tr(Y 1X) = y
T
1X
′y†1 (c.f. (4.58)), where y1 = vec(h˜
T
0 ⊗ I), after some
manipulation, (4.70b) holds if and only if there exists s′′(0) ≥ 0 such that
s′′(0)I − σ2rX ′ −σ2rX ′yˆ†1
−σ2r yˆT1X ′ c
  0, (4.73)






k − τσ2b + 1 − s′′(0)Ntǫ′0. Then (4.70b) can be
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rewritten as
(4.73) for h˜k ∈ H˜k, ∀k, (4.74)
which is handled by the following proposition.













































k = 2, . . . , K;
H¯
(1)













i −τσ2b +1−s′′(0)Ntǫ′0−Σk−1l=1 s′′(l), k = 1, . . . , K, and {s′′(k) ≥ 0} denote
the auxiliary variables.
Proof. We only sketch the proof herein since it is quite similar to that of
Proposition 4.5.1. First, apply Lemma 4.5.2 to (4.73) given h˜k’s, k = 2, . . . , K,
fixed and obtain an initial LMI. Next, manipulate the resulting LMI according to the
property of Schur-Complements to facilitate using Lemma 4.5.2. Then, repeat this
procedure until all the semi-indefinite constraints w.r.t. h˜k’s have been incorporated
into an equivalent LMI.
Proposition 4.5.4. The constraint in (4.70c) is guaranteed if and only if there exists
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s(k) ≥ 0, k = 1, . . . , K, such that the following LMI holds:
H(K) F (K) G(K)








  0, (4.77)
where H(k) and F (k) are recursively given by
H(k) =
A′(k−1) + s(k−1)Iǫk−1 G(k−1)H
G(k−1) H(k−1)




k = 2, . . . , K;
H(1) = −PsX ′′ + γ¯eσ2rX ′ + s(0)I,
F (1) = (−PsX ′′ + γ¯eσ2rX ′) gˆ†,
(4.78)






′(k) = γ¯eQk, c






















k = 1, . . . , K, and {s(k) ≥ 0} denote the auxiliary variables.
Proof. It is observed that (4.70c) differs from (4.46a) in the only respect that σ2e is
replaced by τσ2e . Hence the proof for Proposition 4.5.2 can be directly applied herein
by substituting τσ2e for σ
2
e .
Last, by replacing “ηPs” in (4.46c) with “τηPs” in (4.70e), (4.70e) can be replaced
by a similar LMI as (4.69), denoted by (4.71e′), in which the pertinent auxiliary
variables are denoted by {µk ≥ 0}.
Consequently, the equivalent reformulation for problem (P2′.1-RW-SDR) can be
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s.t. (4.72), (4.75), (4.77), (4.71e′), (4.70d), (4.70f),
s(0) ≥ 0, s′(0) ≥ 0, s′′(0) ≥ 0, (4.79a)
s(k) ≥ 0, s′′(k) ≥ 0, µk ≥ 0, ∀k. (4.79b)
4.5.3 Proposed Rank-One Solutions for Imperfect CSI
(P2′.1-RW-SDR) is convex and can be solved efficiently by convex optimization
tools such as CVX. Next, we derive the Lagrangian of (P2′.1-RW-SDR). Note that
in the following expression, we only consider the uncertainties regarding h˜0, hk’s,
h˜k’s, g0 and gk’s when K = 1 for the purpose of simplicity and the results can be
easily extended to the case of K > 1. Denote the dual variables associated with
(4.70d), (4.72), (4.75) and (4.77) by β0,W , V and Y , respectively. Then the partial
Lagrangian of (P2′.1-RW-SDR) w.r.t. X is
L(Ω) = tr(A¯X), (4.80)
where Ω is the set of all primal and dual variables, and



























1 ; W i,j, i, j = 1, 2, V i,j, i, j = 1, . . . , 3 and Y i,j , i, j = 1, . . . , 3
are the block submatrices of W ∈ C(N2t +1)×(N2t +1), V ∈ C(N3t +Nt+1)×(N3t +Nt+1) and
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Y ∈ C(N3t +2Nt+1)×(N3t +2Nt+1) with the same size as block submatrices in (4.72), (4.75)









Y 2,1 = gˆ
†yT1,2 and Y 2,2 = y2,2gˆ




2,2 are the ith





2,2 are the ith block diagonal submatrices of Y 2,1 ∈ CN3t ×N3t ,
and Y 2,2 ∈ CN3t ×N3t , respectively.









where a¯n ≥ 0, ∀n, b¯ > 0, and ξ¯ ∈ CN2t ×1 is a unit-norm vector orthogonal to Ξ¯
(c.f. (4.29));
2. According to (4.82), if rank(X∗) > 1, i.e., there exists at least one a¯n > 0, we






δˆ∗ = δ∗, (4.84)
τˆ ∗ = τ ∗, (4.85)
while {Qˆ∗k} are obtained by solving the following feasibility problem provided
that Xˆ
∗






s.t. (4.75) given Xˆ
∗
, τˆ ∗, (4.71e′) given τˆ ∗,
Qk  0, µk ≥ 0, ∀k,
s′′(0) ≥ 0, s′′(k) ≥ 0, ∀k.
Proof. According to the KKT conditions of (P2′.1-RW-SDR), we have A¯∗X∗ = 0,
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where A¯
∗
is given by (4.81). Define C¯
∗
= A¯
∗ −w∗2,2PsFˆ 1 with rank(C¯∗) denoted by
r¯c. Then take the similar procedure as Case I and Case II in Appendix C, it can







Next, we prove the second half of Proposition 4.5.5. According to (4.83),
Pstr(Fˆ 1Xˆ
∗
) = Pstr(Fˆ 1X
∗) ≥ min
h˜0∈H˜0
Pstr(F 1X) ≥ δ∗, (4.86)
and thus (4.71a) holds true, which implies that the same optimal value as
(P2′.1-RW-SDR), i.e., δ∗, is achievable. However, since the constraint in (4.70c)
is ignored, the global optimal γ¯∗e for (P2
′.2) via solving (P2′.1-RW-SDR) is probably

























, and thus suboptimal for (P2′).
The scheme that solves (P2′) is summarized in Table 4.2.
4.6 Numerical Results
Here we provide numerical examples to validate our results. We assume a typical
scenario where the K helpers are evenly distributed around Alice with a radius of
ρk = 2m and θk =
2π(k−1)
K
(radian by default), where θk is the angle of direction
(w.r.t. the Alice-relay link by default) of the kth helper, k = 1, . . . , K. Alice, Bob
and Eve are, w.l.o.g., assumed to have the same distance away from the AF relay
with their angle of direction π, π/6 and 11π/6, respectively. We also assume channel
models with both large-scale fading, i.e., path loss and shadowing, and small-scale







, for d ≥ d0, (4.87)
where z is a log-normal RV capturing the effect of shadowing with the standard
derivation σ = 4dB, A0 = 10
−3, d is the distance, d0 is a reference distance set to be
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Table 4.2: Algorithm II for (P2′)
• Initialize γ¯′e search = 0 : α′ : γ¯′emax and i = 0
• Repeat
1) Set i = i+ 1;
2) Given γ¯e = γ¯
′
e search(i),
solve (P2′.1-RW-SDR) and obtain Hˆ(γ¯(i)e ).
• Until i = L′, where L′ = ⌊ γ¯′emax
α′
⌋+ 1 is the length of γ¯′e search













• Given γ¯∗e , solve (P2′.1-RW-SDR) to obtain (X∗, {Q∗k}, δ∗, τ ∗)









, δˆ∗ and τˆ ∗,
obtain {Qˆ∗k} by solving (P2′.1-RW-SDR-sub).
end
• RecoverW ∗ = vec−1(w∗)
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1m, and α = 2 is the path loss exponent. Specifically, the channels including hk’s,
h0, h˜0 and g0, are assumed to suffer from Rician fading while the channels from
the HJ helpers to Bob (h˜k’s) and Eve (gk’s) follow Rayleigh distribution due to the
missing of line-of-sight (LOS) components with their respective average gain specified








hˇk, where h¯k is the
LOS component with ‖h¯k‖22 = D (c.f. (4.87)), hˇk is the Rayleigh fading component
denoted by hˇk ∼ CN (0, DI), and KR is the Rician factor set to be 3. Note that for
the involved LOS component, we use the far-field uniform linear antenna array to
model the channels [97]. In addition, unless otherwise specified, the number of HJ
helpers, K is set to be 5; the AF relay is assumed to be 5m away from Alice; the EH




e = −50dBm. The results presented in Section
4.6.1 are obtained by averaging over 500 times of independent trials.
4.6.1 The Perfect CSI Case
We compare the proposed optimal solutions with three suboptimal schemes
in the case of perfect CSI. One suboptimal scheme, denoted by “Suboptimal 1”,
is introduced in Section 4.4.3 by exploiting the optimal structure of W . The
other described in Section 4.4.3 is known as optimal null-space ZF, denoted by
“Suboptimal 2”. Specifically, each jamming beam nk is restricted to lie in the
orthogonal space of h˜
†
k such that nk’s cause no interference to the IR while maximizing
its effect of jamming at the eavesdropper. As a benchmark, we also present the
well-known isotropic jamming that is particularly useful when there is no Eve’s CSI
known at each HJ helper, Hk, ∀k [50], denoted by “Suboptimal 3”. Note that the
difference between “Suboptimal 2” and “Suboptimal 3” only lies in the design of
jamming noise, for which the former also aligns the jamming noise to an equivalent
Eve’s channel to confront Eve with most interference, while the latter transmits
isotropic jamming with n˜k ∼ CN (0, ηPs‖hk‖2/(Nt − 1)), k = 1, . . . , K, in directions
orthogonal to h˜k’s, due to lack of knowledge of Eve’s channel and thus is expected
to be less efficient than “Suboptimal 2” with perfect CSI.
98





































Figure 4.2: Secrecy rate versus Alice’s transmit power with perfect CSI.
First, we study the secrecy rate at the receiver versus the transmit power of
the transmitter, Ps with Pr = 10dBm. Fig. 4.2 demonstrates that for both cases of
Nt = 3 and Nt = 5, the average secrecy rate increases and tends to be saturated as
Ps goes to 30dBm. It also illustrates that “suboptimal 1” and “suboptimal 2” closely
approach the optimal solutions while “Suboptimal 3” is outperformed more succinctly
with larger number of antennas at the AF relay and the HJ helpers. Moreover, with
Nt increasing, the average secrecy rate gets larger as a result of the higher array gain
of the AF relay and more available power transferred to the HJ helpers.
In addition, we show in Fig. 4.3 the secrecy rate achieved by different schemes
versus the transmit power of the AF relay, Pr with Ps = 30dBm. It is seen that the
average secrecy rate first grows faster and then slower, since when Pr increases, not
only the desired signal but also the noise yielded from the first transmission phase is
amplified to a larger extent. In addition, the performance gap between the optimal
scheme and suboptimal schemes is almost negligible. Similar to Fig. 4.2, “Suboptimal
3” appears to have certain performance loss from the optimality but is considered as
a promising scheme when no Eve’s CSI is available at the HJ helpers.
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Figure 4.3: Secrecy rate versus the relay’s transmit power with perfect CSI.
4.6.2 The Imperfect CSI Case
Now, we consider the imperfect CSI case and compare the proposed scheme
Robust SDR with HJ, which is obtained by solving (P2′.1-RW-SDR-sub), against
some benchmarks. Note that there are two upper-bound benchmark schemes,
namely, Robust SDR with HJ and Robust-eqv with HJ, as well as two lower-bound
benchmarks, which are Robust w/o HJ and Non-robust with HJ. For Robust SDR with
HJ (Robust-eqv with HJ ), given any γ¯e, Hˆ(γ¯e) is approximated by solving the rank
constraint relaxed problem (P2′.1-RW-SDR) ((P2′.1-RW-SDR-Eqv)). On the other
hand, for Robust w/o HJ, we solve (P2′.1-RW-SDR) by setting Qk = 0, ∀k while for
Non-robust with HJ, (4.11) is evaluated by applying the optimal solutions to (P1′.1)
assuming perfect CSI, to the actual channels including errors that are generated from
the sets defined in (4.43).
To assess the worst-case secrecy performance, we use the metric, namely, secrecy
outage probability, defined as [39]:
p = Pr(r ≤ r∗0), (4.88)
where r∗0 obtained by solving (P2
′) is termed as the 100p%-secrecy outage rate.
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Robust SDR with HJ
Figure 4.4: CDFs of the achievable secrecy rate.
The parameters are set identical to those in the perfect CSI case. Regarding the




















k’s are similarly defined and thus omitted here for brevity.
Besides, it is reasonable to assume that the channel estimates w.r.t Eve suffer from




k = 1% while
α20 = α
2
k = 10%, k = 1, . . . , K, unless otherwise specified.
Fig. 4.4 demonstrates the cumulative density function (CDF) of the achievable
secrecy rate from 1000 samples of random channel errors uniformly distributed over
the sets defined by (4.43) given fixed actual channel realization. We set Pr = 20dBm,






k = 2%, k = 1, . . . , K.
Despite being suboptimal to the upper-bound schemes of “Robust SDR with HJ”
and “Robust-eqv with HJ”, the proposed “Robust with HJ” scheme outperforms
its non-robust counterpart “Non-robust with HJ” particularly in the low range
of probability, and overwhelmingly surpasses the “Robust w/o HJ”. For example,
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1 Robust w/o HJ
Robust-eqv with HJ, K=6
Robust SDR with HJ, K=6
Robust with HJ, K=6
Robust with HJ, K=5
Robust-eqv with HJ, K=5
Robust SDR with HJ, K=5
K=6K=5
Figure 4.5: Secrecy outage probability for K = 3 and K = 5 HJ helpers, respectively.
“Robust with HJ” can achieve a secrecy rate of around 3.5bps/Hz in the 3% worst
case versus that of 3.3bps/Hz and 1.0bps/Hz for the “Non-robust with HJ” and
“Robust w/o HJ”, respectively. The solutions for “Robust SDR with HJ” is also
seen to admit very little gap from those for “Robust-eqv with HJ”, which suggests
that approximating Hˆ(γ¯e) by solving the complexity reduced “Robust SDR with HJ
” leads almost no performance loss.
Fig. 4.5 illustrates the CDF of the achievable secrecy rate from 1000 samples
of random channel errors generated in the same way as Fig. 4.4, with Pr = 20dBm,
Ps = 30dBm and Nt = 3. It is observed that proposed solutions to “Robust with
HJ” nearly achieve their upper-bound rank constraint relaxed solutions, i.e., SDR,
to “Robust upper SDR with HJ” throughout the whole range of outage probability.
Moreover, the “Robust w/o HJ” yields the worst performance. In particular, when
the outage probability falls to 3%, the “Robust w/o HJ” achieves a worst-case secrecy
rate of less than 1bps/Hz while the proposed scheme can still guarantee an outage
rate of rough 1.64bps/Hz and 2.07bps/Hz for K = 5 and K = 6, respectively. Also,
it is observed that increasing the number of HJ helpers will improve the secrecy
performance, but we do not draw conclusions on the extent to which the secrecy rate
can increase, since it also depends on the level of channel estimation inaccuracy. For
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Figure 4.6: Secrecy outage rate versus the normalized channel errors.
example, more HJ helpers may also yield larger interference to the legitimate receiver
if the channels from HJ helpers to Bob are not as well estimated as this instance of
α′′2k = 1%, ∀k. Hence we suggest that in practice, a mild number of HJ helpers are
sufficient in view of the trade-off between complexity and performance.
Fig. 4.6 shows two different levels (p = 0.20 and p = 0.30) of secrecy outage rate
versus the channel uncertainty ratios (assuming α0 = αk, k = 1, . . . , K), in which
Pr = 30dBm, Ps = 30dBm, Nt = 3 and K = 5. It is observed that the secrecy
outage rate by the proposed schemes decreases slowly with the eavesdropper’s CSI
error ratios, which validates the motivation of the worst-case robust optimization. It
is worth noting that the advantage of the HJ protocol is more significant when the
normalized channel uncertainty of Eve’s channels surpasses 10%, since the HJ scheme
provides more degree of freedom for robust design and thus capable of guaranteeing
larger worst-case secrecy rate against worse channel conditions compared to that
without HJ. The reasonably suboptimal performance of the proposed “Robust with
HJ” is also seen as from Figs. 4.4 and 4.5.
Fig. 4.7 studies the 100p%-secrecy outage rate for p = 0.05 and p = 0.20,
respectively, versus the transmit power of the AF relay. Specifically, we set Ps =
30dBm, Nt = 3, and K = 5. As observed similarly from Fig. 4.6, the robust
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Figure 4.7: Secrecy outage rate versus the relay’s transmit power.
schemes with the assistance of HJ helpers perform considerably better than solutions
without HJ helpers. Furthermore, when the transmit power is set relatively large,
i.e., Ps = 30dBm, it is seen that continuously increasing Pr does not contribute
much to the secrecy performance, because in this situation the increased amplified
noise at the AF relay compromises the performance, which provides useful insight
for practical setting of Pr. In addition, the proposed “Robust with HJ” is observed
striking a good trade-off between optimality and complexity compared with the two
upper-bound solutions.
4.7 Chapter Summary
A novel harvest-and-jam (HJ) relaying protocol was considered in this chapter
to improve the secret wireless communications in a multi-antenna AF relay wiretap
channel. The AN covariance matrices at HJ helpers and the AF relay beamforming
matrix have been jointly optimized to maximize the achievable secrecy rate and/or
worst-case secrecy rate for the legitimate receiver subject to the transmit power
constraints of the AF relay as well as the HJ helpers, under perfect and imperfect
CSI assumptions, respectively, using the technique of SDR. The SDR were shown
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tight for the perfect CSI case while a suboptimal rank-one reconstruction algorithm
for the robust formulation under imperfect CSI was presented achieving promising
trade-offs between complexity and performance. The effectiveness of the proposed
schemes were also verified by numerical results.
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CJ-aided Multi-AF Relaying for
Secrecy in SWIPT Networks
5.1 Introduction
Alike in Chapter 4, the benefits brought to PLS by WPCN in cooperative
communications continues to be exploited in this chapter. It has been well
investigated in [18, 22] that the secrecy capacity for MISO wiretap channel in the
presence of one eavesdropper is achieved without necessity of employing AN, while
that in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers can normally be increased by exploiting
AN [33]. Analogous to MISO wiretap channel with multiple eavesdroppers, the
multi-AF relaying with security concern in the second hop of a multi-hop cooperative
network thus forms a virtual MISO wiretap channel, in which each single-antenna
relay acts as an MISO antenna. As a result, AN, also known as CJ synthesized
by external helpers in cooperative scenarios, will also contribute to increasing the
secrecy capacity in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers [51]. Further, instead
of implementing CJ with separate relays from those used for CB, a more general
cooperation strategy is proposed that a source transmits confidential information
to a legitimate Rx aided by a set of WEH-enabled AF relays operating with CB
mixed with CJ. Specifically, each relay employs a heterogeneous PS protocol, which
devices the PS receiver for SWIPT in the first transmission phase and further splits
its harvested power for forwarding the received information and generating AN in
the second transmission phase. The objective is thus to maximize the secrecy rate
subject to self-sustained power constraints at the relays, by jointly optimizing the CB
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and CJ using SDR techniques, which is proved to be tight. Centralized closed-form
expressions for the relay beamforming have been derived for two practical types
of WEH-enabled relays, SPS and DPS, respectively. In addition, a completely
distributed algorithm assuming only local CSI available at each relay is provided
as performance benchmark. Simulation results demonstrate the effectiveness of the
proposed multi-AF CB mixed with CJ compared with other suboptimal designs.
Furthermore, motivated by the advantage of large scale antennas, a large number of
WEH-enabled single-antenna AF relays are exploited to simulate the effect of massive
MISO, and the average secrecy rate based on the matched filter (MF) relay weights
for fixed PS ratios is also analyzed utilizing law of large numbers (LLN).
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 5.3, two types
of WEH-enabled receiver architecture for the AF relays are described and the
secrecy rate region of the relay wiretap channel is defined. The secrecy rate
maximization problems that jointly optimize the AN and AF relay beamforming
for WEH-enabled relays operating with the two types of receivers are respectively
formulated in Section 5.4. The problems are respectively solved by centralized
schemes in Section 5.5 and completely distributed approaches in Section 5.6. The
proposed schemes are then verified by extensive simulations in Section 5.7. In
addition, secrecy performance analysis for the well known MF relay beamforming
when the number of relays goes to infinity is provided in Section 5.8 based on
asymptotic results. Finally, the chapter is concluded in Section 5.9.
5.2 Related Work
5.2.1 Cooperation for PLS Enhancements
Among a variety of emerging application scenarios such as relay networks and
device-to-device (D2D) communications etc., PHY-layer security enhancements by
means of cooperative communications have begun drawing much attention [8, 21, 35,
36, 45–47, 50–53, 55, 56] since the relay-assisted secure transmission strategy was first
107
Chapter 5. CJ-aided Multi-AF Relaying for Secrecy in SWIPT Networks
considered in [7, 43]. Related cooperative schemes including multiple relays against
eavesdropping can be primarily classified into three categories [8]: decode-and-forward
(DF), amplify-and-forward (AF), and cooperative jamming (CJ). The robust secure
beamforming designs were studied in [48] for a single multi-antenna AF relay-aided
wiretap channel. Exploiting node cooperation in a DF fashion to achieve PHY-layer
security was considered in [35, 47] by deriving optimal power allocations among nodes
and/or multi-carrier resources. For CJ, coordinated CJ refers to the scheme of
generating a common jamming signal across all single-antenna relay helpers [8, 21,
35, 36], while uncoordinated CJ assumes that each relay helper emits independent
artificial noise (AN) to confound the eavesdroppers [50]. On the other hand, under
the circumstances that direct link is broken between the Tx and the legitimate Rx,
i.e., some of the relays have to take on their conventional role of forwarding the
information while other spare ones can be employed for CJ, a selection of their
function was performed in [52, 53]. Furthermore, a recent paradigm that generalizes
all the above mentioned cooperation strategies is CB mixed with CJ [51, 55], into
which this work also falls. This scheme splits the available power at each relay into
two parts: one for forwarding the confidential message and the other for CJ.
5.2.2 WEH-enabled CB Mixed with CJ
In spite of taking full advantage of all relays’ d.o.f, CB mixed with CJ
may be prohibitive in applications with low power devices, mainly because these
idle relays with limited battery supplies, prefer to saving power for their own
traffic to assisting in other’s secrecy transmission. Thanks to WPCN, SWIPT,
nevertheless, provides essential incentives for these potential helpers to collaborate
with others. However, since the received signal used for harvesting RF energy
cannot be reused for decoding the modulated information due to hardware limitations
[98], practical Rx architectures need to be designed to resolve this issue (see [9] for
more detail). Typically, except for integrated receiver (IntRx) that splits the signal
after converting it to DC current, which thus requires non-coherent detection, time
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switching (TS)/power splitting (PS) receivers are more often implemented in terms
of high-data-rate transmission that have their the power splitting unit installed in the
RF front-ends of separate EH and information decoding (ID) receivers. TS receiver
switches its operations periodically between EH and ID in the two time slots of one
transmission block; RS receiver enables simultaneous wireless information transfer
(WIT) and WPT by splitting the received power into two streams, where α portion
of the received power in one stream is used for EH while the remaining (1 − α) in
the other stream is used for ID. Besides, antenna switching (AS) receiver is a special
case of PS receiver in multi-antenna applications that simply connects each receiving
antenna to either EH or ID receiver, the rate-energy region achieved by which has
little gap from that of PS receiver when the number of antennas are large enough
[99].
The minimum power optimization that incorporates the joint transmit
beamforming and receiver PS ratios was considered in [100] for multiuser MISO
interference channel, where the received power is not used for another hop of
transmission. Facilitated by SWIPT and the d.o.f of multi-hop communications,
cooperative relay(s) using the aforementioned Rx architectures were early investigated
in [101] and then widely studied in [101–103] and [58, 73, 104], w/o and with
secrecy transmission taken into account, respectively.The receiver architecture that
is employed for the multi-AF relays in this chapter is DPS, which turns out to be the
most general Rx operation that was initially proposed in [9].
Note that although the setting of the problem seems a special case of that
considered in [51], its optimal CB mixed with CJ design is not applicable herein due
to the multiplicative nature in beamforming weights incurred by adjustable PS ratios
that intrinsically poses more intractability. Furthermore, in spite that an efficient
algorithm that jointly optimizes PS ratios and AF relay beamforming was investigated
in [73] to maximize the secrecy rate, this chapter differs from it in two folds. The
most general CB mixed with CJ strategy is considered while [73] did not take the
relay-based AN into account in its second transmission phase; the solutions derived
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for the CB without CJ is proved to be global optimal whereas the algorithm proposed
in [73] only converged to a local optimal solution.
5.2.3 PLS in a Large Scale
Massive MIMO or large scale MIMO has been considered to pave one of the main
paths for cellular networks in 5G communications, in which base stations (BSs) are
equipped with a magnitude of (more than) hundreds of antennas and thus provide
multiplexing or diversity gain in a larger scale [105]. More strikingly, it has been
shown that in such system serving multi-users in the same time-frequency resource,
simple linear precoding schemes such as matched-filter (MF) and ZF actually achieve
near performance to the capacity-achieving dirty-paper coding (DPC) [106] since the
effect of noise and multiuser-interference are substantially reduced as the number of
antennas grows to infinity. One potential advantage of massive MIMO for PLS is
its considerable secrecy rate against the external eavesdropping since the received
signal power at the intended user is several orders of magnitude higher than that
at the external eavesdroppers. Zhu et al. in [107] studied the secrecy performance
of MF precoding along with AN generation for multi-cell massive MIMO downlink
transmission in the presence of an external multi-antenna eavesdropper. The authors
investigated the conditions that guarantee secure transmission, among which, AN is
in general required to achieve a positive ergodic secrecy rate. In addition, unlike that
in multiuser-MIMO downlink transmission with finite number of antennas at the BS,
random AN shaping matrices are promising alternative to null-space AN under the
circumstances of no eavesdropper’s CSIT in view of their perfrormance/complexity
trade-off. Furthermore, compared with multiuser massive MIMO systems w/o secrecy
consideration, the ergodic secrecy rate no longer monotonically increases with the
number of BS antennas to the practical interest of pilot contamination [105].
On another front, exploiting cooperative strategy with massive MIMO relay has
also aroused lots of research interest very recently. In [108], H. Q. Ngo et al. explored
a massive-antenna-equipped DF relay operating in full-duplex mode over which
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multiple sources communicate with their respective destinations. They showed that
the advantage of full-duplex is especially prominent in the massive antenna array case
thanks to the significantly reduced loop interference and asymptotically disappearing
inter-pair interference plus noise. Moreover, secure cooperative transmission with
the aid of a massive MIMO relay was early investigated in [75, 109]. [109] considered
secrecy transmission aided by large scale MIMO relaying and provided a thorough
secrecy outage capacity-based analysis for two classical types of relay, i.e., AF and DF,
respectively, under different channel conditions, based on which asymptotic analysis
was further developed to gain insights on the choice between these two relaying
schemes. In addition, to the best knowledge of the author, secrecy cooperative
transmission jointly considering large scale WEH-enabled MIMO AF relaying was
first investigated in [75] and the explicit secrecy outage capacity was obtained therein
to analyze the impact of imperfect legitimate CSI and no eavesdropper’s CSI.
5.3 System Model
Figure 5.1: The system model for an AF relay-assisted SWIPT WSN.
In this chapter, we consider secrecy transmission in a SWIPT-enabled WSN,
where one Tx (Alice) establishes confidential communication with the legitimate Rx
(Bob) far away from it assisted by a set of N WEH-enabled sensors (of non-broken
communication links from the source and to the destination) working as AF relays,
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denoted by N = {1, 2, . . . , N}, in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers (Eves),
denoted by K = {1, 2, . . . , K}, all equipped with single antenna. Our CB mixed with
CJ scheme is applicable to, but not restricted to scenarios, for example, a remote
health system where a moving patient needs to report its physical data to a health
centre far away from it with the aid of intermediary sensors installed on other patients
living in the same community, an environmental monitor system where a thermal
sensor is required to send real-time temperature to a data centre and thus solicits
help from large number of surrounding sensors that have limited battery levels. It is
assumed that there is no direct link from the Tx to the Rx or Eves1 due to either severe
path loss or building-induced shadowing as seen in Fig. 5.1. We assume a two-hop
relaying protocol consisting of two equal-time transmit-slot and the duration of one
transmit-slot is normalized to be unit one so that the term of energy and power is
interchangeable w.r.t. one transmit-slot. In addition, CSI at the associated Tx is
assumed to be known perfectly.
For the receiver at each AF relay, we introduce two types of WEH-enabled
receiver architecture, namely, static power splitting (SPS) (Fig. 5.2(a)) and dynamic
power splitting (DPS) (Fig. 5.2(b)), both of which allow the relay to harvest energy
and receive information from the same received signal. Specifically, as seen from
Fig. 5.2, the receiver first splits a portion of αi, of the received power for EH and
the rest 1 − αi for information receiving, ∀i. Next, the αi portion of harvested
power is further divided into two streams with the power ratio ρi versus 1 − ρi:
ηρiαi|yri|2 used for generating the AN to confound the eavesdroppers and the other
η(1− ρi)αi|yri|2 for amplifying the received signal, where yri is the ith element of the
received signal yr ∈ CN×1 and 0 ≤ η < 1 denotes the EH efficiency. Note that DPS
with adjustable αi’s is currently the most general receiver operation due to the fact
that practical circuits cannot directly decode the information from the stream used
for EH [9] and SPS is just a special case of DPS with αi = α¯i, ∀i, fixed for the whole
1Note that when there exist direct links, by incorporating destination-aided AN in the first
transmit-slot (see [73]), our problem formulation and solutions are shown to be applicable without
much modification as well.
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(b) WEH-enabled relay with dynamic power splitting.
Figure 5.2: Architectures of the receiver for WEH-enabled relay.
transmission duration. However, SPS, advocated for its ease of implementation, is
introduced separately in the sequel for its simplified relay beamforming design. It is
also assumed that any harvested power from the first transmit-slot is not available
for cooperation communication in the following transmission phases.




Pss + na,i, ∀i, (5.1)
where the transmit signal s is a circularly symmetric complex Gaussian (CSCG)
RV with zero mean and unit variance, denoted by s ∼ CN (0, 1). hsri denotes the
complex channel from the Tx to the ith relay, Ps is the transmit power at the Tx
and na,i is the AWGN introduced by the receiving antenna of the ith relay, denoted
by na,i ∼ CN (0, σ2na). As such, the linearly amplified baseband equivalent signal at
the output of the ith relay is given by
xri1 = βi(
√
1− αiyri + nc,i), ∀i, (5.2)
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where βi is the complex amplifying coefficient, namely, AF relay weight, and nc,i
is the noise due to signal conversion from RF band to baseband, denoted by nc,i ∼
CN (0, σ2nc). Since xri1 is constrained by the portion of harvested power for forwarding,




(1− αi)|hsri|2Ps + (1− αi)σ2na + σ2nc
ej∡βi. (5.3)
Next, we introduce the CJ scheme coordinately performed by all relays. Denote
the CJ signal generated from N relays by xr2 = [xr12, . . . , xrN2]
T and define its
covariance matrix as S = E[xr2x
H
r2]. Then the coordinated CJ transmission can be
uniquely determined by the truncated EVD of S given by S = V˜ Σ˜V˜
H
, where Σ =
diag([σ1, . . . , σd]) is a diagonal matrix with σj ’s denoting all the positive eigenvalues
of S, and V ∈ CN×d is the precoding matrix satisfying V HV = I. As a result, the








where vj ’s are drawn from the columns of V , and s
′
j’s are i.i.d. complex Gaussian
variables denoted by s′j ∼ CN (0, 1), which is known as the worst-case distribution for
AN [21]. On the other hand, E[|xri2|2] ≤ ηρiαi|yri|2, ∀i, denotes the power constraint
for jamming at the ith relay, which implies that
tr(SEi) ≤ ηρiαiPs|hsri|2, ∀i, (5.5)
where Ei is a diagonal matrix with its diagonal denoted by ei (a unit vector with its
ith entry equal to 1 and all the other 0).
Note that the CJ scheme we propose is of the most general form. For a special




1, each relay transmits a common jamming signal s
′
1
with their respective weight drawn from v1 [8, 36]. This case is desirable in practice
since it reduces the overhead caused by exchanging d CJ beams.
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In a summary, the re-transmit signal at the ith relay is given by
xri = xri1 + xri2, ∀i. (5.6)
According to (5.6) together with (5.1), (5.2), and (5.4), the transmit signal from all










whereDβα and Dβ denote diagonal matrices with their diagonals composed of
(β1
√
1− α1, . . . , βN
√
1− αN)T and (β1, . . . , βN)T , respectively. In addition, hsr =
[hsri]
N
i=1, na = [na,i]
N
i=1, and nc = [nc,i]
N
i=1.




rdxr + nd, (5.8)
where hrd = [hrid]
N
i=1 comprises complex channels from the ith relay to the Rx, and
nd ∼ CN (0, σ2nd) is the corresponding receiving AWGN. By substituting (5.7) for xr

















j + nd. (5.9)



















where hre,k = [hrie,k]
N
i=1 denotes the complex channels from relays to the kth Eve,
and ne ∼ CN (0, σ2ne) is the AWGN at the kth eavesdropper.
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SINRS,D), and that for the kth Eve is rS,E,k =
1
2
log2(1+SINRS,E,k), ∀k, where SINRS,D



























Next, we define the secrecy rate region that consists of all the achievable
secrecy rate for the relay wiretap channel given transmit power Ps, denoted by
R({∡βi}, {ρi}, {αi},S), which is given by [8, 20]















5.4.1 AN-Aided Secrecy Relay Beamforming for SPS
In this section, we consider the secrecy rate maximization problem by jointly
optimizing the AN beams, relay beam and their power allocations for WEH-enabled
AF relays operating with SPS, i.e., αi = α¯i, ∀i, is fixed.













for convenience. In addition, σ2na‖hTrdDβα‖2 and σ2nc‖hTrdDβ‖2 in (5.11) can also be
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combined as follows.


























where w1 = [w1,i]
N



























By some simple manipulation, (5.5) is reformulated as a power per-relay jamming
power constraint given by
tr(SEi) ≤ ηα¯iPs|hsri|2(1− |w1,i|2), ∀i. (5.22)
Now, the secrecy rate maximization problem w.r.t. ρi’s, ∡βi’s and S for
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(5.21))+ s.t. (5.22), S  0.
5.4.2 AN-Aided Secrecy Relay Beamforming for DPS
In this section, we consider the secrecy rate maximization problem for
WEH-enabled AF relays with adjustable power splitting ratios {αi} by jointly
optimizing the AN beams and relay beam, WEH power splitting ratios {αi}, AN
power splitting ratios {ρi} and amplifying phases {∡βi}.











via which, |hTrdDβαhsr|2 can be expressed as |sTsdu1|2, where ssd =
[hsrihrid
√
η|hsri|2Ps]Ni=1, u1 = [u1,i]Ni=1. Moreover, ‖hTrdDβα‖2 and ‖hTrdDβ‖2 can
be simplified as uH1 diag(c0 ◦ ‖hrd‖.2)u1 and uH2 diag(c0 ◦ ‖hrd‖.2)u2, respectively,
where c0 = [c0,i]
N
i=1 with c0,i = ηPs|hsri|2, ∀i, and u2 = [u2,i]Ni=1. Similarly,
we have |hTre,kDβαhsr|2 = |sTse,ku1|2, ‖hTre,kDβα‖2 = uH1 diag(c0 ◦ ‖hre,k‖.2)u1 and




Second, apply the above transformation to SINRS,D (c.f. (5.11)) and SINRS,E,k























Next, we recast constraints w.r.t. S, αi’s and ρi’s to those w.r.t. the transformed
variables u1,i’s and u2,i’s. In accordance with (5.23), the optimization variables, αi’s
118
Chapter 5. CJ-aided Multi-AF Relaying for Secrecy in SWIPT Networks
and ρi’s, can be alternatively given by αi = 1−
|u1,i|2
|u2,i|2













On the other hand, since αi ≥ 0 and ρi ≥ 0, ∀i, after some simple manipulation, it
follows from (5.26) that
|u1,i|2 − |u2,i|2 ≤ 0, ∀i, (5.28)
|u2,i|2(c1,i|u1,i|2 + σ2nc|u2,i|2) ≤ |u2,i|2 − |u1,i|2, ∀i. (5.29)
Consequently, we are ready to state the secrecy rate maximization problem












s.t. (5.27), (5.28), and (5.29).
5.5 Secure Multi-AF Relaying: A Centralized
Approach
In this section, we resort to centralized approaches to solve problem (P1) and
(P2), respectively, assuming that there is a coordinating centre that is able to collect
all CSIs including hsr, hrd and hre perfectly. On the ground of these information,
the centre performs optimization and broadcasts to relays their individual optimized
parameters, such as the power splitting ratios (αi’s and/ or ρi’s), the phase of the
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complex amplifying coefficient (∡βi’s), and their respective jamming signal xri2’s.
5.5.1 Optimal Solutions for SPS
Note that one of the main challenges for solving (P1) lies in the fact that rS,D
and rS,E,k share the similar structure, which sabotages the convexity of the objective
function even if rS,D and rS,E are made convex, respectively. Hence, in the following,
we recast (P1) into a two-stage problem by introducing a slack variable τ as follows.





















(5.22), S  0.
Next, define f1(τ) as the optimum value of problem (P1.1) and denote H1(τ) =










in which (·)+ in the objective function of (P1) has been omitted and we claim a







s.t. τmin,1 ≤ τ ≤ 1,
which is noteworthy since this single-variable optimization problem allows for simple
one-dimension search algorithm over τ ∈ [τmin,1, 1], assuming that H1(τ) is attainable
given any τ in this region. As the physical meaning of 1/τ − 1 in (P1.1) can be
interpreted as the maximum permitted SINR for the best eavesdropper’s channel,
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≥ 1/τ − 1


















where Cauchy-Schwarz inequality has been applied in (a) and (b) follows from
|w1,i|2 ≤ 1, ∀i ∈ N .
Note that the above epigraph reformulation of non-convex problems like (P1)
has been widely employed in literature [33, 51], and therefore a detailed proof is thus
skipped here that problem (P1.2) admits the same optimum value as problem (P1)
while problem (P1.1) with the optimal τ provides the corresponding optimal solution
to (P1). As a result, we summarize the steps solving (P1): given any τ ∈ [τmin,1, 1],
solve (P1.1) to obtain H1(τ); solve (P1.2) via a one-dimension search over τ . Before
developing solutions to (P1.1), we highlight the lemma as below.
Lemma 5.5.1. H1(τ) is a concave function of τ .
Proof. See Appendix G.
Remark 5.5.1. Thanks to Lemma 5.5.1, it is easy to verify that 1
2
log2(τ + H1(τ))
is also a concave function of τ according to the composition rule [84, pp. 84],
which allows for a more effective one-dimension search for the optimum τ , for
example, bi-section method, than exhaustive search used in [57]. On the other hand,
other one-dimension search methods such as coordinate search and golden search
etc. have been employed to solve this problem in [51] though, they only yield local
optimum solutions in general without showing Lemma 5.5.1. Moreover, although
H1(τ) is not derivable w.r.t. τ , the bi-section method can be numerically implemented
derivative-free, which is shown in detail in Table 5.1.
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In the sequel we focus on solving (P1.1). By introducing X1 = w1w
H
1 and

































tr((S + ηα¯iPs|hsri|2X1)Ei) ≤ ηα¯iPs|hsri|2, ∀i,
X1  0, S  0.
Note that the objective function has been multiplied by τ compared with that of
(P1.1) in order for the straightforward computation of H1(τ).
Although (P1.1-SDR) is made easier to solve than the original (P1.1) by rank
relaxation, it is still a quasi-convex problem considering the linear fractional form
objective function and constraint, for which, Charnes-Cooper transformation [92]
turns out to be an effective tool in equivalent convex reformulation. Specifically, by





























tr((Sˆ + ηα¯iPs|hsri|2Xˆ1)Ei) ≤ ξηα¯iPs|hsri|2, ∀i,
Xˆ1  0, Sˆ  0.
Problem (P1.1-SDP) can now be efficiently solved using interior-point based methods
by some off-the-shelf convex optimization toolboxes, e.g., CVX [110].
A natural question comes out that whether the solution derived to (P1.1-SDR)
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is also optimal to (P1.1), since the optimum value of problem (P1.1-SDR) only serves
as an upper-bound for problem (P1.1) in general due to the rank relaxation. The
following proposition answers this question.










1 , in which wˆ
∗
1 is given by
wˆ∗1 =









Proof. See Appendix H.
Corollary 5.5.1. When N = 1, K = 1, sˆ∗ = 0.





































with its numerator and denominator denoted by
nB and dB, respectively, and RE =
Ps|h˜se|2|w1|2
|hre|2s+Dsˆe|w1|2+σ2ne
with nE and dE similarly





































) ≥ 1. According to (5.34), a
non-positive derivative w.r.t. s is returned, which shows that the secrecy rate in
this case monotonically decreases with the jamming variance and thus completes the
proof.
Proposition 5.5.1 implies that the rank-one relaxation of (P1.1-SDR) from (P1.1)
is tight for an arbitrary given τ . The ρ∗’s and ∡β∗i ’s can thus be retrieved from the
magnitude and angle of w∗1, respectively, by applying EVD to X
∗
1.
5.5.2 Proposed Solutions for DPS
Similar to Section 5.5.1, in this section, we aim at solving the two-stage
reformulation of problem (P2) by introducing a slack variable τ ∈ [τmin,2, 1]. First,




s.t. 1 + (5.25) ≤ 1/τ, ∀k, (5.27), (5.28), (5.29).
Next, alike problem (P1.2), denoting H2(τ) = τf2(τ), where f2(τ) is the optimum
value for problem (P2.1), we solve the following problem that admits the same






s.t. τmin,2 ≤ τ ≤ 1.








, denoted by τmin,2. We claim that (P2.2) can be
solved by bi-section for τ over the interval [τmin,2, 1] assuming that H2(τ) is valid for
any given τ (Otherwise a zero secrecy rate, i.e., H2(τ) = 0, is returned.), since H2(τ)
has the following property.
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Lemma 5.5.2. H2(τ) is a concave function of τ .
Proof. The proof is similar to that for Lemma 5.5.1 and thus omitted here for brevity.
It is also seen that how to attain H2(τ) forms the main thrust for solving (P2).
However, the constraints in (5.27), (5.28) and (5.29) are not convex w.r.t. u1,i and/or
u2,i, ∀i, due to their high orders and multiplicative structures. (P2.1) thus turns out
to be very hard to solve in general. To cope with these non-convex constraints, we
introduce the following lemma.
Lemma 5.5.3 ([100]). The restricted hyperbolic constraints which have the form
xHx ≤ yz, where x ∈ CN×1, y, z ≥ 0, are equivalent to rotated second-order cone




∥∥∥∥∥∥ ≤ y + z. (5.35)
Proof.
xHx ≤ yz
⇔ y2 + z2 + 4xHx ≤ 4yz + y2 + z2
⇔ (y − z)2 + ‖2x‖2 ≤ (y + z)2 (a)⇔ (5.35),
where (a) holds true since y, z ≥ 0.
For convenience, denoting |u1,i|2, |u2,i|2, tr(SEi) by xi, yi and zi, respectively,
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∀i, (5.27) can be rewritten as follows.
zi ≤ c0,i
(
































According to (5.5) and (5.23), it is easily verified that 1− zi
c0,sr,i
− c1,sr,ixi > 1−ρiαi−
(1− ρi)αi ≥ 0. Hence, (5.36) is eligible for Lemma 5.5.3, which is reformulated into





























Similarly, (5.29) can be simplified as yi(c1,ixi + σ
2
ncyi) ≤ yi − xi, and after some



































At last, (5.28) is apparently a linear constraint w.r.t. xi and yi given by
xi − yi ≤ 0, ∀i. (5.40)
Note that (5.27), (5.29), and (5.28) have so far been equivalently transformed
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into the SOC constraints (5.37), (5.39), and the linear constraint (5.40), the latter
two of which are jointly convex w.r.t. xi and yi, ∀i. However, (5.37) is not convex
w.r.t. zi, ∀i, yet. To circumvent this, in the sequel we propose to solve problem (P2)
by alternating optimization. The upshot of the algorithm is that first we fix S by S
and zi by z¯i = tr(SEi), ∀i, and solve problem (P2′)2 to find optimal {α∗}, {ρ∗} and
{∡βi} via (P2′.1) and (P2′.2); then with α¯i = α∗i , ∀i, provided, we devise the optimal
solution derived in Section 5.5.1 to obtain the optimal CJ covariance, viz, S∗, and
thus z∗i = tr(S
∗Ei), ∀i; finally, by updating S = S∗ and z¯i = z∗i , ∀i, (P2′) and (P1)
are iteratively solved until they converge.
The remaining challenges lie in how to solve problem (P2′.1) now that (5.37),
(5.39) and (5.40) are all made convex w.r.t. their variables xi, yi, ∀i. Similar as that
for (P1.1), we introduce U 1 = u1u
H
1 and U 2 = u2u
H
2 and exempt problem (P2
′.1)





s.t. (5.42), ∀k, (5.37), (5.39), (5.40),
tr(U 1Ei) = xi, tr(U 2Ei) = yi, ∀i,
U 1  0, U 2  0,





























Recalling the same procedure taken to deal with (P1.1-SDR), next, we devise
2Note that we denote problem (P2) ((P2.1),(P2.2)) with fixed S as (P2′) ((P2′.1),(P2′.2)) in the
sequel.
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Charnes-Cooper transformation to further convert (P2′.1-SDR) into a convex
problem, denoted by (P2′.1-SDP), by replacing U 1 and U 2 with Uˆ 1/ξ and Uˆ 2/ξ,
respectively. The solution for (P2′.1-SDR) is proved to be tight on the account of the
following proposition.
Proposition 5.5.2. 1) The optimal solution to problem (P2′.1-SDP) satisfies
rank(Uˆ
∗







1 , in which uˆ
∗
1 is given by
uˆ∗1 =





where Crd = diag(c0 ◦ ‖hrd‖.2), uˆ1 and Ξ′ are given in Appendix I;
3) Uˆ
∗
2, of which the diagonal entries compose a vector denoted by uˆ
∗




Proof. See Appendix I.





Finally, we summarize the proposed algorithm for solving problem (P2) in
Table 5.1.
5.6 Secure Multi-AF Relaying: A Distributed
Implementation
In this section, we study heuristic algorithms to solve (P1) and (P2) in a
completely distributed fashion. Note that different from the paradigm of distributed
optimization that allows for certain amount of information exchange based on which
iterative algorithms are developed to gradually improve the system performance,
we herein assume that each individual relay can only make decisions based on its
local CSIs, namely, hsri, hrid, hrie, ∀i, and there is no extra means of information
128
Chapter 5. CJ-aided Multi-AF Relaying for Secrecy in SWIPT Networks
Table 5.1: Algorithm for Solving (P2)
Require: S∗; r∗SPS that denotes the optimum value for (P1) given α¯i = .5, ∀i
1: ii← 1, r(ii)sec ← r∗SPS, r(0)sec ← 0
2: repeat
3: ii← ii+ 1
4: S¯ ← S∗ , z¯i ← tr(S∗Ei), ∀i, and solve (P2′):
5: kk ← 0, r(0)DPS ← 10−6, r(1)DPS ← 10, l ← τmin,2, u← 1
6: while |r(kk+1)DPS − r(kk)DPS| / r(kk)DPS > ǫr do
7: kk ← kk + 1, τ ← l+u
2




DPS ← 12 log2(τ +H2(τ))
11: rtemp ← 12 log2(τ˜ + H2(τ˜ )), where τ˜ ← max(τ − ∆τ, τmin,2) and ∆τ > 0
denotes an arbitrary small value.
12: if r
(kk+1)
DPS ≤ rtemp then
13: u← τ
14: else
15: l ← τ
16: end if
17: end while
18: return U ∗1, U
∗
2, and obtain {α∗i } according to (5.26)
19: α¯i ← α∗i , ∀i, and solve (P1):
20: kk ← 0, r(0)SPS ← 10−6, r(1)SPS ← 10, l ←= τmin,1, u← 1
21: while |r(kk+1)SPS − r(kk)SPS | / r(kk)SPS > ǫr do
22: kk ← kk + 1, τ ← l+u
2




SPS ← 12 log2(τ +H1(τ))
26: rtemp ← 12 log2(τ˜ +H1(τ˜)), where τ˜ ← max(τ −∆τ, τmin,1).
27: if r
(kk+1)
SPS ≤ rtemp then
28: u← τ
29: else
30: l ← τ
31: end if
32: end while
33: return X∗1, S
∗, and obtain {ρ∗i } and {∡β∗i } according to w∗1,i =
√




sec according to (5.13)
35: until r
(ii)
sec − r(ii−1)sec ≤ ǫ0
Ensure: {α∗i }, {ρ∗i }, {∡β∗i }, and S∗
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acquisition due to loads of system overhead otherwise. The reason for designing such
an algorithm is as follows. On one hand, we aim for answering the question that in
the least favourable situation, namely, no cooperation, what can be done to improve
the achievable secrecy rate of the whole system? On the other hand, it provides
lower-bound for the centralized schemes proposed in Section 5.5, which sheds light
upon the trade-off between performance and complexity.
Besides, we emphasize the jamming scheme that is different from the CJ in the
centralized schemes. Unlike the CJ signal that is coordinately transmitted by all
relays, in the distributed implementation, each relay is only able to generated AN









T , in which si’s are i.i.d AN denoted
by s′i ∼ CN (0, 1). This type of CJ is known to be IJ as mentioned in Section 5.3 with
the covariance matrix S = diag([σ1, . . . , σN ]). In this section, we assume that each
relay consumes all of its remaining power from AF for AN, i.e., σi = ηρiαiPs|hsri|2,
∀i ∈ N (c.f. (5.5)). Hence, the AN design solely depends on αi’s and/or ρi’s.
5.6.1 Distributed Algorithm for SPS
First, we propose a heuristic scheme for the ith AF relay to decide on ρi, ∀i,







where δ ∈ (0, 1) is a constant that controls the relay’s conservative level for jamming
in the distributed scheme. For example, a larger δ indicates that each relay prefers to
splitting a larger portion of power for jamming and vice versa. The intuition behind
(5.44) is easy to see. For the ith relay, if it observes that |hrid|2 ≥ max
k∈K
|hrie,k|2,
which means that a nonnegative secrecy rate is achievable even if there is only itself
in the system, it will shut down AN transmission; otherwise, it will split up to δ
portion of the harvested power for jamming. For example, in an extreme case of
|hrid|2 ≪ max
k
|hrie,k|2, probably when an eavesdropper is located within the very
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proximity of this relay, it allocates δ of power to generate AN.
Next, since an individual relay cannot evaluate the secrecy performance of the
whole system, ∡βi’s are simply chosen to be the optimum for the multi-AF relaying
without security concerns, i.e., ∡βi = −∡hrid − ∡hsri , ∀i.
5.6.2 Distributed Algorithm for DPS
Following the same designs for ρi’s and ∡βi’s in Section 5.6.1, the remaining task
for WEH-enabled relays operating with DPS is to set proper αi’s. We choose αi’s
that maximize the “hypothetical SINR”, where the “hypothetical” indicates that this
SINR may not be the actual SINR for the destination, but just a criterion calculated
based on the “hypothetical” received signal seen by the ith relay, denoted by y˜di, ∀i,




























. Consequently, the maximization of (5.46) w.r.t. αi, ∀i, is













Subject to 0 ≤ αi ≤ 1.
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Proof. It is easy to verify that problem (P2-distributed) is convex and the minimum
solution of its objective function derived from the first-order derivative happens to
fall within the feasible region of αi, which is seen in (5.47).
With ρi’s, ∡βi’s and αi’s set, each AF relay is then able to decide its relay weight
and AN transmission.
5.7 Numerical Results
In this section we compare our proposed schemes for multi-AF relaying networks
operating with SPS or DPS with a variety of benchmarks. For the centralized
schemes, the optimal solutions for SPS described in Section 5.5.1 is denoted by
CJ-SPS, while Algorithm 5.1 proposed in Section 5.5.2 is denoted by CJ-DPS.
The distributed schemes proposed in Section 5.6.1 and Section 5.6.2 are referred as
Distributed-SPS and Distributed-DPS, respectively. To demonstrate the effectiveness
of our AN-aided secure multi-AF relay beamforming algorithms, we also provide three
benchmark schemes:NoCJ-SPS, NoCJ-DPS and Random Power Splitting (Random
PS). For NoCJ-SPS, we solve problem (P1) by replacing S with 0. Similarly, for
NoCJ-DPS, we initialize S = 0 and quit the loop in Algorithm 5.1 after the very first
time of solving problem (P2′). Random PS, on the other hand, picks up i.i.d. αi’s and
ρi’s uniformly generated over [0, 1], respectively, and co-phases ∡βi = −∡hsri−∡hrid,
∀i.
Consider that N WEH-enabled AF relays and K eavesdroppers are located
within a circular area of radius R. Specifically, we assume that their respective
radius and radian are drawn from uniform distributions over the interval [0, R] and
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[0, 2π), respectively. we also assume that channel models consist of both large-scale







where A0 = 10
−3, d denotes the relevant distance, d0 = 1m is a reference distance, and
α is the path loss exponent set to be 2.5. hsri, hrid, and hrie,k, ∀i ∈ N , ∀k ∈ K, are
generated from independent Rayleigh fading with zero mean and variance specified
by (5.48).
The simulation parameters are set as follows unless otherwise specified: the
radius defining the range is R = 5m; the transmit power at the source is Ps = 40dBm;




, ∀k; the energy harvesting efficiency is assumed to be η = 50%. In
addition, the numerical examples provided below are based on an average over 500
channel realizations.
5.7.1 Secrecy Performance by Centralized Approach
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed centralized designs
in Section 5.5. The efficiency of the alternating optimization that iteratively attains
numerical solution to problem (P2) is illustrated in Fig. 5.3, which shows the rise of
the achievable secrecy rate after each round of the iteration. The most rapid increase
is observed after the first iteration, which shows that the optimization of the power
splitting ratios αi’s, accounts for the main factor for the secrecy rate performance
gains from the SPS scheme that sets {αi = 0.5}. It is seen that the alternating
algorithm converges with the relative tolerance ǫr = |r(kk+1)DPS − r(kk)DPS|/r(kk)DPS set to be
10−3, after an average of 5 – 6 iterations for several channel realizations, which is
reasonable in terms of iterative algorithms.
Fig. 5.4 shows the achievable secrecy rate for the legitimate Rx with the increase
in the number of AF relays by different schemes. It is apparently observed that the
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Times of iteration




























Figure 5.3: The achievable secrecy rate by CJ-DPS vs the number of iterations for
the alternating optimization presented in Algorithm 5.1, Ps = 40dBm, N = 10, and
K=5.
secure multi-AF relaying schemes assisted by the transmission of AN outperforms
that w/o AN for both SPS and DPS. In addition, with the increase in N , the role of
CJ gradually reduces for both schemes of SPS and DPS, which is due to the following
reason. As N gets larger, the optimal designs tend to suppress the interception at
the most capable eavesdropper more effectively with N d.o.f, namely, enforcing the
numerator of SINRS,E,k and thus rS,E,k, ∀k ∈ K to a relatively low level, which can also
be observed from Fig. 5.4(a), and therefore the optimal amount of power allocated
to AN beams inclines to be little otherwise the jamming yielded will be detrimental
to the reception of the legitimate channel. Besides, given the same number of AF
relays, the secrecy performance gains brought by the proposed schemes with CJ are
more prominent in the presence of more eavesdroppers, since it is hard to reduce all
the eavesdroppers’ channel capacity without resort to CJ properly.
Fig. 5.5 demonstrates the achievable secrecy rate for the legitimate Rx versus
the number of eavesdroppers by different schemes. First, similar to the results
shown in Fig. 5.4, the proposed AN-aided multi-AF relaying designs operating with
DPS-enabled relays, viz, CJ-DPS, perform best among all the schemes. Secondly, as
134
Chapter 5. CJ-aided Multi-AF Relaying for Secrecy in SWIPT Networks
Number of EH relays































rS,E,k vs the number of AF relays.
Number of EH relays





























(b) The achievable secrecy rate vs the number of AF relays.
Figure 5.4: Comparison of different schemes with Ps = 10dB for K = 5 and K = 10,
respectively.
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Number of eavesdroppers


























Figure 5.5: The achievable secrecy rate vs the number of eavesdroppers by different
schemes with Ps = 10dB for N = 10 and N = 20, respectively.
K goes up, the AN-aided schemes, CJ-DPS and CJ-SPS, allow the achievable secrecy
rate to drop slowly, in other words, more robust against multiple eavesdroppers,
while the secrecy rate of their NoCJ counterparts almost goes down linearly with
K. Moreover, with K rising, for example, more than 10, the increase in the number
of relays, for example, from N = 10 to N = 20, cannot replace the role of CJ
as in Fig. 5.4, since in the presence of many eavesdroppers, more relays may also
result in improved eavesdroppers’ decoding ability w/o the assistance of AN. It is
also noteworthy that in the case of K = 1, there is little use of CJ by the centralized
schemes, which was also observed in the numerical results of [33]. Although to the best
of the authors’ knowledge, there is no theoretical proof peculiar to this phenomenon
in literature, a proof for no use of CJ in a special case of N = 1 is provided in
Corollary (5.5.1).
Fig. 5.6 provides simulation results of different schemes by varying the source
transmit power. It is observed that with more power available at the source, the
advantage of CJ is more outstanding against the schemes w/o CJ, since given other
variables fixed, larger Ps indicates larger feasible regions for problem (P1) and (P2).
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Figure 5.6: The achievable secrecy rate vs the transmit power by different schemes
with K=5 for N = 10 and N = 20, respectively.
Furthermore, as similarly seen in Fig. 5.4, in a mild number of eavesdroppers (K=5),
subject to the same Ps, a large number of cooperative relays enable more d.o.f in
designing optimal αi’s and ∡βi’s that alleviates the dependence on AN beams to
combat Eves.
5.7.2 Secrecy Performance by Distributed Implementation
In this section, we validate the purely distributed secure multi-AF relaying
schemes, namely, Distributed-SPS and Distributed-DPS proposed in Section 5.6.
As mentioned in Section 5.6, these heuristic designs with almost “zero” overhead
incurred by information exchanged among relays are provided as benchmarks to
demonstrate what can be done under the extreme “no-cooperation” circumstance,
in comparison with Random PS. Note that any other distributed schemes with
certain level of cooperation among relays are supposed to increase the secrecy
performance up to the proposed centralized algorithms, namely, CJ-DPS and CJ-SPS,
at the expense of extra computational complexity and system overhead. Fig. 5.7
compares the achievable secrecy rate of various schemes versus different number
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Figure 5.7: The achievable secrecy rate vs the number of AF relays by distributed
algorithms with Ps = 10dB.
of relays. Distributed-SPS and Distributed-DPS, are seen to be outperformed by
their centralized counterparts though, they are considerably superior to Random PS.
It is also seen that the performance gap between the centralized and distributed
approaches are enlarged as N increases, which is expected, since larger N yields
more d.o.f for cooperation that is exclusively beneficial for the centralized schemes.
Furthermore, compared with the centralized schemes, the distributed ones are more
vulnerable to the increase in the eavesdroppers’ number.
In Fig. 5.8, we investigate the relationship between the secrecy rate performance
and the number of eavesdroppers by different methods. It can be seen that compared
with the centralized schemes, the secrecy rate achieved by Distributed-SPS and
Distributed-DPS both reduce more drastically with the increase in K due to the
lack of effective cooperation. Also, the advantage of DPS over SPS for the distributed
schemes is compromised since αi’s are not jointly designed with other parameters. At
last, a similar observation has been made as that for Fig. 5.7, that is, larger N yields
more visible performance gap between the centralized and distributed approaches.
In Fig. 5.9, we examine the effect of increasing the transmit power at the source
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Number of eavesdroppers



























Figure 5.8: The achievable secrecy rate vs the number of eavesdroppers by distributed
































Figure 5.9: The achievable secrecy rate vs transmit power by distributed algorithms
with N = 10 and K=5.
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on the secrecy performance of different schemes under the same settings as those in
Fig. 5.6. Among all the presented designs, CJ-DPS still achieves the best secrecy
rate as observed in other examples. In addition, the fact that large N benefits more
from cooperative designs is corroborated again due to the same reason as that for
Fig. 5.7. Furthermore, the secrecy rate of Distributed-SPS or Distributed-DPS is
quickly saturated when Ps > 20dB while that for their centralized counterparts still
rises at a fast speed.
5.8 Secure Multi-AF Relaying: A Large Scale
Realization
In this section, we consider the case when the number of EH-enabled AF relays
goes to a large scale, when any centralized algorithm becomes impractical at the cost
of drastically increasing computation complexity and large sum of overhead in the
phase of information coordination. As an alternative, we employ in the following a
simple linear relay beamforming, i.e., MF relay weights, which are completely locally
decidable. Specifically, the MF coefficients are set to be ∡βi = −∡hrid−∡hsri , i ∈ N .
To facilitate the analysis in the sequel, we first rewrite the channels to explicitly







βrie,kh¯rie,k, ∀i ∈ N , ∀k ∈ K, where βsri, βrid and βrie,k are
determined by (5.48), and h¯sri’s, h¯rid’s and h¯rie,k’s are assumed to be i.i.d. complex
Gaussian RVs with zero mean and unit variance, respectively. Next, given any αi’s,
the secrecy rate analysis is developed for large N in a special case of K = 1 based on
the following lemma.
Lemma 5.8.1. The instantaneous achievable secrecy rate for an MF-based
AF-relaying SWIPT network with a single transmission pair in the presence of one
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2 , i = 1, . . . , N , K = 1, and






x < 0, stands for the exponential integral function specified by parameter x, and
Wλ,µ(·) represents the Whittaker function with parameters λ and µ [111, 9.22].
Proof. See Appendix J.
Based on Lemma 5.8.1, it follows immediately the following proposition.
Proposition 5.8.1. The average achievable secrecy rate for an MF AF-relaying
SWIPT network with a single transmission pair in the presence of one eavesdropper,






































(c.f. (5.49)), K = 1.
Proof. Since the instantaneous secrecy rate is non-negative if and only if Z ≤ CN
DN
,
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Furthermore, as CN = O(N) and DN = O(1), CNDN approximates to O(N), which
tends to be infinite as N goes larger, i.e., CN
DN
N→∞−−−→ ∞. Accordingly, (5.51) can be
further simplified as (5.50) by noting that e
−CN
DN ln(1 + CN)
N→∞−−−→ 0.
Corollary 5.8.1. In the high SNR regime in terms of Ps
σ2na
















































, and K = 1.
Proof. The proof can be directly obtained by removing Ps from nominator and
denominator for each of the fractional terms in (5.50) and applying Ps
σ2na
→∞.
Under the same setup as that for a finite number of relays in Section 5.7, the
asymptotic results derived above are verified by simulations in the following. Note
that since N AF relays are assumed to be randomly distributed with their individual
radius and radian uniformly drawn from [0, R] and [0, 2π), respectively, evaluation of
the average achievable secrecy rate versus N is the mean value of 100 trials in terms
of the path lass specified in (5.48), with each trial of the path loss averaged by 104
sub-trials in terms of the small-scale fading.
Fig. 5.10(a) shows the increasing in the average achievable secrecy rate with N .
It is seen from Fig. 5.10(a) that a few hundreds of relays has already guaranteed
negligible gap between the asymptotic results and the exact ones. To further
investigate the performance of the MF relay beamforming by varying Ps with fixed
N , Fig. 5.10(b) depicts the average achievable rate for the legitimate Rx and the
eavesdropper alone, respectively, and the average achievable secrecy rate for the
legitimate Rx. As seen in Fig. 5.10(a), with the simple MF precoder, the achievable
rate of the Rx’s channel approximately increases with Ps linearly, whereas that of
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Number of EH relays




















































(b) The average achievable secrecy rate vs the transmit power.
Figure 5.10: Comparison of asymptotic analysis and simulation results for K = 1
with Ps = 30dBm and N = 200, respectively.
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the eavesdropper only admits a rough log-increase, which accounts for the growing,
albeit slowly, achievable secrecy rate of the wiretap channel.
5.9 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, secure multiple single-antenna AF relaying assisted by AN
transmission via CJ is studied for a SWIPT-enabled relay network, in the presence of
multiple single-antenna eavesdroppers. Considering a heterogeneous power splitting
(PS) protocol employed at the relay, the achievable secrecy rate for the relay wiretap
channel has been maximized by jointly optimizing the complex relay beamforming
weights and CJ covariance along with the PS ratios for relays operating with SPS
and DPS, respectively. Reformulating the constraints into restricted hyperbolic forms
essentially enabled us to develop convex optimization-based solutions. Furthermore,
we also proposed an information-exchange-free distributed algorithm with very low
complexity that outperforms random decisions. In addition, as a preliminary
exploration for the impact of simple linear relay beamforming on the large number
of relay-based average secrecy rate, the corresponding performance analysis provided
guidelines for practical large-scale distributed relay implementation.
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Conclusions and Future Work
6.1 Conclusions
The notion of physical-layer security (PLS) has advanced a paradigm shift in
design of wireless security schemes to achieve information-theoretic security. The
basic idea of it is to leverage the physical-layer channel induced impairments to enlarge
the decoding capacity between the legitimate channel and the eavesdropper’s channel
so as to send confidential information to the desired receiver reliably and securely. In
this thesis, an in-depth study on PLS enhancements in the flourish of self-sustaining
wireless powered communication network (WPCN) has been given. With an emphasis
on the fundamental challenges and opportunities of PLS gained by WPCN, judicious
transmission and cooperation strategies along with their resource allocations have
been proposed by assorted optimization technologies.
Chapter 3 is concerned with one of the fundamental challenges in simultaneous
wireless information and power transfer (SWIPT) with security concerns, that is, the
ER that is presumed to only scavenge energy from the received signal may attempt
to decode the information for the IR. Under a simplified three-node SISO fading
wiretap channel, with the dual usage of AN, the secrecy outage probability and
ergodic secrecy capacity have been minimized and maximized for delay-limited and
no-delay-limited secrecy transmission, respectively, subject to combined average and
peak power constraints at the Tx, as well as an average EH constraint at the ER.
For each of the two problems, a dual decomposition based optimal method was first
proposed followed by an effective suboptimal algorithm, and then compared with
benchmark schemes where no AN was employed or the AN was used but cannot be
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canceled by the IR.
Motivated by WPCN with separately located ERs and potential eavesdroppers,
the goal of wireless power transfer and achieving secrecy information transmission is
not necessarily antagonistic. In the evolving densely deployed wireless networks with
users’s concerns of limited battery mitigated by WPCN, the advantage of cooperative
strategies for improving PLS has been fundamentally boosted. Novel cooperative
strategies for PLS enhancements were thus developed in Chapter 4 and 5.
A novel harvest-and-jam (HJ) relaying protocol is proposed in Chapter 4 to
improve the secret communications over a multi-antenna AF relay wiretap channel.
The secrecy rate and/or worst-case robust secrecy rate maximization problems have
been formulated to jointly optimize the CJ covariance matrices of HJ helpers and
beamforming matrix of the AF relay. Particularly, on imperfect CSI occasions,
a new approach that equivalently models the error-bounded channel imperfections
from simultaneous K HJ helpers has been proposed, for the first time, to facilitate
LMI-based conic programming. Moreover, suboptimal rank-one reconstruction
algorithm based on the SDR solution was proposed to strike satisfactory trade-off
between complexity and performance under imperfect CSI’s case.
Finally, Chapter 5 is built upon the wireless-powered CJ schemes proposed
in Chapter 4 and further generalized the scope of applications to a WEH-enabled
multi-AF relay network in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers, where the
cooperative d.o.f was fully exploited by advocating simultaneously wireless-powered
CJ and CB based on a novel hybrid PS scheme. The joint optimization of CJ and CB
as well as the PS ratios was then studied with explicit relay beamforming expressions
to maximize the secrecy rate for SPS and DPS-operated relays, respectively. As a
by-product, in the centralized scheme with global CSI, the solution obtained for AF
relay beam and the corresponding PS ratios without employing CJ was proved to
achieve the global optimum by investigating the tightness of SDR.
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6.2 Future Work
Several interesting future directions are highlighted as follows, which are deemed
to be worthy of further investigation based on the results attained in this thesis.
The dual usage of AN for both obfuscating the potential eavesdropping ERs
and satisfying their prescribed amount of WPT calls for more general channel
assumptions. In particular, robust optimization framework that jointly incorporates
transmit beamforming and spatially AN designs is worth investigating against
imperfect CSI from both IRs and ERs. Although some work has begun studying
the robust secrecy rate optimization for SWIPT-enabled MISO downlink system
in the presence of one IR and multiple ERs, their channel uncertainty models are
mostly limited to error-bounded deterministic ones. It is thus necessary to consider
more practical channel uncertainties including random distribution-based CSI error,
especially when the imperfect estimation takes main effect.
The efficiency of the proposed HJ scheme in Chapter 4 closely depends on the
amount of energy harvested in the first transmission phase. Hence, instead of a
two-equal-phase HJ protocol, the optimal proportion of the EH phase to the whole
transmission duration is expected to be jointly optimized with other parameters.
Intuitively, if the relay’s main channel is already much stronger than that of the
eavesdropper, very little time is likely to be allocated for EH, since the secrecy
transmission achieved by the relay beamforming alone is good enough;however, if
the main channel is more degraded than the eavesdropper’s channel, a longer EH
phase is nessary to ensure effective jamming in the following phase.
To further motivate the potential WEH-enabled helpers to assist in secret
communications, practical energy and communications cooperation mechanisms need
to be designed for multi-user secrecy SWIPT by game theoretic approaches. For
example, ERs in the immediate vicinity of the AP could be self-interested and
prefer to storing the harvested energy to providing cooperation with the Tx. In
this situation, the Tx needs to offer some extra incentive, such as spectrum access
in cognitive radio networks, to enable the secondary users’ cooperative secrecy
147
Chapter 6. Conclusion and Future Work
transmission after they harvest energy from the AP.
Since WPCN will be beneficial for green communications beyong 5G, the
advantage of key-enabling technologies in 5G, for example, massive MIMO, ought to
be further studied to accommodate secrecy SWIPT. In particular, multiuser massive
MIMO BC wiretap channel, in which each receiver is regarded as an eavesdropper
for all messages unintended for it, has not yet been addressed. It is expected that
simple linear precoding schemes may be viable in keeping the confidentiality of the
desired message from all the rest of users, since they are asymptotically immune
against multi-user interference in massive MIMO systems. Typically, for a two-user
MIMO BC wiretap channel, the optimality of corresponding linear precoding schemes
can be further evaluated by comparing it with the optimal secret dirty-paper coding
(S-DPC), the secrecy capacity region of which under the matrix power constraint has
been fully characterized in the literature.
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Proof of Proposition 3.5.1
We prove Proposition 3.5.1 for the two cases of p1(α˜) > Ppeak and p1(α˜) ≤ Ppeak,
respectively, shown as follows.
1) Case I: p1(α˜) > Ppeak
In this case, since the minimum power for achieving r0 already exceeds Ppeak,
the outage is inevitable. Hence,
L1(p, α) = 1 + (λ− ζµg)p. (A.1)
To minimize L1(p, α), we have
p∗ =
 Ppeak if λ− ζµg < 00 otherwise. (A.2)
Note that since in this case X ≡ 1, α can take any value over the interval [0, 1]
and thus we set α∗ = 0 for convenience.
2) Case II: p1(α˜) ≤ Ppeak
In this case, the outage can be avoided by jointly optimizing p and α. As a
result, we have
L1(p, α) =
 1 + (λ− ζµg)p if 0 ≤ p < p1(α˜),(λ− ζµg)p if p1(α˜) ≤ p ≤ Ppeak. (A.3)
According to (A.3), the optimal power allocation to minimize L1(p, α) also
depends on whether λ − ζµg < 0 or not. Thus, in the following we further
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discuss two subcases.
– Subcase II-1: λ − ζµg < 0. In this subcase, given any α = α¯ with
p1(α¯) ≤ Ppeak, L1(p, α¯) is a monotonically decreasing function over p.
As a result, over the interval 0 ≤ p ≤ p1(α¯), L1(p, α¯) is minimized by
p = p1(α¯); while over the interval p1(α¯) < p ≤ Ppeak, it is minimized by
p = Ppeak. Note that given any α¯ with p1(α¯) ≤ Ppeak, it follows that 1 +
(λ− ζµg)p1(α¯) > (λ− ζµg)Ppeak. Therefore, the optimal power allocation
for any α¯ is p∗ = Ppeak. Moreover, any α¯ that satisfies p1(α¯) ≤ Ppeak is
optimal.
– Subcase II-2: λ − ζµg ≥ 0. In this subcase, given any α = α¯ with
p1(α¯) ≤ Ppeak, L1(p, α¯) is a monotonically increasing function over p. As a
result, over the interval 0 ≤ p < p1(α¯), L1(p, α¯) is minimized by p = 0 (i.e.,
L∗1(p, α¯) = 1); while over the interval p1(α¯) ≤ p ≤ Ppeak, it is minimized
by p = p1(α¯). Furthermore, p1(α¯) can be minimized by setting α¯ = α˜
(i.e., L∗1(p, α¯) = (λ − ζµg)p1(α˜)). Hence, the optimal power allocation
for minimizing L1(p, α¯) depends on the relationship between 1 and (λ −
ζµg)p1(α˜). If 1 < (λ − ζµg)p1(α˜), since p∗ = 0, any α¯ is optimal and
thus we set α∗ = 0 for simplicity; however, if 1 ≥ (λ − ζµg)p1(α˜), the
optimal power allocation is p∗ = p1(α˜) with the optimal power splitting
ratio α∗ = α˜.
By combing the above two cases of p1(α˜) > Ppeak and p1(α˜) ≤ Ppeak, Proposition
3.5.1 is thus proved.
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Proof of Proposition 3.5.2














. It can be shown from (B.1) that if x < −1, then ∂R(α,p¯)
∂α
< 0 with
0 ≤ α ≤ 1. Thus, R(α, p¯) is a monotonically decreasing function over α in the interval
[0, 1], and the optimal solution to problem (3.26) is α∗ = 0. If −1 ≤ x < 1, it can be














Finally, if x ≥ 1, ∂R(α,p¯)
∂α
≥ 0, and thus R(α, p¯) is non-decreasing over α ∈ [0, 1]. In




Proof of Proposition 4.4.1
The KKT conditions of (P1′.1-RW-SDR) are given by
A∗X∗ = 0, (C.1a)
B∗kQ
∗





= 0, ∀k. (C.1c)


















k ) = 2, which yields rank(Q
∗
k) ≥ Nt − 2 as
a result of (C.1b). Otherwise, when β∗k > 0, we will have rank(B
∗





k )− rank(α∗γ¯eg∗kgTk ) = Nt − 1 [57, Lemma A.1 ], which implies rank(Q∗k) ≤ 1.
However, rank(Q∗k) cannot be 0, since otherwise tr(Q
∗
k)− τ ∗ηPs‖hk‖2 < 0 and thus
β∗k = 0 according to (C.1c), which contradicts to β
∗




Next, define C∗ = −λ∗σ2rY 1 − α∗PsF 2 + α∗γ¯eσ2rY 2 − β∗0Φ and according to
(4.26), we have
A∗ = PsF 1 +C∗. (C.2)
Then define rc, Ξ and ηn, n = 1, . . . , N
2
t − rc (c.f. (4.29)). Similar to the approach
used in [57, Appendix B], we discuss the structure of the optimal X under two cases.
(1) Case I: rc = N
2
t
As C∗ is full-rank, rank(A∗) ≥ rc− 1 = N2t − 1 and hence N2t − 1 ≤ rank(A∗) ≤
N2t . If rank(A
∗) = N2t − 1, rank(null(A∗)) = 1 and it follows that X∗ = bξξH
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by assuming ξ as the only basis of null(A∗). Otherwise, according to (C.1a), we
obtain X∗ = 0, which ceases the secrecy transmission and cannot be the optimal
solution to (P1′.1-RW-SDR).
(2) Case II: rc < N
2
t
If C∗ is not full-rank, rank(A∗) ≥ rc − 1. Then by pre-multiplying ηHn and









n F 1ηn, ∀n. (C.3)
According to (4.25), it is necessary for A∗  0 to obtain an optimal solution
of X∗ and therefore ηHnA
∗ηn ≤ 0, which conforms to PsηHn F 1ηn ≥ 0 if and
only if A∗ηn = 0 and F 1ηn = 0. Hence, Ξ ⊆ null(A∗), i.e., N2t − rank(A∗) ≥
N2t − rc ⇒ rank(A∗) ≤ rc. Next, we show rank(A∗) 6= rc by contradiction. If




n . However, in this case,
since F 1ηn = 0, Pstr(F 1X
∗) = 0, which is apparently not optimal. Hence, we
have rank(A∗) = rc − 1 and thus rank(null(A∗)) = N2t − rc + 1. This indicates
that besides the basis in Ξ, null(A∗) spans over an extra dimension of basis,






Assume that (X∗, {Q∗k}, τ ∗) is the optimal solution to (P1′.1-RW-SDR) with
rank(X∗) > 1. Then construct a new solution {Xˆ∗, Qˆ∗k, τˆ ∗} according to
(4.30)–(4.32). Now, we check if the reconstructed solution is feasible if (4.33) holds.
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In addition, (4.24c)–(4.24e) are easily shown to be satisfied. In the above, (a) and (b)




∗) shows that the reconstructed solution achieves the same optimum value
as that of (P1′.1-RW-SDR). Hence, an optimal solution to (P1′.1-RW-SDR) with
rank-one X is ensured.
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Proof of Proposition 4.4.2
Denoting the dual variable associated with (4.41a), (4.41b) and (4.41c) by λ, α
and β0, respectively, the Lagrangian of (P1
′.1-sub2-SDR) is expressed as
L(χ) = tr
(
(PsF 1 − λσ2rY 1 − αPsF 2 + αγ¯eσ2rY 2 − β0Φ)X
)
+
(−λσ2b + αγ¯e(q + σ2e) + β0Pr) τ + λ, (D.1)
where χ = {X, τ, λ, α, β0} denotes the set consisting of all the primal and dual
variables. Since problem
(P1′.1-sub2-SDR) satisfies the Slater condition, its optimum value admits zero duality
gap with its dual counterpart. Furthermore, according to (D.1), in order for the dual
function to be bounded from above, the following constraints must hold:
Z = PsF 1 − λσ2rY 1 − αPsF 2 + αγ¯eσ2rY 2 − β0Φ  0, (D.2)
− λσ2b + αγ¯e(q + σ2e) + β0Pr ≤ 0. (D.3)




s.t. (D.2), (D.3), (D.4a)
(λ, α, β0)
T ≥ 0. (D.4b)
It is observed that Z is of the same form as the Hessian matrix with respect to
X without rank relaxation. According to [112, Theorem 2.1], Z  0 implies that
155
Appendix D. Proof of Proposition 4.4.2
the SDR problem (P1′.1-sub2-SDR) is tight in this case, i.e., ∃w∗ such that X∗ =
w∗w∗H . Moreover, since KKT condition necessitates Z∗X∗ = 0, it follows that
w∗ is the eigenvector corresponds to the zero-eigenvalue of Z∗. Hence, we have








is due to the power constraint
of (4.24c), which completes the proof.
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Proof of Proposition 4.5.1
First, given h˜k, k = 2, . . . , K, fixed, only consider the uncertainty of h˜1. Since







≥ 0. By applying Lemma 4.5.2 to (4.60)
with H1
(1) = PsX









i−δσ2b−w(0)Ntǫ′0, B1(1) = −δQ1 ˆ˜h†1,
and A1






















  0. (E.1)
Note that for Q1  0, there always exists w(1) > 0 such that w(1)Iǫ′′1 + A1
(1) ≻
0 and we assume that such constraint is applied. According to the property of




































  0. (E.3)
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Next, assume that the robust design for (4.60) has been considered against the
precedent k − 1 uncertainties, i.e.,

H1













  0, k ≥ 2. (E.4)








(k−1) H1(k−1) F 1(k−1)
B1
(k−1)H F 1(k−1)H c
(k−1)
1 −w(k−1)
  0. (E.5)
Then given h˜i, i = k + 1, . . . , K fixed, accommodate the kth uncertainty, i.e.,
h˜k ∈ H˜k, for (E.5). By applying Lemma 4.5.2 to the uncertainty of h˜k, the implication


























































(k) = −δQk ˆ˜h†k and A1(k) = −δQk, k ≥ 2. Thus, using the method of
mathematical induction, (4.60) holds for h˜k ∈ H˜k, k = 1, . . . , K, if and only if there
exists {w(k) ≥ 0}, such that (4.61) is satisfied, which completes the proof.
158
Appendix F
Proof of Proposition 4.5.2
Taking the similar procedure as that for dealing with (4.59), the implication




  0, (F.1)
where H2 = −PsX ′′ + γ¯eσ2rX ′ + v(0)I, F 2 = (−PsX ′′ + γ¯eσ2rX ′)gˆ† and c2 =








e − v(0)Ntǫ0. (4.46a) has been
equivalently reformulated into (F.1). Then, given gk fixed, applying similar procedure














































  0. (F.3)
Next, devising the method of mathematical induction again as that for (E.3),
(F.1) holds for gk ∈ Gk, ∀k, if and only if there exists {v(k) ≥ 0}, such that (4.65) is
satisfied, which completes the proof.
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Proof of Lemma 5.5.1
Since the optimal solution to (P1.1-SDP) is proved to be optimal to (P1.1), the
optimum value for (P1.1-SDP) is τf1(τ) = H1(τ). Hence, we identify the property of








sd − λDsˆd +
K∑
k=1



















((− λh†rdhTrd + K∑
k=1





(− λσ2nd + K∑
k=1






0 ) + ζ
)
ξ + λτ, (G.1)
where χ denotes a tuple consisting of all the primal and dual variables. Specifically,
Y 1, Y 2 and λ are Lagrangian multipliers associated with Xˆ1, Sˆ and the first
constraint of problem (P1.1-SDP), respectively; {θk} are the dual variables associated
with the SINR constraint for the kth eavesdropper, respectively; U = diag([ui]
N
i=1)
with each diagonal entry ui denoting the dual variable associated with the per-relay
power constraint; ζ is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with ξ ≥ 0. In addition,
W 0 = diag([ηα¯iPs|hsri|2]Ni=1). The KKT conditions for (G.1) are partially listed as
160
Appendix G. Proof of Lemma 5.5.1
follows.
Y 1 = −Psh˜†sdh˜
T
sd + λDsˆd −
K∑
k=1






















θk(1/τ − 1)h†re,khTre,k +U (G.2b)
ζ = λσ2nd −
K∑
k=1












s.t. θk ≥ 0, ∀k, ui ≥ 0, ∀i,
λ ≥ 0, ζ ≥ 0, Y 1  0, Y 2  0,
where Y 1, Y 2, and ζ are given by (G.2a),(G.2b), and (G.2c), respectively. Since it is
easily verified that (P1.1-SDP) satisfies the Slater condition, the strong duality holds
[84]. This implies that the dual optimum value given by (P1.1-SDP-dual) is exactly
H1(τ), which turns out to be a point-wise minimum of a family of affine functions
and thus concave over τ ∈ [τmin,1, 1] [84, pp. 80].
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Proof of Proposition 5.5.1
The KKT conditions for (G.1) also yields the following complementary slackness.
Y 1Xˆ
∗







0 with the left hand side (LHS) and right hand side (RHS)











Y 1 =− Psh˜†sdh˜
T
sd + λDsˆd −
K∑
k=1






































Next, introducing the notation of [·]offd to represent a square matrix with its diagonal






























0 ]offd = 0. (H.3)
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By subtracting (H.3) from (H.2), Y 1 can be rewritten as follows.
Y 1 = −Psh˜†sdh˜
T
sd + λDsˆd −
K∑
k=1





































































we denote (H.5) by Red,k, ∀k. Y ∗1 can thus be finally recast as



























0 ]d −Dsˆd)(λI −
K∑
k=1
θk(1/τ − 1)Red,k). (H.7)






se,k is a positive definite
matrix. Note that since Ξ is a diagonal matrix, its definiteness is only determined by
the signs of its diagonal entries, for which we commence with the discussion in three
difference cases.

















it follows from (H.7) that [Ξ]i,i > 0 in this case.







0 ]d]i,i − [W 0]i,i|hrid|2(λ∗ −
∑K
k=1 θk(1/τ − 1)[Red,k]i,i) ≥ 0















3) Case III: ∃i such that λ−∑Kk=1 θk(1/τ − 1)[Red,k]i,i = 0






0 ]i,i ≥ 0. It is noteworthy that the
number of i such that λ−∑Kk=1 θk(1/τ−1)[Red,k]i,i = 0 cannot exceed one. This can be
proved by contradiction. (If ∃i1, i2, i1 6= i2, such that λ−
∑K
k=1 θk(1/τ−1)[Red,k]i1,i1 =
0 and λ − ∑Kk=1 θk(1/τ − 1)[Red,k]i2,i2 = 0, it implies that ∑Kk=1 θk[Red,k]i1,i1 =∑K
k=1 θk[Red,k]i2,i2, which contradicts to the fact that for any two independent
continuously distributed RVs, the chance that they are equal is zero.)





se,k ≻ 0. Next, we show that it still holds true in the case that
∃i′, such that [Ξ]i′,i′ = 0, i′ ∈ N , by definition of positive definite matrix. Define
the null-space of Ξ by ψ = {η|η = αei′, α ∈ C} and multiply ηH and η,
∀η 6= 0, on LHS and RHS of Ξ +∑Kk=1 θkPsh˜†se,kh˜Tse,k, respectively. If η /∈ ψ, it
















2|[h˜se,k]i′ |2 > 0, since [h˜se,k]i′ 6= 0
in probability. As a result, Y 1 in (H.6) is shown to always take on a special structure,
that is, a full-rank matrix minus a rank-one matrix. Note that this observation plays
a key role in proving rank-one Xˆ
∗
1, which is also identified in [51, Appendix C].
Finally, multiplying both sides of (H.6) by Xˆ
∗
1, as per (H.1a), we obtain
that Xˆ
∗




















sd) = 1. In addition, since the optimality of (P1.1-SDP)
suggests that Xˆ
∗
1 6= 0, rank(Xˆ
∗
1) = 1 is thus proved.
As Xˆ
∗




1 by EVD, (H.1a) results in Y 1wˆ
∗
1 = 0,
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Consequently, we have wˆ∗1 = βwˆ1, where β ∈ R+. On the other hand, by


























At last, we show part 3) of Proposition 5.5.1. For the case of K ≥ N , it is
obvious that rank(Sˆ)∗ ≤ N . For the case of K < N , we first prove that λh†rdhTrd+U
is a full-rank matrix, i.e., λh†rdh
T
rd +U ≻ 0, by definition. According to (G.2b), Y 2
can be rewritten as follows.




rd +U − (
K∑
k=1
θk(1/τ − 1)h†re,khTre,k + h†rdhTrd) (H.10)




where Ω = {k ∈ K|θk > 0}.
Next, multiply ηH and η, η 6= 0, with LHS and RHS of Y 2 (c.f. (H.10)),
respectively and discuss the following cases based on η’s relation with null(Y 2)
and/or Φ.









θk(1/τ − 1)h†re,khTre,k + h†rdhTrd)η
(b)
> 0, (H.11)
where (a) is attained by ηHY 2η = 0 (c.f. (H.10)) and (b) is due to the fact that
either ∃k such that |ηHh†re,k|2 > 0 or |ηHh†rd|2 > 0, otherwise η ∈ Φ.
2) Case II: η /∈ null(Y 2)
Together with Y 2  0, ηHY 2η > 0 holds and substituting (H.10) for Y 2, it follows
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θk(1/τ − 1)h†re,khTre,k + h†rdhTrd)η ≥ 0. (H.12)
3) Case III: η ∈ null(Y 2) ∩ Φ 6= ∅
As a result of (H.1b), the singular vectors of Sˆ
∗
is composed of any orthogonal set





H , β > 0,
where {ηi}, i = 1, . . . , r, η are orthogonal each other, and r = rank(Sˆ
∗
). As such,
we reconstruct Sˆ that is given by Sˆ
′
= Sˆ
∗ − βηηH . Since η ∈ Φ, i.e., hTre,kη = 0,
k ∈ Ω, and hTrdη = 0, it is easy to verify that Sˆ
′
satisfies all the constraints of problem
(P1.1-SDP). Furthermore, the per-relay power constraints w.r.t. Xˆ1 turn out to be
tr((Sˆ
∗
+ ηα¯iPs|hsri|2Xˆ1)Ei) ≤ ξηα¯iPs|hsri|2 + βtr(ηηHEi), ∀i, (H.13)
which enlarge the feasible region in terms of Xˆ1 compared with that given the original
Sˆ
∗
. It thus implies that given Sˆ
′
, problem (P1.1-SDP) yields a larger optimum value
in general, which violate the optimality of Sˆ
′
. This contradiction is caused by the
assumption of Case III, which shows that η ∈ null(Y 2) ∩ Φ = ∅.
In a summary, since there exist only Case I and Case II, we have shown
that ∀η 6= 0, ηH((1 + λ)h†rdhTrd + U)η > 0 holds, and therefore λh†rdhTrd + U is
also a full-rank matrix. Finally, according to (G.2b), rank(Y 2) ≥ N − K since
rank(
∑K
k=1 θk(1/τ − 1)h†re,khTre,k) ≤ K. Combining with (H.1b), rank(Sˆ
∗




Proof of Proposition 5.5.2
First, we exploit the following lemma to rewrite (P2′.1-SDR).





s.t. (5.42), ∀k, (I.1), (I.2), ∀i,
tr(U 1Ei) ≤ xi, tr(U 2Ei) ≥ yi, ∀i,
tr((U 1 −U 2)Ei) ≤ 0, ∀i,
U 1  0, U 2  0,


















































Proof. For the convenience of the proof, the optimum value for (P2′.1-SDR)
167
Appendix I. Proof of Proposition 5.5.2
and (P2′.1-SDR-Eqv) are denoted by f ∗0 and f˜
∗
0 , respectively. Assuming that
(U ∗1,U
∗
2, {x∗i }, {y∗i }) is the optimal solution to (P2′.1-SDR), it is easily verified
to be feasible for (P2′.1-SDR-Eqv) as well, which implies that f ∗0 ≤ f˜ ∗0 . On
















































































in which (a) is due to (I.1), and (b) comes from tr(U˜
∗
1Ei) ≤ x˜∗i and tr(U˜
∗





2, {x′∗i }, {y′∗i }) can also be proved to satisfy (5.39). In addition,




2Ei) ≤ 0, ∀i, i.e., (5.40) holds true. These feasibility
implies that f˜ ∗0 ≤ f ∗0 . By combining the above two facts, we have f˜ ∗0 = f ∗0 , which
completes the proof.
Then, we apply the Charnes-Cooper transformation again to (P2′.1-SDR-Eqv),
the result of which is denoted by (P2′.1-SDP-Eqv). It is noteworthy that the
Charnes-Cooper transformed constraint of (I.1) admits the form given by ‖x(i)‖ ≤
h(xˆi, yˆi), ∀i, where x(i) is the column vector inside ‖·‖ of the LHS of (I.1) and h(xˆi, yˆi)
indicates the RHS. Since it is easy to check that ξ > 0 as a result of feasibility, we
have ‖x(i)‖ > 0⇒ h(xˆi, yˆi) > 0, which implies thath(xˆi, yˆi) x(i)H
x(i) h(xˆi, yˆi)I
  0 (I.4)
according to Schur Complement. (I.4) thus holds true, ∀x(i) such that ‖x(i)‖ ≤
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h(xˆi, yˆi). Consequently, it enables us to show that (I.1) can be recast into a constraint
not related to Uˆ 1, Uˆ 2, following the same procedure as [41, Appendix III] by
exploiting [113, Lemma 2]. Similarly, the Charnes-Cooper transformed constraint
of (I.2) can also be rewritten without Uˆ 1, Uˆ 2. Hence, the partial Lagrangian for







sd − λσ2nadiag(c0 ◦ ‖hrd‖.2) +
K∑
k=1






















where ϕ denotes a tuple comprising all the associated primal and dual variables:
Y 1, Y 2, and {θk} are Lagrangian multipliers associated with Uˆ 1, Uˆ 2, and (5.42),
∀k, respectively; λ is the dual variable associated with the only equality constraint;
∆ = diag([δi]
N
i=1) and Π = diag([πi]
N
i=1) denote those associated with tr(U 1Ei) ≤ xi
and tr(U 2Ei) ≥ yi, ∀i, respectively; finally, the diagonal entry of Σ = diag([σi]Ni=1)
denotes the dual variable associated with tr((U 1 − U 2)Ei) ≤ 0, ∀i. The KKT
conditions related to (I.5) are accordingly given by








Y 2 =D −Π−Σ, (I.6b)
Y 1Uˆ
∗
1 = 0, (I.6c)
Y 2Uˆ
∗
2 = 0, (I.6d)




D + Σ + ∆, and D = λσ2ncdiag(c0 ◦ ‖hrd‖.2) −∑K
k=1 θk(1/τ − 1)σ2ncdiag(c0 ◦ ‖hre,k‖.2) for the notation simplicity.






se,k in (I.6a) is a positive definite matrix
in the following two cases.
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1) Case I: θk = 0, ∀k ∈ K
In this case, since λ > 0 (c.f. (I.5)) due to the strong duality, it is easily verified that
D ≻ 0 and therefore Ξ′ ≻ 0.
2) Case II: ∃k such that θk 6= 0
Since Ξ′ is a positive semidefinite diagonal matrix, it is shown to have maximum
one zero diagonal entry according to the similar argument made in Case III of







can thus be proved by definition without difficulty. As Y 1 (c.f. (I.6a)) again complies
with the difference between a positive definite matrix and a rank one matrix, it turns
out that rank(Uˆ 1) ≤ 1 according to (I.6c). Then, following the same procedure









−1s†sd, the detailed of which is omitted here for brevity.
Finally, it is verified that (P2′.1-SDP) is related to Uˆ
∗
2 merely with its diagonal
entries, viz, [Uˆ
∗


















′.1-SDP), which completes the proof for 3).
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Proof of Lemma 5.8.1
To facilitate the asymptotic analysis in the sequel, we first reexpress SINRS,D








































Next, we examine each terms in (J.1) and (J.2).
To proceed with term I, by substituting βi with (5.3), where ∡βi = −∡h¯rid −
∡h¯sri, we calculate the variance of each indexed part of the summation, i.e., Xn,
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To obtain Var[Xn] = E[X
2









= βrndβsrnηαn ≤ βrndβsrnη, (J.4)
where the cause of (a) is that |h¯rnd|2’s follows exponential distribution with unit
mean. Denoting Var(Xn) by σ
2




















βrndβsrn. As a result, the condition for




















(1− αi)PsβsriYi + (1− αi)σ2na + σ2nc
]
, (J.5)
where Yi is the RV representing |h¯sri|2 that is drawn from exponential distribution
with unit mean and takes on a value yi. Since |h¯rid|’s are i.i.d. Rayleigh RVs




mean, the remaining task is to derive the expectation
of Yi√
(1−αi)PsβsriYi+(1−αi)σ2na+σ2nc



































, yi + vi is denoted by y˜i, and the last equation is in
accordance with [111, 3.383(4)], where Wλ,µ(·) denotes the Whittaker function
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βrid|h¯rid|2ηαi YiYi+vi . (J.7)
As that for I, we verify the condition for Kolmogorov’s SLLN on (J.7) and therefore,













Moreover, as E[ Yi
Yi+vi















































1−αi (1 + vie
viEi(−vi)), since E[ YiYi+vi ] = 1 +
vie
viEi(−vi).
























‖Dβre,kD†βαhsr‖2, IV can be
recast as a Chi-square distributed RV with 2 d.o.f [107, Lemma 1], denoted by Z,
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i=1), ∀k ∈ K. Hence,





















βrie,kβsriηαi(1− vi − v2i eviEi(−vi)), (J.11)
where (a) is as a result of SLLN and (b) is due to [111, 3.382(4)], the same as that for





i=1 βrie,kβsriηαi(1− vi −
v2i e
viEi(−vi)). Similar to II and III, since |h¯rie,k|2’s, ∀k ∈ K, are also RVs independent










1−αi (1 + vie
viEi(−vi)), respectively. Consequently,










1−αi )(1 + vie
viEi(−vi)) + σ2ne,k
. (J.12)
Further, replacing the corresponding asymptotic expressions for rS,D (c.f. (J.10))
and rS,E,k (c.f. (J.12)) for K = 1 in line with (5.13), Lemma 5.8.1 is proved.
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